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Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed 
by 
Kenneth W. Simons* 
Draft: March 1, 2011 
 
Abstract: 
The law frequently distinguishes between individualized knowledge (awareness that one’s act will 
harm a particular victim, e.g., driving through an intersection while aware that one’s automobile is 
likely to injure a pedestrian) and statistical knowledge (awareness that one’s activity or multiple acts 
will, to a high statistical likelihood, harm one or more potential victims, e.g., proceeding with a large 
construction project that one confidently predicts will result in worker injuries).  Under tort and 
criminal law doctrine, acting with individualized knowledge is ordinarily much more difficult to justify, 
and, if unjustified, much more culpable, than acting with statistical knowledge.  Yet the distinction is 
very difficult to explain and defend. 
In this article, the first systematic analysis of this pervasive but underappreciated problem, I offer a 
qualified defense of the distinction.  Acting with statistical knowledge is ordinarily less culpable than 
acting with individualized knowledge, and often is not culpable at all.  Expanding the spatial or 
temporal scope of an activity or repeating a series of acts sometimes causes the actor to acquire 
statistical knowledge, but such an increase in scale ordinarily does not increase the level of culpability 
properly attributable to the actor.  Two invariant culpability principles, “Invariant culpability when acts 
are aggregated” and “Invariant culpability when risk-exposures are aggregated,” formalize this idea. 
Why is acting with individualized knowledge especially culpable?  Part of the answer is the special 
stringency principle (SSP), a deontological principle that treats an actor as highly culpable, and treats 
his acts as especially difficult to justify, when he knowingly imposes a highly concentrated risk of 
serious harm on a victim.  Under SSP, speeding to the hospital to save five passengers, knowing that 
this will likely require killing a pedestrian in one’s path, is much harder to justify than speeding to the 
hospital to save one passenger, knowing that this creates a 20% chance of killing a pedestrian in one’s 
path. 
The analysis has a number of significant implications but is also subject to important qualifications: 
 Notwithstanding the invariant culpability principles, if a faulty or unjustified actor repeats his acts 
or expands his activity, that repetition sometimes reveals a new type of culpability: the defiance of 
moral and legal norms.  Accordingly, a retributivist can indeed support a punishment premium for 
recidivists. 
 In rare cases, when the actor possesses merely statistical knowledge but his conduct is extremely 
unjustifiable, the actor’s culpability is comparable to that of an actor with individualized 
knowledge. 
 The higher culpability of acting with individualized knowledge is not explained by a supposed 
higher duty owed to “identifiable victims,” except insofar as that duty is a crude version of SSP. 
 When an actor conducts a cost-benefit analysis of a planned activity and thereby acquires 
statistical knowledge that the activity will cause serious harm, his decision to proceed with the 
activity despite that knowledge is not, by itself, evidence of his culpability. 
 A legal system can be legitimate even though legal actors within the system know that it will, as a 
statistical matter, punish the innocent. 
 
                                                 
* Professor of Law & The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Boston 
University School of Law.   Kenneth W. Simons 2010; all rights reserved.  For helpful comments, I 
thank Matt Adler, Larry Alexander, Eric Blumenson, Bob Bone, Mike Cahill, Alon Harel, Kim Ferzan, 
Leo Katz, Adam Kolber, Gerry Leonard, Mike Meurer, Nancy Moore; participants at Boston 
University School of Law, Brooklyn Law School and [University of Texas School of Law, March 
2011=] faculty workshops; and participants at the Harvard Law School Private Law Workshop.  I am 
also grateful to Joseph Cooper, Andrew Keutmann, Greg Racki and Renee Williams for excellent 
research assistance and editorial advice. 
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The law typically treats an actor who knows that he will likely cause serious 
harm, and who does cause that harm, as a very culpable wrongdoer, meriting a 
severe sanction.  Consider a simple illustration: 
 
Clara (a speeding driver who acts with individualized knowledge) 
Clara is running late for a plane to a critically important business 
meeting.  Speeding along a narrow and deserted mountain road, she 
suddenly sees a drunk young man, barely moving, lying on the road in the 
path of the car.  Rather than stop for him, she slows down but continues, 
striking the man as her car passes over him.  She realizes that she is very 
likely to injure him, which she does.1 
 
Clara is likely to be liable in tort for a knowing battery, with ensuing punitive as 
well as compensatory damages, and for criminal assault and battery as well.  And if 
she realizes that she is likely to kill the victim, and does kill him, she will very likely 
be guilty of murder. 
But the Anglo-American legal system does not treat actors so severely in 
cases where the knowledge is (what I will call) “statistical” rather than, as in Clara’s 
case, “individualized.”2  Such comparative leniency is ordinarily the correct 
approach, as we will see.  Yet it is remarkably difficult to explain and justify. 
Consider two examples of actors who possess statistical knowledge that they 
will cause harm: 
 
Agatha (a careful builder who acts with statistical knowledge) 
Agatha is building an enormous tunnel.3  Based on past experience 
with projects of this size and scope, she can confidently predict that even 
with the highest level of care currently attainable, a dozen of the thousands 
of workers who will be employed over the ten year period of the project will 
                                                 
1 The illustration is loosely based on a famous hypothetical from Sandy Kadish’s criminal law 
casebook.  See S. Kadish, S. Schulhofer, & C. Steiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes 842 
(8th ed. 2007). 
2 Other discussions of the problem also use the term “statistical” knowledge.  See Sanford 
Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 871, 
891-894 (1976); = Armour, Henderson.  Thomas Schelling appears to have originated the 
terms “statistical life” and “statistical death,” to be contrasted with losses of identified, 
individual lives.  Thomas Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in Thomas 
Schelling, Choice and Consequence 115 (1984).  See Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and 
Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 Md. L. Rev. 159, 160 n. 4 (2006). 
3 For simplicity, assume that she is the owner of the construction company and makes all 
relevant decisions about taking precautions.  This obviates the difficult question of assessing 
the mental state of an organization or corporate body.  (Worker’s compensation laws will 
affect the ability of the workers to obtain tort recovery from Agatha; for purposes of this 
discussion, assume that they are a category of workers not barred from tort recovery by such 
laws.) 
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suffer serious injuries, and, as a statistical matter, there is a 90% chance of at 
least one death.  Agatha does employ a high level of care.  A dozen workers 
do suffer a serious injury, as predicted.  One dies. 
 
Knowingly injuring a person counts as battery under both criminal law and 
tort law.  Is Agatha guilty of a dozen counts of criminal law battery?  Is she liable to 
the dozen victims for tortious battery?  For punitive damages?  Knowingly causing a 
death usually counts as murder.  Is she guilty of murder of the worker who died?  
Under current law, the answer to all of these questions is no. 
Now consider this variation: 
 
Bertha (a less careful builder who acts with statistical knowledge) 
Bertha is building an enormous tunnel, of the same size and scope 
as Agatha’s.  But Bertha takes less extensive precautions than are 
customary, based on advice that these lesser precautions are almost as 
effective as the usual ones, and are less costly and time-consuming, 
permitting the tunnel to be completed much earlier, with resulting social 
benefits.  The projected injury rate is approximately 30% higher than would 
be expected for Agatha’s project. 
 
Bertha might be found negligent, or perhaps reckless, in deciding to use 
lesser precautions.  But it is quite unlikely that she will be found guilty of a knowing 
or intentional battery if the lesser precautions cause some additional workers to 
suffer injuries.  And it is quite unlikely that she will be found guilty of murder if her 
lesser care resulted in the death of one more worker than she would statistically 
expect if she had used due care. 
Are these disparate legal results correct?  If so, how can they be explained?  
Or conversely, if in the second scenario Bertha should be deemed a “knowing” 
injurer or killer, why shouldn’t Agatha be so deemed in the first scenario (even 
though, by hypothesis, she used all reasonably feasible care)?  Moreover, recall 
Clara, the speeding businesswoman who will be considered a knowing wrongdoer, 
under both tort and criminal law doctrine.  Is the disparate legal treatment of Bertha 
and Clara justifiable?  If so, why? 
Finally, consider an example from prominent criminal law theorist Sanford 
Kadish4 that vividly highlights the contrast: 
 
                                                 
4 Kadish, supra note 2=, at 892.  I have slightly modified his example.  In the original, five to 
fifteen lives were almost certain to be lost despite the exercise of due care, and the cost of not 
lowering the fitting in place was an indefinite but not necessarily permanent abandonment of 
the tunnel. 
 Louis Kaplan and Steven Shavell offer a very similar example in their famous 
article.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 
1276 n. 757 (2001) (last para. of footnote).  However, Kaplow and Shavell infer from the 
example, not that there is a distinction between individualized and statistical knowledge, but 
that on a consequentialist view, we should draw no distinction; apparently they would not 
object to the decision of Eleanor to sacrifice the worker. 
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Eleanor (a builder who acts with individualized knowledge) 
Eleanor is building an enormous underwater tunnel.  Based on past 
experience with projects of this size and scope, she can confidently predict 
that even with the highest level of care currently attainable, three to five 
lives are almost certain to be lost by the end of the project.  Early in the 
construction process, she discovers that a worker is trapped in a section of 
the partially laid tunnel.  Unfortunately, a fitting must be lowered into place 
within an hour, or else the whole tunnel will have to be permanently 
abandoned due to changing river conditions; and one hour is insufficient 
time to rescue the worker.  She knows that laying down the fitting will 
surely crush the worker to death.  She proceeds to lower the fitting, and the 
worker dies. 
 
Kadish observes: “I expect that it would nonetheless be a form of criminal 
homicide to lower the fitting.  Even if it were justified under a lesser-evils formula, 
which is doubtful, the decision would be a soul-searching one.  Yet attaining the 
very same social good—the construction of the tunnel—readily justified its 
construction despite the predicted loss of multiple lives.”5  Our cast of characters 
reinforce Kadish’s observation: the law will treat Eleanor very differently from 
Agatha or Bertha.  Again, the question is: why? 
In this article, I defend a qualified legal (and moral) distinction between 
individualized knowledge (exemplified by Clara and Eleanor) and statistical 
knowledge (exemplified by Agatha and Bertha).  But clarifying, justifying, and 
sensibly qualifying the distinction are no easy matter, as we will see. 
On the one hand, there are strong prima facie reasons to reject the idea that 
one who acts with statistical knowledge that he will cause harm should be 
considered extremely culpable (and just as culpable as one who acts with 
individualized knowledge).  Consider the following reasons: 
 “Scale should not matter”:  If I drive carefully on a single occasion, imposing 
low risks on others, I do not deserve legal sanction if I happen to cause harm.  
Why, then, should I suddenly become liable merely because I choose to drive in 
the same manner every day?  If I hire one worker, after carefully checking his 
documentation, I do not deserve legal sanction if it turns out that he is an 
undocumented immigrant.  Why, then, should I suddenly become liable for 
knowingly hiring an undocumented immigrant6 if I employ 100,000 workers and 
I know that my careful screening will nevertheless result in my hiring at least 
one undocumented worker? 
 Below, I formalize the argument that multiplying (a) similar acts or (b) 
similar occurrences of risk-exposure, either over time or space, does not by itself 
change the culpability of the underlying act.  The principle corresponding to (a) 
is “ICAA,” shorthand for “Invariant Culpability when Acts are Aggregated”; 
corresponding to (b) is “ICREA,” or “Invariant Culpability when Risk-
Exposures are Aggregated.”7 
 “Careful risk/benefit analysis should not inculpate”:  Many believe that 
sound and justifiable regulatory and tort law policy requires companies to 
                                                 
5 Id. at 892. 
6 “It is unlawful for a person or other entity … to hire … for employment in the United States 
an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.”  8 U.S.C. §1324a (a)(1)(A). 
7 See TAN = infra. 
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conduct careful risk-benefit cost-benefit analyses of whether to adopt 
precautions that would reduce the health and safety risks of their products or 
activities.  It would be inconsistent with this desideratum then to impose 
sanctions on companies merely because they conducted such analyses and 
carefully examined the probable consequences of their actions.  But if statistical 
knowledge should be treated as harshly as individualized knowledge, it follows 
that a company that chooses to engage in far-flung activities or chooses to 
manufacture or distribute a large number of products should be treated as highly 
culpable simply because (1) it conducted a careful cost-benefit analysis and (2) 
the scale of its activities is vast.  That is a most unwelcome conclusion.  And it 
is a conclusion explicitly rejected by provisions of the recently adopted 
Restatement Third of Torts.8 
 “The modern hierarchy of mental states requires a distinction between 
statistical and individualized knowledge”:  On the conventional modern view 
of the hierarchy of mental states, knowingly causing harm is roughly 
comparable in culpability to purposely causing harm; recklessly causing harm is 
less culpable; and negligently causing harm is even less culpable.  But if 
statistical knowledge is really just as culpable as individual knowledge, this 
framework crumbles, because many cases of statistical knowledge seem 
indistinguishable from cases of recklessness, of negligence, or even of faultless 
conduct. 
 “Knowingly harming another is distinctively wrongful only when the 
actor’s knowledge is individualized”:  Consider two distinct versions of this 
crucial argument: 
(1) “We owe a higher duty to identifiable victims”:  When the actor has 
statistical knowledge, the victim is typically unidentified, while if he has 
individualized knowledge, the victim is identifiable.  And we arguably have a 
more stringent moral and legal obligation to save an identifiable victim than to 
take advanced precautions against harm to unidentified possible future victims.  
Governments, and coal companies, spend much more (per life saved) to save 
trapped coal miners than they spend to prevent coal mining accidents in the first 
instance.  This distinction reflects political reality but arguably is also justifiable, 
in light of our more stringent duty to save those we see in immediate peril than 
to prevent future harm to the large and indeterminate group of victims that we 
calculate will be at risk if we take inadequate safety precautions. 
                                                 
8 Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability for Physical or Emotional Harm, §1, 
comment e, page 9: 
[I]n many situations a defendant's knowledge of substantially certain harms is 
entirely consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example, an owner 
of land, arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can confidently 
predict that some number of workers will be seriously injured in the course of the 
construction project; the company that runs a railroad can be sure that railroad 
operations will over time result in a significant number of serious personal injuries; 
the manufacturer of knives can easily predict that a certain number of persons using 
its knives will inadvertently cut themselves. Despite their knowledge, these actors 
do not intentionally cause the injuries that result. Moreover, despite their 
knowledge, none of the companies—absent further facts—can even be found guilty 
of negligence; nor does the knowledge possessed by the knife manufacturer subject 
it to liability under products-liability doctrines. 
 
For further discussion, see TAN = infra. 
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(2) “We owe a special duty not to impose highly concentrated risks of harm 
on a single person”:  On this view, it is wrongful to concentrate the costs of an 
activity on one person merely to provide small benefits to many other persons.  
Nonconsequentialists object that utilitarians are too willing to justify acts whose 
aggregate benefits outweigh their costs, even when the costs are concentrated on 
a few persons or even a single person, while the benefits are widely diffused.  
Consider Greg Keating’s version of philosopher T.M. Scanlon’s famous World 
Cup example: 
Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has toppled and crushed a 
television technician helping to broadcast [the World Cup live] to a billion 
viewers worldwide, and that the only way to save the technician’s life is to 
interrupt the broadcast for thirty minutes, effectively thwarting the 
transmission of the show . . . .9 
The objection is powerful and persuasive: clearly it would be wrong to 
knowingly permit the technician’s death simply in order to provide a small 
benefit to each viewer; and this is so even if the number of viewers is vast.  But 
then the question arises: how can we permit other risky activities, such as high-
speed (but careful) driving, when they are justified only by the small and diffuse 
benefits they provide to those engaged in the activity?  A partial answer is that 
when an actor drives carefully, even at high speed, on a single occasion, he does 
not have individualized knowledge that someone on the road will suffer death or 
bodily injury. 
 
And yet, on the other hand, there are also strong reasons to question the 
view that those who act with merely statistical awareness that they will cause harm 
are less culpable than those who act with individualized knowledge.  Consider these 
arguments: 
 “Statistical victims are still victims”:  The distinction between statistical 
knowledge and individualized knowledge appears to rest on a fallacious claim 
that if a victim is not identifiable in advance, if he is a mere statistic, then his 
death somehow counts for less.  But as Professor Lisa Heinzerling has argued, 
“[s]imply calling what we are valuing ‘risk’ … rather than ‘life,’ does not 
change the fact that real lives, not statistical lives, hang in the balance.  There 
are no statistical people.  There are only real people.”10  And it is arguable 
immoral, and even irrational, to care more about “identifiable” victims than 
about other victims.  More bluntly: to permit the predictable killing of 
“statistical” victims is to permit “statistical murder.”11 
 “Juries often reject the distinction”:  Juries often view in a very harsh light a 
company’s deliberate decision not to adopt a safety precaution when the 
                                                 
9 Gregory Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 Vand. L. 
Rev. 653, 666 (2003).  I have changed Keating’s original example from a broadcast of a 
popular television show to a broadcast of the World Cup. 
10 Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 521, 531 
(2006).  See also Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 
189, = (2000); Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 6 (1983) (“I have 
never run into a ‘statistical’ life anywhere, in my car or anyplace else.”). 
11 See James Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. identified lives in benefit-cost 
analysis, 35 J Risk Uncertainty 45, 45 (2007), citing Joanne  Linnerooth, Murdering Statistical 
Lives…?, in Michael Jones-Lee (ed.) The Value of Life and Safety (1982), p. 231. See also 
Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values at Risk (Douglas MacLean, ed. 1986), pp. 94-112, 
at 97 (wondering why this is not “murder for hire”). 
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company knows the likely harmful consequences of taking less care.  This 
condemnation suggests that juries at least sometimes consider statistical 
knowledge morally equivalent to individualized knowledge.  The lawsuits 
involving the decision of Ford not to strengthen the Pinto’s fuel tank, and of 
General Motors to place the 1979 Malibu’s fuel tank close to the rear bumper, 
arguably fit this pattern.  In each case, the jury was presented with evidence of 
the company’s statistical knowledge that their design would cause more injuries 
and deaths than an alternative design, and in each case, the jury imposed 
considerable punitive damages, beyond ordinary compensatory damages.12 
 “Ordinary people often find cost-benefit analysis abhorrent”:  Experimental 
research has explored the behavior of mock juries confronted with the decision 
whether to sanction a company in the following three scenarios:  
(a) The company conducted an unreasonable cost-benefit analysis of whether to 
adopt a precaution; 
(b) The company conducted a reasonable cost-benefit analysis; 
or 
(c) The company acted unreasonably but failed to conduct any cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Jurors are more likely to sanction with punitive damages companies in category 
(b) than those in category (c), even though companies in (b) are not negligent 
while companies in (c) are negligent.13  These studies arguably support a 
conclusion that causing harm while possessing statistical knowledge of the 
harmful effects of one’s decision not to adopt a precaution (even when the 
decision itself is reasonable) is viewed as quite culpable—and more culpable 
than negligent ignorance of those effects.  Perhaps such jurors believe that 
acting with statistical knowledge (acquired through the deliberate use of 
cost/benefit analysis) is about as culpable as acting while possessing 
individualized knowledge. 
 “Acting with merely statistical knowledge is sometimes still highly 
culpable”:  Some actors who arguably fit the “statistical” knowledge category 
rather than the “individualized” knowledge category are nevertheless highly 
culpable.  Consider: 
 
                                                 
12 In the 1978 Ford Pinto case, the initial punitive damage award was $125 million (an 
extraordinarily large sum at that time), later reduced to $3.5 million.  In the 1999 GM 
Malibu case, the initial punitive damage award was $4.9 billion, later reduced to $1.1 billion; 
the case was subsequently settled for an undisclosed amount.  Peter Hong, Judge Cuts Award 
Against GM to $1.2 Billion, L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1999, at B1.  See W. Kip Viscusi, 
Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 547, 569 (2000); Peter Y. 
Hong, Judge Cuts Award Against GM to $1.2 Billion, L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1999; Staff 
Writers, GM to Settle Case Over Gas Tank Explosion, L.A. Times, July 25, 2003. Accessed 
at: http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/25/local/me-briefs25.1.  See generally Gary 
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto, 42 Rutg. L.Rev. 1013 (1991). 
13 See Viscusi, id. at 588.    Although Viscusi’s study is illuminating, one possibly legitimate 
reason for the participants’ reactions is their arguably justifiable distaste for actors who 
engage in an especially narrow form of cost-benefit analysis.  Another, less legitimate reason 
is hindsight bias: when an observer knows that the actor’s risky conduct caused a serious 
harm, the observer is likely to overstate the risk that the actor should have recognized ex 
ante.  See Robert Macoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: 
Comment on Viscusi, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1821 (2000). 
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Time bomb 
 A terrorist plants a bomb in a central train station.  He knows that  
the bomb is constructed in such a way that it will explode at an 
indeterminate time in the near future, indiscriminately wounding or killing 
many individuals who happen to pass by. 
 
Should we not conclude that the terrorist knowingly kills?  Is he not as culpable 
as the other characters we have already encountered who possessed individual 
knowledge, Clara and Eleanor?  And yet it is indeterminate in advance who will 
be killed, and when they will die.   
This last example suggests that perhaps other actors who possess statistical 
knowledge, who know that their activities will result in death at an 
indeterminate time, to indeterminate victims, and at indeterminate locations, 
should similarly be treated very harshly.  If a manufacturer knows that a small 
number of his products contain defects that will cause harm, should he not be 
treated like the terrorist?  Isn’t his product a “ticking time bomb”?  And 
similarly for the tunnel builders Agatha and Bertha; isn’t the decision to embark 
on a huge construction project similar to triggering a bomb or distributing a 
poison that will have destructive effects at some point, to someone? 
___________ 
 The conundrum of statistical knowledge is of both theoretical and practical 
interest, and has been a focal point of controversy in a very wide range of legal 
contexts.  This article is the first systematic examination of the issue.  Solving the 
conundrum, or at least reducing the confusion it engenders, illuminates a range of 
different questions, including: 
(a) The basic rationale for treating individualized knowledge as an especially 
culpable state of mind; 
(b) Whether recidivists deserve a punishment premium;  
(c) Whether one owes a more stringent duty not to harm “identifiable” victims; 
(d) Why many people intuitively (but often wrongly) condemn corporate 
decision-makers for proceeding in the face of a cost-benefit analysis which 
predicts that their decision not to take a safety precaution will cause death or 
serious harm; and 
(e) Why a legal system can be legitimate even though it predictably punishes the 
innocent. 
The article is organized as follows.  Section II addresses the legal relevance 
of mental states in general, and cognitive mental states in particular.  Section IIIA 
explains the scope of the problem.  Section IIIB introduces the principle of 
“invariant culpability when acts are aggregated” (ICAA) as a novel analytical 
device, while IIIC examines whether the principle applies to faulty as well as 
faultless actors.  Section IIID elucidates SSP, the special stringency principle.  Many 
nonconsequentialist endorse an especially stringent duty not to impose concentrated 
risks on another, a duty that helps explain the presumptive unjustifiability of acting 
with individualized knowledge.  Section IIIE asks whether the real issue in 
distinguishing individualized from statistical knowledge is whether the victim is 
identifiable; it answers in the negative.  Section IIIF investigates why we are 
tempted to make the false equation of statistical knowledge and individualized 
knowledge. 
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Section IIIG considers some possible criteria for distinguishing statistical 
from individualized knowledge, and at the same time (1) delineates the principle of 
ICREA (Invariant culpability when risk-exposures, rather than acts, are aggregated) 
and (2) points out that in exceptional circumstances—namely, when the risk is 
extremely unjustifiable—statistical and individual knowledge are indeed 
normatively indistinguishable; but these circumstances actually “prove” the rule, i.e. 
they actually underscore the legitimate rationales behind ICAA and ICREA.  Section 
IV applies the analysis to several issues, including: contexts where knowledge 
pertains to a legally relevant circumstance rather than a causal result; objections to 
cost-benefit analysis; and a serious objection to retributivism.  The latter objection is 
that retributivists cannot justify any real-world system of punishment, because 
retributivists find unjustifiable the knowing infliction of suffering on those who do 
not deserve it, and yet any realistically imaginable legal system will predictably 
result in the mistaken punishment of the innocent.  Section IVD attends to some 
practical and doctrinal issues.  It is followed by a conclusion that responds to the 
questions I have raised in this introduction.14  An Appendix includes ICAA, ICREA, 
and SSP, and offers some paradigm individual knowledge scenarios, together with 
some intriguing variations. 
 
II. The legal relevance of mental states including cognitive mental states 
  
 A.  Mental states in general 
As background to the analysis to follow, it is important to outline briefly 
some of the principal reason why mental states matter to legal liability. 
                                                 
14 I should briefly note some limitations and assumptions of this article’s analysis.  First, in 
speaking of an actor’s beliefs in a particular probability that a harm will occur or that a 
circumstance exists, I am employing an epistemic and Bayesian conception of risk, not a 
frequentist conception.  This conception is, I believe, the one most appropriate to the legal and 
moral issues explored here.  See Matthew Adler, Against ‘Individual Risk,’ 153 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1121, 1226-1227 (2005).  However, a frequentist analysis of risk might be relevant to 
certain issues, such as loss of a chance damages in tort law.  See Matthew Adler, Risk, Death, 
and Harm, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1293, 1436-1444 (2003). 
 Second, I do not examine here the distinction between individual and population 
risk.  See Adler, Against ‘Individual Risk,’ supra at 1126.  I doubt that that distinction has 
much relevance in typical criminal law and tort law scenarios.  See Kenneth W. Simons, Tort 
Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 
Loyola L. Rev. 1171, 1218-1221 (2008).  Or, more precisely, I doubt the significance of the 
distinction when the risks in question are relatively small.  However, when the individual risk 
is especially high, the difference is indeed significant for a nonconsequentialist.  Suppose D1 
creates a 90% risk of killing each of 10 people, while D2 creates a 0.9% risk of killing each of 
1,000.  D1 and D2 create the same population risk, for in either case, the expected harm is 9 
deaths.  However, D1 alone creates an extremely high individual risk to the group he 
endangers, triggering what I call the Special Stringency Principle, discussed infra at = .  This 
justifies a higher legal sanction for D1 than for D2 (assuming that the motives, benefits, and 
other relevant features of their acts are otherwise the same). 
 Third, the statistical knowledge conundrum that I consider pertains to the actor’s 
culpability for “knowingly” causing harm or for “knowing” that a legally relevant 
circumstance (such as the illegal status of his employee) exists.  Thus, I am not addressing the 
evidentiary problems raised by the “blue bus” hypothetical and similar quandaries, where we 
are unsure whether one actor or another caused the harm, and where we have only 
probabilistic evidence (e.g., “60% of the buses in this town are owned by Blue Bus Co.”) to 
resolve the question.  A valuable recent discussion of these evidentiary issues is Mike 
Redmayne, Exploring the Proof Paradoxes, 14 Legal Theory 281 (2008). 
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An actor’s state of mind is frequently a crucial determinant of his legal 
responsibility.  It can determine his legal responsibility vel non, as well as the extent 
or grade of liability (and the availability of defenses).  A criminal defendant’s 
mental state can be the difference between guilt or innocence, or between mandatory 
life imprisonment and a much shorter prison term.  A tort defendant’s mental state 
determines whether she has committed an intentional tort or instead a tort of 
negligence, and that distinction entails further consequences—for example, whether 
victim fault may reduce recovery, or whether resulting harm will be deemed 
sufficiently “proximate.”  Moreover, a tortfeasor is liable for punitive as well as 
compensatory damages only if she is “reckless” (in some sense), not if she is merely 
negligent.  Finally, the mental state of a government actor is often relevant to 
liability, and sometimes decisive.15 
These examples underscore the extraordinarily wide range of contexts in 
which mental states figure in legal doctrine.  Mental state distinctions play a more 
central role, and are more extensively elaborated, in some legal contexts (such as 
criminal law) than in others.  What is a bit surprising, though, is this: insofar as legal 
responsibility does depend at least in part on mental states, a single conventional 
hierarchy is pervasively employed.  That hierarchy identifies four basic mental states 
reflecting decreasing legal responsibility: purpose (or intention), knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence.16  The hierarchy has an attractive simplicity, and legal 
decision-makers often employ a full or partial version of it across doctrinal 
categories.  The Model Penal Code is the exemplar, though tort law and other fields 
of law also use most or all of these categories. 
A closer look reveals that the four culpability terms in the conventional 
hierarchy do not simply identify different degrees of culpability along a single 
spectrum; they also combine different qualitative dimensions of culpability, 
dimensions of belief, desire, justifiability, and deviation from a normative 
standard.17  Thus, purpose or intention requires a “conscious object”18 to bring about 
a result (for example, in murder, the death of a victim), and thus typically requires 
both a belief that the result is possible and a desire (in some sense) that the result 
                                                 
15 Thus, a government actor is subject to liability for intentional discrimination on the basis of 
race or sex, but not for knowingly imposing disproportionate harm upon a racial minority 
group or women (under the Equal Protection clause); for deliberately restricting speech 
because of disapproval of the speaker’s ideas, but not for imposing the same restriction on the 
basis of a legitimate, and not censorial, policy (under the First Amendment); and for 
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners, but not for mere negligence (under 
the Eighth Amendment). 
16 The hierarchy also recognizes a fifth no-fault or strict liability category, identifying cases 
in which the actor has none of the four basic types of mental state but still is subject to legal 
liability. 
 It is fair to ask whether negligence is a genuine “mental state.”  In many contexts, it 
is used as a criterion of substandard behavior, without any reference (or any direct reference) 
to a state of mind.  See Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 815, 829, ch. 20 (J. Coleman & S. 
Shapiro eds. 200=); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, = 
(1992).  But for simplicity, in this paper I will describe it as a mental state, rather than as a 
“culpability term,” a phrase that is the more accurate but less familiar. 
17 See Simons, supra note 16=. 
18 Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(a)(i). 
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occur.19  Knowledge (insofar as it is simply a mental state20) requires a belief that a 
result is quite likely to occur.21  Recklessness, in a common modern formulation, 
requires both (1) a belief that there is a significant or substantial risk that the harmful 
result will occur, and (2) that the taking of the risk is unjustifiable.22  And negligence 
is often defined as culpable inadvertence to risk; it requires a deviation (or a gross 
deviation) from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, either 
in appreciating a risk or in acting to avoid or minimize the risk. 
The application of these four culpability terms to circumstances, such as a 
victim’s nonconsent, rather than results, such as the harm to a victim, is analyzed in 
a similar fashion23: we can ask whether an actor who intentionally had sexual 
intercourse with a victim also intended (or desired or hoped) that she not consent, 
whether he knew she was not consenting, whether he was reckless as to that fact, or 
whether he was negligent. 
Consider four homicide examples, in each of which the victim dies. 
 
Don causes death purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently 
If Don deliberately crashes his car into Victor with the intention of 
killing him, he causes the death purposely.  If he drives his car through a 
crowd while escaping from the police, recognizing that he is very likely to 
kill one of the pedestrians but not desiring or intending to do so, he causes 
the death knowingly.  If he drives very near a pedestrian, recognizing that he 
might hit and kill him, but believing that he most likely will not do so, he 
causes the death recklessly.  And if Don is engrossed in reading Professor 
Simons’ most recent work on mental states while absent-mindedly driving 
in stop-and-go traffic, and therefore does not see a pedestrian walk in front 
of his car, he causes the pedestrian’s death negligently. 
 
                                                 
19 Here I elide some important complexities.  For further discussion, see Michael Bratman, 
Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987); F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm = (Oxford 2006).   
The MPC definition of purpose as “conscious object” does not specifically require 
that the actor believe that the means he chooses have some possible chance of achieving the 
result, but this is probably implicit in the quoted phrase.  (If you shoot a gun at an astronaut 
on the moon, desiring his death, but believing it impossible to achieve this goal, you 
probably don’t have the “conscious object” of killing him, though you do hope for that 
result.)  
20 A legal requirement that D know that X actually combines a mental state requirement, that 
D believe that X, with an objective requirement, that X is true.  In order for an actor to 
knowingly cause a harm, for example, the actor must believe that the harm will occur, and 
the harm must indeed occur.  The latter requirement is not a mental state.  For convenience, 
however, I will follow convention and characterize the mental state as “knowing” rather than 
“believing.”  (Among other things, there is no similar linguistic equivalent of the adverb 
“knowingly.”  If I believe that I will cause someone’s death yet fail to do so, I cannot have 
acted “knowingly.”  Rather, I acted “believingly.”  The latter term, alas, is not (yet?) in any 
standard English dictionary.) 
21 MPC §2.02(2)(b), 2.02(7); Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A; =Cite to torts restatement 
3rd. 
22 MPC §2.02(2)(c). 
23 But not identically.  See TAN = below. 
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In this essay, which is part of a larger project of critiquing the reigning 
hierarchy of mental states, I focus on, and question, one aspect of the hierarchy—the 
law’s treatment of cognitive mental states, and particularly the mental state that tort 
and criminal law typically call “knowledge.”  Keep in mind that this term 
encompasses only a belief that a result is highly likely to occur (or that a 
circumstance is highly likely to exist).  “Knowledge,” then, is a term of art: it 
departs from standard usage insofar as we often do colloquially speak of 
“knowledge” that one’s conduct creates a small risk of harm (“She knew that her 
dangerous driving might kill someone”), or of “knowledge” that there is a small risk 
that a fact (such as the victim’s lack of consent) exists (“He knew that she might not 
have consented to their sexual relations.”).  These latter examples, where the actor is 
aware of a small risk rather than a high likelihood of harm, are instances of cognitive 
“recklessness,” not knowledge, under modern doctrine. 
 
B. Cognitive mental states 
The culpability of knowledge is much more complex and interesting than is 
generally acknowledged.24  The argument in this article will concentrate on one 
particular context in which a culpability of knowledge is especially problematic—
when a person knows that his repeated conduct or extensive activity will very likely, 
in a statistical sense, cause harm. 
 Before we examine the statistical knowledge conundrum, it is useful to 
consider more carefully how cognitive mental states like knowledge, belief, and 
recklessness are relevant to legal responsibility. 
A legal requirement of knowledge always includes a requirement that the 
actor have some type and degree of subjective belief.  A requirement of recklessness 
usually also includes a requirement of subjective belief.25  To know that a result will 
occur is (inter alia) to believe that it will surely, or very likely, occur; to be reckless 
is to believe that the result has a significant or substantial chance of occurring.  In 
principle, in judging the degree of an actor’s responsibility, the law could employ 
belief requirements spanning the entire range of probabilities, from a belief that the 
probability is 100% to the belief that it is just above zero.26  As a practical matter, 
                                                 
24 Two examples: 
(1) Does “knowingly causing harm” have the same meaning and significance when, instead of 
acting, I have failed to act (when I had a duty to do so)?  Is a lifeguard who simply panics and 
thus fails to rescue a drowning swimmer a knowing killer, i.e., a murderer? 
(2) Suppose I know a legally relevant fact but, when I later act and cause harm, I have 
forgotten the fact.  Should I be treated as still knowing it? 
25 However, sometimes recklessness criteria do not require subjective awareness; instead, 
they require either gross negligence or some form of culpable indifference.  To avoid 
unnecessary complications, I do not discuss these variations. 
 Belief is also sometimes relevant to a negligence standard, especially in criminal 
law.  The Model Penal Code essentially defines negligence as unreasonable failure to be 
aware of a substantial risk, i.e., failure to believe what a reasonable person would have 
believed. MPC §2.02(2)(d).  But in other contexts (and most of the time in tort law), belief is 
not relevant in this way to negligence: an actor’s behavior can be negligent because it falls 
below an idealized standard of care (such as a standard of proficiency or skill), not because, 
or not merely because, it is based on negligent beliefs. 
26 I am discussing inculpatory belief requirements; there would be no point to a 
“requirement” that the actor believe that the risk of harm from his action is zero.  But as a 
matter of exculpation, such a belief is of course highly relevant.  An actor who inflicts deadly 
force in self-defense (even in circumstances where this is disproportionate to the threat) but 
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however, legal standards pick out at most only two or three points on the continuum.  
Thus, with respect to circumstance elements, the Model Penal Code distinguishes 
awareness of a substantial risk, awareness of a high probability, and simple belief 
that the circumstance exists.27  Some other criminal codes only identify one point, 
and tort law standards often identify only one, or perhaps two.28 
We should also remember that “recklessness,” as defined in the influential 
Model Penal Code and in many state criminal codes, is a complex concept, 
combining two requirements.  The actor must both (a) believe that the risk of the 
relevant legal fact is substantial and (b) take a risk that society considers 
unjustifiable.  In most of this essay, I will be using the term in its simpler, purely 
cognitive sense, i.e., as encompassing requirement (a) but not requirement (b).  
Thus, unless otherwise noted, the reader should assume that “reckless” is an instance 
of cognitive recklessness, not complex recklessness.  (This distinction is crucial, we 
shall later see.) 
What is the significance of determining that an actor has or has not satisfied 
a mens rea requirement of knowledge?  That requirement serves hree crucial 
functions: 
(1) Grading offenses or legal wrongs, or varying sanctions, according to 
relative seriousness; 
(2) Establishing a threshold below which the conduct is not legally 
impermissible at all; and  
(3) Demanding an especially strong justification before the conduct will be 
deemed legally permissible (especially strong, that is, relative to the 
justification needed in the case of a lesser mental state such as recklessness 
or negligence). 
A mental state of cognitive recklessness or knowledge can serve all three functions 
(and so can other mental states, such as intention). 
 First consider the grading function.  In criminal law, a more culpable state of 
mind can lead to greater punishment.  Cognitive mental states are especially apt 
means for achieving this grading function, because beliefs are scalar, i.e., 
differentiable according to the actor’s degree of certainty or confidence.  Thus, 
acting with knowledge is often treated as more culpable than acting with the “lower” 
belief of cognitive recklessness. Not surprisingly, knowingly causing death is 
                                                                                                                               
who reasonably believed that there was zero or very little risk that his violent response would 
be that harmful will obtain a full defense based on his reasonable mistake. 
27 =cites.  It treats the latter two degrees of belief essentially the same, as two different 
formulations of “knowledge.”  Specifically, awareness of a high probability suffices for 
knowledge “unless [the actor] actually believes that [the fact] does not exist.” §2.02(7).  For 
some difficulties with this formulation, see Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal 
Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 179, = (2003).  With 
respect to results, the MPC defines knowledge as belief that the result is “practically certain.” 
§2.02(2)(b)(ii). 
28 Under the Restatement (Second), intent is defined to include both purpose and knowledge.  
Negligence does not require actual awareness.  Recklessness is an infrequently used mental 
state in tort law, and it is not clear whether it requires awareness of risk.  See Simons, 
Rethinking Mental States, supra note 15=, at 483.  And it is similarly unclear whether the 
reckless disregard often required for punitive damages, although sometimes defined 
differently than the recklessness occasionally used as a basic mental state for liability, 
requires awareness of risk.   See id. at 484.   
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usually murder, while recklessly causing death is usually manslaughter.29  With 
intentions, by contrast, for the most part either one has an intention or one does not; 
further legal gradations of degree are rarely invoked. 
In tort, the significance of greater culpability for liability is less direct, since 
compensatory damages are measured the same way for both intentional torts and 
torts of negligence (or of strict liability).  Still, characterizing a tort as “intentional” 
(which encompasses both purposeful and knowing infringements) aids the plaintiff 
in a number of ways—in sometimes permitting recovery for emotional harm even 
without physical harm; in precluding consideration of victim fault, in many 
jurisdictions; in relaxing requirements of proximate cause; and in more readily 
permitting the award of punitive damages. 
Why do we so readily assume that a person who knowingly causes harm is 
more blameworthy or responsible than a person who recklessly causes harm?  
Because, in the usual case, if a person chooses to create a risk while believing that a 
harmful consequence is likely, he is, ceteris paribus,30 more responsible or culpable 
than a person who creates a risk believing only that a harmful consequence is 
possible; for the first actor reveals, by his action, willingness to tolerate a greater 
harm or evil in pursuit of his ends.  When we condemn an actor or hold her 
responsible for knowingly or recklessly causing harm, we are not condemning her 
simply for having a “guilty” or culpable state of mind as to results (or even, in the 
case of recklessness, for failing to fully recognize the seriousness of risks).  Rather, 
or more precisely, we hold her responsible for her willingness to act notwithstanding 
her belief that her actions will or might cause harm.31  What is morally and legally 
significant is her decision to act in light of her beliefs. 
                                                 
29 This is not a pure example of scalar grading, however.  Jurisdictions (such as those 
following the Model Penal Code) that define manslaughter as “recklessly causing death” 
mean “recklessness” in the complex sense, as (a) cognitively reckless awareness of a risk (b) 
that is unjustified.  But the second element, lack of justification, is not part of the definition of 
knowing murder; rather, necessity and self-defense remain as distinct defenses to murder.  So 
comparing knowing murder with (complexly) reckless manslaughter is comparing apples with 
oranges.  If reckless manslaughter were understood in the cognitive sense (element (a) only), 
then the comparison would be apples to apples. 
30 The ceteris paribus condition is important.  Some cases of knowingly causing a harm are 
less culpable than some cases of recklessly (in the cognitive sense) causing a harm.  See Larry 
Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen Morse, Crime and Culpability: A 
Theory of Criminal Law 33 (2009): 
[S]omeone who imposes a very high risk of harm on another – a risk just short of 
practical certainty – for a very frivolous reason, such as a thrill, is surely more 
culpable than one who imposes a practically certain harm for a quite weighty, but 
ultimately insufficient, reason. For example, if Albert knowingly inflicts severe 
bodily injury on another to prevent him from accidentally destroying Albert’s entire 
life’s work, Albert may be culpable; but he is surely less culpable than if he imposes 
a slightly lower risk of the same harm on another just to satisfy his urge to drive like 
a madman. In short, instances of what we now call extreme indifference to human 
life may not only be equal to but also more culpable than some cases of knowledge. 
 
Moreover, if a person desires or intends to cause harm, it might be irrelevant whether 
he believes that the harm is very likely or merely believes that the harm has a substantial 
chance of occurring.  See Itzhak Kugler, Direct and Oblique Intention in the Criminal Law: 
An Inquiry into Degrees of Blameworthiness 91-99 (2002).  Under the Model Penal Code, 
“purpose” requires that the actor have the conscious object to bring about a result but does not 
require the belief that the result will occur with any specified probability. 202(2)(a)(i). 
31 In the case of omissions, we hold her responsible for a failure to act when she has a duty to 
do so, and when she is aware that her action will or might prevent harm. 
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Second, consider the threshold function of a mental state.  Knowledge 
requirements often serve this function.  This is true not only of many crimes (for 
example, knowledge is often required for drug and other possession offenses), but 
also of many other types of wrongs.  Thus, such “intentional” torts as trespass and 
battery can be committed only by purposely or knowingly invading the victim’s 
property interest or interest in physical integrity, not be invading such interests 
inadvertently.32  And, as a constitutional matter, tort liability for defamation of a 
public figure or public official requires proof that the defendant “recklessly 
disregarded” the truth; that phrase has been interpreted as requiring a state of mind 
close to knowledge.33 
Third, consider the justificatory function of mental states: actions 
accompanied by more “serious” or culpable mental states require more compelling 
justifications, and often only permit justifications in narrower categories, relative to 
actions accompanied by less “serious” mental states.  In criminal law, a purposeful 
or knowing killing is murder and can only be justified by a narrow and particularly 
compelling set of reasons, such as self-defense or necessity.34  But one who is or 
should be aware that his conduct poses a substantial risk of death, and is thus merely 
cognitively reckless or negligent, is only guilty in the first instance if the risk of 
death he poses is unjustifiable.  Moreover, justification is much easier to 
demonstrate here than in the case of purposeful or knowing killing.  A surgeon can 
be justified in posing even a very high risk of death, if the expected benefit of the 
operation is to save the patient’s life; but an automobile driver can be justified in 
posing a risk of death for a relatively trivial reason (e.g. he takes a drive in order to 
feel the wind rushing through his hair), so long as the risk of death he poses is 
relatively small. 
These explanations of three crucial functions of mental states have thus far 
been stated somewhat abstractly.  I will put some flesh on the bones of this analysis 
below, when I introduce several new characters—Larry, Maxwell, and Ned—and 
explore whether these functions operate differently in the contexts of individualized 
and statistical knowledge. 
 
III. Statistical knowledge deconstructed 
 A. Specifying the problem 
Recall the two earlier examples involving tunnel builders Agatha and 
Bertha.  Careful Agatha could predict that even with a high (and non-negligent) 
level of precaution, injuries and even death will occur to a few of the thousands of 
workers over the lengthy duration of the project.  Less careful Bertha could predict 
that with a lower (and probably negligent) level of precaution, injuries and death are 
even more likely.  And recall Clara: 
 
                                                 
32 Nor is it the case that negligent invasions of those interests are necessarily actionable under 
the tort of negligence.  The latter tort requires that the victim suffer physical harm; the torts of 
trespass and battery do not.  Thus, purpose or knowledge indeed does serve a threshold 
function in trespass and battery.  See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of 
Intentional Torts?, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1061, 1080-1090 (2006). 
33 See discussion at notes = infra. 
34 Indeed, many states do not permit a necessity defense to murder.  Joshua Dressler, 
Understanding Criminal Law = (5th ed. 2009); Heinzerling, Knowing Killing, supra note 10=, 
at 528.  And when they do recognize necessity, they often limit the necessity to 
“emergencies.”  Dressler, at =. 
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Clara (a speeding driver who acts with individualized knowledge) 
Clara is running late for a plane to a critically important business 
meeting.  Speeding along a narrow and deserted mountain road, she 
suddenly sees a drunk young man, barely moving, lying on the road in the 
path of the car.  Rather than stop for him, she slows down but continues, 
striking the man as her car passes over him.  She realizes that she is very 
likely to injure him, which she does. 
 
The law will characterize Clara as “knowingly” causing that injury, but it 
will not characterize either Agatha or Bertha as “knowing” that she will cause death 
or serious injury to others.35  And yet in one sense Agatha and Bertha do satisfy the 
usual criteria for knowingly causing harm: they subjectively believe that harm is 
almost certain to occur as a result of their activities.  How can their mental states be 
distinguished from Clara’s?  Or from the mental state of Eleanor, the builder who 
knowingly crushes the victim to death?  Or must we swallow the (very) bitter pill 
and concede that all of these cases must be treated the same? 
A very similar statistical knowledge problem arises when the object of the 
required knowledge is a circumstance that makes the actor’s conduct illegal, rather 
than (as in the examples thus far) a result of the actor’s conduct.  This version of the 
problem is much less discussed, but it seems in principle the same.  Recall the earlier 
example of a large corporation charged with the crime of “knowingly” hiring 
undocumented immigrants as employees.  And suppose the corporation is so large, 
with hundreds of thousands of employees, that it can confidently predict that it will 
hire some illegal employees, even if it uses extraordinary efforts to comply with the 
law.  Interpreting this criminal prohibition to embrace statistical knowledge would 
result in conviction for acts that are, by hypothesis, not even negligent.  This 
implication makes it highly doubtful that courts would interpret the prohibition so 
broadly.36  But why, exactly, would that broad interpretation be improper? 
                                                 
35 There is little explicit case law on the topic.  However, some tort cases have held that (what 
I call) statistical knowledge does not satisfy the intent requirement for battery.  See Shaw v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F.Supp. 539, 548 (D.Md.,1997): 
Brown & Williamson did not know with a substantial degree of certainty that 
second-hand smoke would touch any particular non-smoker. While it may have had 
knowledge that second-hand smoke would reach some non-smokers, the Court finds 
that such generalized knowledge is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for 
battery. 
See also Madden v. D.C. Transit Systems, Inc., 307 A.2d 756 (D.C. 1973) (rejecting battery 
claim for lack of requisite intent where plaintiff claimed that defendant knew that its buses 
were regularly spewing fumes and oily substances).  
Some academics have supported tort liability for statistically known harms.  See 
generally Darren S. Rimer, Secondhand Smoke Damages: Extending a Cause of Action for 
Battery Against a Tobacco Manufacturer, 2 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1237, = (1995) (arguing that 
statistical knowledge should suffice for battery liability); Paul LeBel, Intent and Recklessness 
as Bases of Products Liability: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward, 32 Ala. L. Rev. 31, 67 
(1980) (arguing that statistical knowledge should suffice for products liability if defendant is 
permitted a risk-utility defense). 
36 My research has not uncovered cases containing the claim that statistical knowledge 
suffices for legal liability when the fact the defendant “knows” is a circumstance rather than a 
result.  
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The statistical knowledge conundrum is also part of the contentious debate 
over the legal relevance, and even the legitimacy, of cost/benefit analyses conducted 
by corporate actors.  Should we fault such actors simply for performing a deliberate, 
conscious cost-benefit calculus before engaging in risky activity?  To do so is very 
troubling; after all, on at least some accounts of negligence and recklessness, actors 
have a moral and legal duty to conduct just such an analysis.37  To be sure, some 
believe that a utilitarian comparison of costs and benefits is the wrong way to 
distinguish faulty from faultless behavior.38  But even if that is so—indeed, even if 
conducting a purely utilitarian analysis is sufficiently wrong to deserve blame or 
legal sanction—it is an enormous further step to equate the culpability of an actor 
who makes such an analysis with the very serious culpability characteristically 
displayed by actors who cause harm with the mental states of purpose or 
individualized knowledge.  And yet, once again, it is not clear why, in applying a 
doctrinal knowledge requirement, a corporate actor that can reliably predict that its 
activities, services, or products will cause harm should not be treated as a knowing 
actor, for such a prediction seems to satisfy the knowledge criterion. 
A good way to begin answering the statistical knowledge conundrum is to 
revisit the three critical functions (noted earlier) that are served by characterizing a 
mental state as “knowing”: (1) grading or sanctioning the actor as especially 
responsible or culpable; (2) establishing a threshold, below which the action is not 
legally impermissible; and (3) demanding an especially strong justification before 
his conduct will be deemed legally permissible.39  Consider how the law will treat 
statistical knowledge differently from individualized knowledge with respect to 
these three functions. 
First, in criminal law, causing death with individualized knowledge is often 
punished more harshly than recklessly causing death: the first is typically murder, 
while the second is typically reckless or involuntary manslaughter.  But a case of 
unreasonably risky conduct accompanied by statistical knowledge, such as the 
Bertha scenario, will at worst be treated as reckless manslaughter, not as murder.40  
Moreover, in tort law, punitive damages will often be available in individualized 
knowledge cases, but they will not normally be available in statistical knowledge 
                                                 
37 See Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra note 12=, at 588 (reporting results of mock 
juror analysis showing that “undertaking any type of risk analysis was harmful to the 
corporation’s prospects both with respect to the probability of punitive damages and, more 
importantly, with respect to the magnitude of the award”); Henderson & Twerski =. 
38 Deontological views of negligence include George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972); Gregory Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in 
Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1996); Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 Soc. 
Phil. & Pol. 52 (1999); Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Encompassing Fairness As Well as Efficiency Values, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 901 (2001); Richard 
Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," in Symposium, Negligence in 
the Law, 4 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 145 (2003); John Oberdiek, Towards a Right 
Against Risking, 28 Law & Phil. 367 (2009). 
39 Other doctrinal consequences do not perfectly coincide with the individualized/ statistical 
distinction.  For example, insurance and worker’s compensation exclusions for “intentional” 
torts more often apply when the knowledge is individualized than when it is statistical, but 
the correspondence is not exact.  See, e.g., =  
40 The point in the text also applies in tort law.  Consider the examples mentioned in note 8= 
supra [=quote from R.3rd torts=].  If the actors in any of these cases unreasonably took 
inadequate precautions against harm, they would be considered negligent but would not be 
considered liable for the intentional tort of battery. 
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cases.41  Statistical knowledge cases, if culpable enough to deserve legal sanction, 
will ordinarily be classified as cases of recklessness or negligence, not as cases of 
individualized knowledge. 
Second, although individualized knowledge sometimes differentiates 
criminal from noncriminal behavior (e.g., a crime might prohibit knowing but not 
reckless possession of a weapon), again statistical knowledge will not do as a 
substitute for such knowledge.  Recall the example of a large employer charged with 
knowingly hiring an undocumented worker.  If he utilizes the best practicable 
method for screening out such workers, but the scale of his operation is so large that 
he knows that some of his workers must be undocumented aliens, it is exceedingly 
unlikely that a court would permit his conviction.  
And third, the demand for an especially strong justification where the 
defendant has individualized knowledge that he will cause harm does not ordinarily 
extend to defendants with statistical knowledge: the law will harshly sanction Clara, 
who lacks a socially compelling justification, but will not sanction Agatha at all, 
even though her justification is arguably not much more compelling than Clara’s. 
But why are statistical knowledge and individualized knowledge treated so 
differently?  And what, exactly, is the relevant difference?  The answer to these 
questions is vitally important, not only in differentiating more culpable actions 
(knowing) from less culpable ones (reckless or negligent), but also in differentiating 
those “knowing” actions that are culpable or deficient from those that are entirely 
permissible or justifiable. 
A central rationale for the difference between individualized and statistical 
knowledge is that causing serious physical harm with individualized knowledge is 
almost always unjustified, and indeed almost always highly unjustified.  Consider 
Clara again.  This is a paradigm individualized knowledge case because the actor 
knows that there is a very high probability that she will cause serious harm to a 
single, identifiable person.  Here, the law has good reason to distinguish knowledge 
from lesser forms of culpability.  The decision to take an action that one realizes is 
very likely to seriously harm another is virtually always unjustifiable: it can only be 
justified by a small number of extremely narrow justifications, most prominently 
self-defense and necessity.42  All else being equal, one who knowingly creates a 
higher risk of harm needs a weightier justification in order to deserve exemption 
from legal responsibility than one who knowingly creates a much lower risk of that 
harm. 
To be sure, the morality and social acceptability of imposing risks is a 
complex topic.  But, whether one endorses consequentialist or deontological 
principles (or some stew of the two), and whatever one’s views about what risks are 
permissible or impermissible, it is not controversial that ordinarily an actor needs a 
                                                 
41 Some famous tort cases seem to be striking counterexamples to this proposition, especially 
the Ford Pinto case; but they are not.  See = infra. 
42 As noted above, many states that permit a necessity defense do not permit it as a defense to 
murder.  Note 42= supra.  So an actor who qualifies as a murderer because he has 
individualized knowledge that he will cause harm cannot be justified in such a jurisdiction.  
There are reasons to question this limitation of the necessity defense.  (If the pilot of a 
disabled airplane deliberately steers the plane from its current path to another direction, in 
order to minimize the almost certain death toll from twenty to five, should he really be guilty 
of murdering the five?)  But putting that aside, notice that the limitation is especially 
objectionable if statistical knowledge counts as individualized knowledge; for then every 
corporate decision to market a product known to cause a small number of deaths in the 
population of users might qualify as unjustified murder. 
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much weightier reason to justify imposing a much greater risk (ceteris paribus). 
Clara’s interest in arriving on time to an important business meeting is, in this 
context, an interest of only modest social value.  The same would be true if her 
reason for hurrying home was to prepare dinner or give her children more help with 
their homework.  In either the original Clara example or this variation, these 
interests would nevertheless justify her choosing to impose very small risks of injury 
on pedestrians by driving carefully rather than walking.  But they do not justify her 
consciously imposing very substantial risks by driving incautiously or very fast. 
Moreover, in a standard individualized knowledge case, the law properly 
treats the actor harshly—and more harshly than an actor whose conduct is similarly 
unjustified but who demonstrate a lesser culpability than knowledge (for example, 
cognitive recklessness or negligence).  Ordinarily, the greater the probability of 
harm that the actor knowingly creates, the more the actor devalues the interests of 
the victim (or other socially valued interests) relative to the actor’s own ends.43  
Knowingly taking a high risk of seriously injuring someone for the purpose of one’s 
career is a different matter than taking a very slight risk of such an injury for the 
same reason. 
What, then, is the appropriate culpability level for those who act with 
statistical knowledge?  Which of the culpability categories (other than individualized 
knowledge) most closely corresponds to their culpability?  Recklessness?  
Negligence?  Or no culpability at all?  The short answer is: any of the above could 
be the appropriate culpability level, depending on the context.  Let us see why. 
Consider two somewhat stylized statistical knowledge cases: 
 
Larry, the frequent careful driver 
Larry routinely drives carefully, very near the speed limit.  He is 
unusually well-informed, and knows the aggregate risk of injury that this 
poses over his lifetime of driving.  (He averages 15,000 miles per year.)  
Specifically, he knows that it is highly likely that he will cause: (a) damage 
to another’s vehicle or property on at least six occasions; and (b) minor 
personal injury to someone else on at least one occasion.44 
                                                 
43 Also, we normally cannot be sure that the actor who knowingly creates a smaller risk 
would have been willing to knowingly pose the greater one.  In the unusual situation when 
we can be sure of this, however, arguably we have reason to sanction the actor as if he had 
possessed the greater degree of awareness of risk.  See note = supra. 
44 I invented these figures.  But whether this is an accurate depiction of the aggregate lifetime 
risks of driving is not critical to the analysis. 
     Apparently the annual risk of death in a transportation accident is 1 in 6,000.  See 
http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/Resources/res_stats_services/Pages/FrequentlyAskedQu
estions.aspx#question10.  The lifetime risk of death in an automobile accident is 1 in 84. 
http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/injury_and_death_statistics/Pages/TheOddsofDyin
gFrom.aspx. 
   It is interesting to consider how an actor should be treated if the risks that he 
subjectively perceives turn out to be either less than or greater than the risks that a reasonable 
person in his shoes would perceive, or than the risks that the most informed human being 
could possibly perceive (either ex post or ex ante).  These questions are beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Of course, if an actor unreasonably underestimates the seriousness of the risks 
she is posing, then even if she poses only statistical rather than individualized risks, the law 
might consider her negligent.  
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Maxwell, the frequent speeder 
Maxwell routinely drives ten miles per hour over the speed limit. 
(Like Larry, he averages 15,000 miles of driving per year.)  He, too, is 
unusually well-informed, and knows that it is highly likely that he will 
cause: (a) damage to another’s vehicle or property on at least 30 occasions; 
(b) minor personal injury to someone else on at least five occasions; and (c) 
moderate personal injury on at least one occasion. 
 
Despite his statistical knowledge that he will, over time, cause harm to 
others, Larry should not be considered as culpable as an actor with individualized 
knowledge.  Indeed, he probably should not be found legally responsible at all.45  
Maxwell, on the other hand, is a more complex case.  In an important sense, he 
seems like Larry, insofar as he has statistical but not individualized knowledge of 
the harm that he will cause, and insofar as the number of times he drives does not 
seem to affect his level of culpability.  But as we shall see, there is also some reason 
to conclude that his repetition of an unjustifiable action legitimately bears on his 
culpability.  
The fundamental question concerning statistical knowledge is whether such 
cases are better categorized along with individualized knowledge, on the one hand, 
or with recklessness, negligence, or even no liability, on the other.  The short 
answer? Statistical knowledge ordinarily belongs with recklessness (or a lesser 
culpability level), not with individualized knowledge.  This conclusion follows when 
we examine the dimensions discussed above, aggravated culpability (features (1) 
and (2)) and clear lack of justification (feature (3). 
First, consider aggravated culpability.  When a person acts despite statistical 
knowledge that harm will result, he need not significantly devalue the interests of 
the potential victims.  Indeed, he might well value those interests more highly than a 
cognitively reckless actor who is aware only of a significant risk that the same harm 
will befall a particular individual.  For example, compare: (1) the decision of a 
delivery service to use automobiles rather than bicycles in a particular municipality, 
despite statistical knowledge that this will over time cause more injuries to 
pedestrians (but will greatly speed delivery time); with (2) the decision of a motorist 
or bicyclist, on a single occasion, to speed very near a particular pedestrian, aware of 
the significant risk of injury.  The second actor is clearly more culpable, even if she 
correctly estimates the risk of injury from her single act as 10% while the delivery 
company correctly estimates the risk that its (carefully operated) fleet of cars will at 
some point injure a pedestrian as 95%. 
Second, consider the question of justification.  The heavier burden of 
justification that we demand when an actor knowingly creates a high (rather than a 
low) risk to a victim on a single occasion does not imply that we should require a 
similarly high burden of justification when an actor’s “knowledge” that others are 
likely to suffer harm is merely statistical.  Statistical knowledge cases simply 
involve the predicted aggregate effect of numerous low-risk individual acts; but if a 
low burden of justification is appropriate in the case of each such act, then it should 
ordinarily be appropriate when we aggregate the acts.  The decision to engage in an 
                                                 
45 I qualify this assertion because imposing strict tort liability on Larry for the harm he causes, 
or requiring him to insure in advance against such harms, might not be unfair.  I do not have 
space to explore the issue here. 
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activity that one realizes is statistically likely to cause harm (given the repetitive or 
far-reaching nature of the activity) carries no presumption of unjustifiability.  To be 
sure, the activity might not be justifiable; but whether it is or not should normally 
turn on the usual criteria relevant to justifiable risk-creation, not on whether one can 
recharacterize the activity as if it were a single event stretching over time and space.  
Or, to put the matter differently, how one frames the scope of the risk is quite 
arbitrary: one might describe the risks of such activities in temporally or spatially 
limited terms, or instead in more capacious terms; yet the first description will yield 
a lower probability than the second.  The chance that I will injure someone through 
moderate speeding over my lifetime might be 40%; but the chance that my moderate 
speeding will injure someone in a single trip to the beach is vanishingly small.46  The 
legal permissibility of the risky conduct, and how (if at all) it should be sanctioned, 
should not depend on the contingency of this arbitrary risk description. 
These two arguments are, I recognize, too brief to explain away the 
statistical knowledge conundrum.  But they are a start.  And we will make further 
progress if we proceed to a more formalized explanation of the reason we should 
ordinarily treat statistical knowledge differently than we treat individualized 
knowledge. 
 
B.  A partial solution: the principle of ICAA (Invariant culpability when 
acts are aggregated) 
 Larry, the frequent careful driver, should not be found legally at fault for 
property harm that he causes just because he knows, in a statistical sense, that this 
result is a highly likely consequence of his taking tens of thousands of drives.  After 
all, each time he drives, the risk of property damage (and of personal injury) is 
extremely small.  Assuming no other fault in the way he drives on any particular 
occasion (such as inattention or a dangerous maneuver), Larry is not negligent or 
otherwise at fault for choosing to drive at such a speed.  This is so even though safer 
alternatives exist, such as walking, or riding his bicycle, or driving much more 
slowly.  And if Larry does not act in a faulty manner on any of his individual drives, 
there is no apparent reason why his decision to repeat his activity thousands of times 
should transform the activity from faultless to faulty. 
Implicit in this argument is the following principle: 
                                                 
46 See Simons, Negligence, supra note 36= at =.  The point in the text is an aspect of the 
notorious “reference class” problem in probability analysis.  On a frequentist analysis of risk, 
one needs to explain what class of persons the frequencies refer to, but there is no 
uncontroversial way to do so.  See Adler, Against ‘Individual Risk,’ supra note =, at 1144-
1147. 
 Or consider the infamous Ford Pinto case, where Ford was found to have 
negligently designed an automobile in such a way that the fuel tank was unusually likely to 
cause serious fires in the case of a collision.  Ford conducted a cost-benefit analysis, using 
figures supplied from the federal government, that they claimed excused their failure to make 
a post-sale modification of the vehicles to prevent such fires.  Reportedly, the risk that any 
individual Ford Pinto vehicle would catch fire and cause a burn death (that reasonable 
precaution would have avoided) was .0000144, over a fleet of 12.5 million vehicles.  That 
sounds like an insignificant percentage.  However, we could alternatively describe that risk 
by the expected number of burn deaths over the entire fleet of Ford Pintos.  Framed this way, 
the risk is an expected toll of 180 expected deaths over the fleet of Pintos.  See Simons, 
Rethinking Mental States, supra note 15= at 292 n. 69; Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford 
Pinto, supra note 17=, at 1059-1062. 
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Invariant Culpability when Acts are Aggregated (“ICAA”): 
 Suppose: (1) a person engages in a course of conduct containing 
multiple acts each of which, considered individually, is identical in all 
respects relevant to legal culpability, including: 
the actor’s intentions, beliefs, and motives;  
the socially recognized benefits and risks of harm that the act 
entails; and  
the manner in which the benefits, and risks of harm, from the act are 
distributed among the actor, potential victims, and others;  
Then: (2) we should attribute to that actor the same degree of 
culpability for the whole course of conduct as the degree of culpability that 
we properly attribute to him for any individual act. 
 
Under ICAA, if performing a single act is faultless, then performing a hundred 
relevantly similar acts is faultless.  If performing a single act is merely negligent, 
then so is performing a hundred similar acts; and so on for other types of culpability.  
Aggregation of acts does not, by itself, increase culpability.  ICAA is especially 
crucial to understanding the proper scope of a cognitive mental state such as 
knowledge.  For, as the scope and frequency of otherwise similar acts increases, the 
actual and reasonable beliefs of the actor about the probability that his aggregate acts 
will cause harms (or will produce benefits) will typically change: he will recognize 
that those harm are now much more certain.  But, absent a constraint such as ICAA, 
the actor will implausibly be liable for a higher level of fault, or for some level of 
fault even though each separate act is lacking in fault, simply because he expands or 
repeats the activity. 
ICAA presumptively should govern when similar acts are multiplied either 
over time or over space.  If Alicia only drives once in her lifetime, while Bella 
drives 10,000 times, and Carmen 300,000, ICAA provides that their responsibility 
for resulting harm should be the same, so long as their driving behavior is the 
same.47  And if a company expands its fleet of drivers ten-fold, or 100-fold, or 
10,000-fold, but otherwise maintains the same safety policies, its liability or 
responsibility for harms caused by driving should not change, simply because the 
aggregate risks are much greater.48 
                                                 
47 The number of “drives,” a notion that I employ for simplicity here and in many other 
examples, is imprecise in several ways.  For one thing, a single drive contains numerous acts, 
as I discuss momentarily.  For another, miles driven, weather conditions, congestion, and 
other factors are highly relevant to the risk posed.  For purposes of this essay, assume that the 
characteristics of a single “drive” are reasonably well-defined, so that we can meaningfully 
(a) compare different actors each of whom takes a single (relevantly similar) “drive,” and also 
(b) compare an actor engaging in one “drive” to that actor engaging in many (relevantly 
similar) “drives.” 
48 Of course, insofar as harms actually caused increase, compensatory liability for those 
harms must increase; and insofar as the number of risky acts increases, sanctions for those 
risky acts must proportionately increase.  But ICAA provides that the level of fault 
attributable to an act risking or causing harm does not vary with the number of similar acts 
committed.  Nonfaulty conduct does not become faulty.  Negligent conduct does not become 
reckless.  And reckless conduct does not become knowing (in the individualized sense). 
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It might seem that statistical knowledge should be treated like individualized 
knowledge at least in a case where it is very likely that the activity in aggregate will 
cause at least one instance of serious physical injury or death.  But this argument is 
flawed, because it is vulnerable to the largely arbitrary way in which we frame our 
spatiotemporal description of an activity and its effects.  Over a million years of 
repetition, innumerable human activities will cause physical harm.49  Over a span of 
a second, few activities will.  Yet neither description is more or less accurate than 
the other.  Moreover, although the relative urgency of precaution depends in part on 
the frequency of harm over time, even a very low-level risk is worth averting if the 
burden of doing so is sufficiently low and if the harm (were it not averted) is 
sufficiently great. 
The discussion above of how ICAA applies to the number of “drives” a 
person is inexact.  To be more precise, we could try to individuate, not separate 
“drives,” but instead distinct but comparable segments of risky behavior, or even 
distinct acts of risk creation.  After all, a given drive could easily contain numerous 
discrete episodes or acts of risk creation—for example, driving at one speed through 
the first intersection, at another speed through the second, steering close to the 
sidewalk at the third, steering farther away at the fourth.50  Suppose Alicia drives for 
fifteen minutes in such a way that she poses a tiny risk to one person before she 
concludes the drive, while Arthur drives in such a way that he poses an equivalent 
risk successively to three people, endangering each of them for fifteen minutes along 
different parts of the road.  Alicia, we might say, has engaged in one episode of risky 
behavior, while Arthur has engaged in three comparable episodes.51  Along each 
road segment, each has engaged in bodily movements, and has made a number of 
decisions such as how to steer his car and how fast to drive. 
But perhaps we should ask the narrower question: How many distinct acts 
has Alicia or Arthur performed?  Alas, act individuation is a notoriously difficult 
conceptual (and perhaps normative) problem, in both philosophy and criminal law 
                                                 
49 If you were immortal, yet persisted in engaging in risky acts such as driving, or even 
trivially risky acts such as taking a brief stroll down a quiet street, you could be sure to cause 
a death eventually.  But it is doubtful that you should therefore be considered a prima facie 
murderer.  See Tyler Cowen, 
http://volokh.com/2004_01_11_volokh_archive.html#107409984581699780; Tyler Cowen, 
http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/01/would_potential.html, 
quoting a post by Lawrence Solum. 
50 A single drive might also endanger no persons, one person, or many persons.  Indeed, a 
single act within one “drive” could differ in how many are exposed to risk, and in the type of 
risks of harm that it creates.  This second aspect, the number of risk-exposures, needs to be 
analyzed separately.  Obviously, a single act of risk-creation (driving near the sidewalk) could 
endanger numerous persons or one, or could create serious risks of death and personal injury 
or only minor risks of property damage.  I provide such an analysis below, introducing the 
related but distinct principle, ICREA (Invariant culpability when risk exposures are 
aggregated).  Infra notes =. 
51 Further complexity is added if we apply ICAA to acts of risk-creation in which no one is 
“objectively” at risk (say, from the perspective of a witness at the scene), e.g. if Arthur drives 
at night in a college town and no pedestrians are nearby.  Should we examine the risk 
according to Arthur’s subjective beliefs?  According to the risk that a reasonable person in 
Arthur’s shoes would perceive?  According to the risk that an omniscient observer would 
perceive?   How we should characterize risk is a notoriously difficult problem in criminal law 
and moral theory.  I believe, however, that the proper resolution of these problems does not 
affect the arguments I make in this paper.  A range of plausible criteria of “risk” are consistent 
with the basic argument that ICAA should presumptively apply if an actor engages, not just in 
one act of “risk”-creation, but in multiple similar acts. 
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theory.52  Fortunately, for purposes of our inquiry, we can safely skirt the problem.  
Whatever conception of “act,” or of risky episode, we apply to Alicia, we can 
readily construct scenarios in which another actor (Arthur) engages in several acts or 
episodes of that nature.  The question then remains: is Arthur, by reason of repeating 
such acts, more culpable than Alicia?  And ICAA gives the presumptive answer: no.  
I will also employ the idea of a “single drive” as a crude proxy for a single act while 
driving that creates a risk of harm.  This idea permits a more straightforward 
comparison of different scenarios and is thus more useful in identifying the strengths 
and limitations of ICAA.53 
What deeper theory of permissible risk-creation and of punishment underlies 
the ICAA?  Perhaps the most straightforward defense of ICAA is provided by a 
consequentialist54 analysis under which the justification for engaging in an activity 
with a known set of risks depends on the ex ante expected costs and benefits of the 
activity.  Thus, under the Learned Hand test,55 if it is not negligent for Larry to drive 
at a moderate speed rather than walk, this means that the burden of not driving on a 
given occasion is greater than the marginal costs of driving on that occasion (where 
risks of injuring others are prominent among these costs).  But multiplying occasions 
simply amounts to multiplying each side of this equation by the same number.  The 
resulting equation will obviously preserve the original inequality.  If, for one drive, 
B > P x L, so that the actor is not negligent, then obviously, for 10,000 drives,  
[10,000 x B] > [10,000 x (P x L)], and the actor is still not negligent.56 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Michael Moore, Act and Crime (1993); Alexander & Ferzan, supra note =, at =. 
53 One further reason justifies agnosticism about how to individuate “acts.”  The only concept 
that we really need in order to defend ICAA and to explain why statistical knowledge is 
distinguishable from individualized knowledge is the concept of a shorter rather than longer 
episode of conduct in which the actor (1) creates risks of harm, (2) is potentially culpable, and 
in which (3) the episode is repeatable.  The episode could, but need not, be an “act.”  Let me 
explain. 
 Individualized knowledge, as I define it, means that an actor believes he is imposing 
a risk of harm on the particular victim greater than some threshold probability T (e.g., 75%).  
(See Appendix.)  So if an actor believes that the risk of harm to the victim due to his acts or 
conduct during the relevant episode is as large as T, then he causes that harm with 
individualized knowledge.  If, however, he believes that the risk is less than T, then he lacks 
individualized knowledge.  The point of ICAA is to emphasize the following: if A1 engages 
in a short episode of conduct that does not create a risk to an individual victim as high as T, 
while A2 engages in a longer episode that also falls short of creating a risk to an individual 
victim as high as T, then: (a) neither has acted with individualized knowledge, and (b) A2’s 
culpability is presumptively no greater than A1’s. 
 I thank Kim Ferzan for pressing me on the “act individuation” problem, though I am 
confident that she will find this resolution unsatisfactory. 
54 This form of consequentialism, however, is truncated: it examines only whether a 
particular type of act or behavior is optimal or instead deficient or unjustified.  A broader 
consequentialist account will also consider whether it is optimal to impose legal sanctions on 
behavior that is suboptimal in the narrower, truncated sense.  See Simons, Tort Negligence, 
supra note 13=, at = . 
55 The Learned Hand test need not be understood in consequentialist terms, however.  See 
Simons, The Hand Formula, supra note =, at  =; Simons, Tort Negligence, supra note 13=, at 
=. 
56 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 261 (8th ed. 2011): 
Consider a railroad that because it runs many trains every year knows with a 
confidence approaching certainty that it will kill 20 people a year at railroad 
crossings.  Is it therefore an intentional tortfeasor?  It is not, either in law or in 
economics.  The same thing that makes PL high—the scale of the railroad’s 
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But a nonconsequentialist also can, and indeed should, endorse ICAA.  
Whatever criterion of unjustifiable risk-creation a nonconsequentialist endorses for a 
single act, the criterion should apply mutatis mutandis to multiple acts of the same 
type.  For example, suppose the criterion is this: it is only justifiable to impose a risk 
of serious injury on others so long as those others either (a) consent to or benefit 
from the risk or (b) impose a risk of similar magnitude on the actor.  Then if a single 
risky act by Larry is sufficiently reciprocal in the risks it creates to satisfy this 
criterion of permissible risk-imposition, multiple acts of that type are also 
sufficiently reciprocal to satisfy the criterion.  And the analysis should be the same 
for most other plausible nonconsequentialist criteria.57 
Consider a highly abstract depiction of the argument: 
 
Chart 1:   Larry 
  
Disvalue of risk 
(of causing personal injury) 
 
Value of benefit 
 
Larry, one drive 






Larry, 20,000 drives 
[Not at fault] 
 
20,000 





The example is stylized insofar as the numbers represent magnitudes of values that 
cannot really be quantified with any precision.58  Thus, I am simply positing that 
                                                                                                                               
operations—makes B high.  The ratio of B to PL is unaffected by the scale of the 
potential injurer’s operation, and it is the ratio that enables us to differentiate 
between intentional and unintentional torts in an economically relevant sense. 
57 For example, drivers on a highway or bicyclists on a bicycle path pose significant risks of 
harm to each other.  If those risks are sufficiently reciprocal to be justified on a 
nonconsequentialist account, then it is justifiable for a driver or bicyclist to impose them 
once, twice, or a million times.  (For some nonconsequentialist accounts of unjustifiable risk-
creation, see note 36= supra.) 
 At the same time, I concede that ICAA will not hold for nonconsequentialist criteria 
that include thresholds.  And sometimes, as I suggest below, thresholds are plausible to 
include (as when environmental risks are harmless below an aggregate threshold and harmful 
above).  Often, however, thresholds are very problematic.  Nonconsequentialist views that 
very broadly prohibit the imposition of “substantial” or “significant” risks have to be 
formulated very carefully in order to avoid the arbitrary framing objection I have noted.  Cf. 
Keating =; Wright =. 
58 Moreover, for purposes of both economic analysis and other approaches (including 
nonconsequentialist principles) that analyze the justifiability of risk-creation, one should 
focus on the marginal risks and benefits of a particular level of care.  See Simons, Tort 
Negligence, supra note 13 =.  For simplicity, I do not emphasize this marginal feature in the 
charts, but it would be possible to modify the charts to reflect it.   
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“20,000” is an abstract measure of the disvalue of creating a 70% risk of causing 
personal injury.  And I am not assuming a consequentialist justification for the legal 
sanction or regulation of the risky conduct, though I am indeed assuming that the 
justification (whether consequentialist or nonconsequentialist) requires some type of 
balancing of socially recognized risk and socially recognized benefit.59  But the chart 
is still useful in revealing significant relationships (as will become more apparent 
shortly when additional examples are added). 
 Chart 1 illustrates one important lesson of ICAA: if we initially and properly 
characterize behavior as not faulty, we should not deem the behavior faulty simply 
because it occurs more often.  Suppose a known 70% probability of causing personal 
injury (in a case such as Clara or Eleanor) suffices as individualized knowledge.  
ICAA provides that if Larry drives carefully, then even if over 20,000 drives he 
knows there is a 70% probability that his driving will cause personal injury to 
someone, he should not be treated the same as those actors possessing individualized 
knowledge.  We should not elevate his culpability simply because he drives more 
frequently. 
To be sure, ICAA sometimes needs to be qualified in order to address 
exceptional situations.  One exception involves thresholds of harm.  If an actor 
contributes to a social harm, and that harm is significant only if it exceeds some 
threshold, then the actor might owe a special duty not to contribute to crossing that 
threshold.  Some environmental harms fit this description: certain contaminants are 
hazardous to health only if the aggregate air or water pollution that they create 
exceeds a particular level.  In such circumstances, ICAA should not apply strictly.  
The fact that a farmer or manufacturer could justifiably produce a small amount of 
pollution in light of the social benefits of his activity does not mean that it can 
justifiably produce a much larger amount of pollution, even if the social benefits are 
also proportionately greater.60  Similarly, a driver might not be justified in taking as 
many trips as he likes in a city where aggregate air pollution from automobiles is a 
health hazard, even if he would be justified in taking that many trips in an 
unpolluted city.  However, these types of cases are exceptional, and ICAA can be 
qualified to accommodate them.  By contrast, for the kind of risky conduct and 
activities most commonly at issue in tort and criminal law, there is no threshold 
which the actor has a special duty not to exceed, nor is there an invariant threshold 
(of probability or of expected harm) below which the risk of harm is 
inconsequential.  Aggregate property damage and physical injury are social harms 
that normally increase in rough proportion to increases in such risky activities as 
                                                                                                                               
Furthermore, the permissibility of an act and the degree of its reprehensibility 
cannot be adequately expressed as simple functions of two continuously varying values, at 
least on any moral or legal theory more subtle than economic cost-benefit analysis.  The 
number of relevant values could be much more numerous, and the way in which they 
matter—the structure of wrongdoing—could be much more complex.  For one recent, 
promising effort to formalize nonconsequentialist constraints on consequentialist balancing, 
see Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Economics, and Morality (2010). 
59 See Simons, Tort Negligence, supra note 13=. 
60 For discussion, see Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. I: Harm to 
Others (Oxford 1984), pp. 225-232. 
  A range of scenarios needs to be addressed in order to fully analyze the threshold of 
harm issue.  For example, even a tiny contribution from one manufacturer might, when 
combined with tiny contributions from 200 other manufacturers, exceed the threshold, in 
which case all of the manufacturers arguably have a duty not to contribute to the harm. 
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driving, distributing a particular type of product, constructing a particular type of 
building, or performing a particular type of medical procedure. 
 
C. Does ICAA apply to faulty actors? 
 Now consider whether ICAA applies to faulty actors.  Does it preserve 
whatever level of fault the actor displays in a single action, even if the actor repeats 
the action?  Or can repetition increase the level of fault?61  Recall the example of 
Maxwell, who routinely chooses to drive ten miles per hour over the speed limit.  In 
any individual drive, he is negligent and at worst reckless.62  If he drives a thousand 
times, does he become a knowing wrongdoer?  If his speeding causes a death on his 
nine hundredth drive, is he guilty of murder (which typically is defined to include 
knowing causation of death) or instead of manslaughter (often defined as reckless 
homicide)?  On first glance, the number of times that he engages in a particular type 
of act does not seem to change his culpability; the ICAA principle seems to apply.  
Thus, manslaughter seems to be the more appropriate level of punishment.  Of 
course, the fact that he repeatedly acts unjustifiably certainly warrants imposing 
aggregate legal sanctions (whether in the form of civil fines, civil liability, or 
criminal punishment) that reflect the aggregate risks and harms he has created.  But 
ICAA instructs that the warranted total sanction is merely additive, equaling only 
(but no more than) the sum of the warranted sanctions for each act.63 
Yet this initial conclusion, that ICAA should extend to the benefit of faulty 
actors, may be too hasty.  In the earlier example, Larry took a justifiable risk, and 
ICAA properly applied.  But perhaps ICAA does not apply when an actor such as 
Maxwell takes unjustifiable risks (or otherwise demonstrates culpability) in a series 
of acts.  Here, it seems, the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.  On this 
view, Maxwell’s speeding twenty times is a worse state of affairs or reflects greater 
aggregate fault than an alternative state of affairs in which twenty different, 
unrelated individuals each speeds once. 
                                                 
61 This issue is particularly acute when the “aggregation” or multiplication occurs over time, 
rather than over space.  The examples discussed in this section involve the former. 
 Most of the analysis in this section, including the argument that the culpability for 
the “whole” course of conduct sometimes can be greater than the culpability for a “part,” does 
not apply when the multiplication is merely “spatial.”  If Domino’s Pizza adopts a policy 
today requiring its delivery drivers to speed in order to assure prompt delivery, that negligent 
or reckless policy remain negligent or reckless, whether it applies the policy to ten, a 
thousand, or 100,000 drivers.  But if it continues the policy over time, new arguments emerge 
for attributing to Domino’s a higher level of culpability.  See TAN = infra. 
62 Is Maxwell reckless?  Is he sufficiently “aware” of the risk of harm he is posing simply 
because he has a general, background appreciation of the risks of speeding?  On some 
modern formulations, such as the Model Penal Code’s, the state probably must show more: 
that he possess a more vivid or specific awareness of the particular risk that his speeding 
poses on the given occasion.  See Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea 
Provisions Be Amended?, supra note 15=, at =. 
63 I do not mean to suggest that a retributivist must endorse a simple additive formula for 
converting desert into punishment.  Even if D1’s criminal desert is twice that of D2, it hardly 
follows that D1 ought to be incarcerated for precisely twice as long as D2.  How one 
converts retributive desert into actual institutional punishments raises difficult questions of 
quality and quantity of punishment that I do not explore here.  Similar difficulties attend the 
task of converting an actor’s culpability into tort punitive damages on a corrective justice or 
other nonconsequentialist tort principle.  If D3 is twice as culpable as D4, it does not follow 
that the punitive award that D3 should pay ought to be twice as large as the award that D4 
should pay. 
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Consider the fact that the criminal laws of most states punish recidivists 
especially harshly.64  In this respect, they depart from ICAA, for they impose on the 
recidivist a punishment significantly greater than would be warranted if he had 
committed only his most recent offense and no prior offenses.  (Put differently, his 
total punishment for all offenses will exceed—often by an enormous amount—the 
sum of the distinct punishments that would otherwise be warranted if each of the 
recidivist’s offenses had been committed by different individuals.65)  Similarly, a 
tort defendant who repeatedly endangered others (e.g. someone with a long history 
of drunk driving) would be a prime candidate for punitive as well as compensatory 
damages, even if the dangerous acts, if committed by distinct individuals, would 
only warrant compensatory damages.66 
A consequentialist has good reason not to apply ICAA to (individually) 
faulty actions.  If Maxwell repeatedly acts unjustifiably, a greater than usual 
sanction will often be needed in order to specifically deter him, since he (by 
hypothesis) has not been deterred by the normal threatened sanction for the prior 
acts; and similarly, general deterrence might be undermined unless we imposed a 
greater sanction for actors who repeatedly commit wrongs.  Thus, consequentialist 
analysis does justify recidivist sanctions (and comparable sanctions) that depart from 
ICAA.  However, for Larry, who repeatedly acts justifiably, consequentialism 
requires adherence to ICAA.  A cost-benefit analysis suggests no reason for 
recharacterizing his culpability as faulty rather than faultless, simply because he 
repeats his acts.  After all, by hypothesis, the net social value of a single act (judged 
                                                 
64 To be sure, it is controversial whether and why we are justified in imposing greater civil or 
criminal sanctions on recidivists and those with a record of drunk driving than ICAA would 
permit.  But the justification, if any, cannot be simply that recidivists realize that harm is 
proportionately more likely to occur if they commit risky activity more frequently.  If that 
were the only reason, there would be no justification for enhanced punishment of recidivists.  
Other possible reasons are examined in the text below. 
65 But note that often the law takes the opposite tack and grants an effective “bulk discount” 
to a different type of “recidivist,” the offender who commits numerous crimes prior to being 
caught.  The state will typically punish Maxwell much less for speeding twenty times before 
being apprehended than the aggregate punishment that it will impose on twenty unrelated 
individuals who each independently speeds once.  How (or whether) retributivists can 
explain such a discount is a difficult question.  See Jesper Ryberg, Retributivism and 
Multiple Offending, 11 Res Publica 213 (2005); Alexander & Ferzan on “volume discounts” 
in punishment. =.  Perhaps, when one has committed not two or three but fifty burglaries, a 
discount is appropriate because the behavior expresses a compulsiveness that is somewhat 
mitigating.  
 However, there are many complicating factors at play here, beyond principles of 
just deserts.  For example, a judge might give the one-time speeder a higher punishment than 
his conduct by itself deserves in order to teach him a lesson, or because she believes he has 
likely engaged in numerous similar risky acts for which he escaped apprehension or sanction. 
66 One might further distinguish between “de jure” recidivists, who have been convicted of a 
prior crime or found liable for a prior tort, and “de facto” recidivists, who have engaged in 
similar criminal or tortious acts in the past but have not been legally sanctioned for them.  
(See prior footnote.)  The extra culpability of a de facto recidivist arises from his persistence 
in endangering others.  His defiance of his legal obligations is at most implicit.  The extra 
culpability of a de jure recidivist is arguably greater, arising both from such persistence and 
from his explicit defiance of his legal obligations.  =  See TAN = next page.= 
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ex ante) is positive, so the net social value of a series of identical acts will also be 
positive and proportionately greater.67 
But on a nonconsequentialist account, does ICAA continue to apply even to 
wrongful and unjustifiable conduct?  The answer is less straightforward.  One 
important complication here flows from an empirical observation.  When someone 
repeats such conduct, he often does so with a higher level of culpability than 
before—for he might, in the process of repeating the act, either develop a new level 
of awareness of the risks, or act with an especially egregious motive or attitude not 
present in a single culpable act.  However, on closer inspection, such cases are not 
really a counterexample to ICAA; rather, they are simply instances in which, as an 
empirical matter, ICAA’s ceteris paribus condition does not apply.  Let me explain. 
As noted above, ICAA holds true if we keep constant all other factors 
relevant to culpability, including beliefs, intentions, motives, benefits, and harms.  
But as an empirical matter, the repetition of wrongful acts often will be accompanied 
not only by mere repetition of these culpability factors, but also by new elements or 
degrees of culpability.  Thus, in practice, an actor (such as a speeding driver) will 
often have a more confident and certain belief about the harmful results of his 
conduct as he repeats the conduct, especially if the conduct occasionally results in 
harm.68  For example, even if a single incident would only be judged negligent, 
repetition of the very same conduct will often be judged reckless, simply because the 
evidence is now clear that the repeating actor has become cognizant of the risks.69  
And similarly, when the conduct repeats, a legal decision-maker will also have more 
confidence in judging that the actor was aware of the risk all along.  Moreover, as 
the number of acts multiplies and the time frame expands, the actor can no longer 
rely on the claim that the act was impulsive and thus less culpable.70  And since he 
                                                 
67 See Posner, supra note =.  This analysis requires qualification.  It is possible that the single 
act, considered alone, does not have positive net social value, but is not worth regulating by 
legal sanctions because the costs of such regulation are excessive.  Yet it is quite conceivable 
that a series of similar acts are worth regulating, if the marginal costs of regulation decline 
sufficiently with the increased number of acts.  (The state might not find it worthwhile to 
prosecute a petty theft unless the offender is known to have committed numerous small 
thefts.) 
68 On the other hand, if an actor repeatedly engages in risky conduct yet fortuitously does not 
cause harm, he might lower his subjective probability estimate of the risk.  On a purely 
subjective understanding of culpability, this will lower his culpability.  But it is often 
unreasonable to respond to nonoccurrence of harm by lowering one’s subjective estimate of 
the ex ante risk.  Speeding drivers only rarely cause harm, but they can become irrationally 
overconfident that their speeding is not risky until they actually cause an accident.  One 
solution to this problem is to permit legal liability for running risks that are wrongful in some 
“objective” sense (e.g. from the perspective of a reasonable person). 
69 Indeed, faultless conduct can become faulty due to these effects of repetition.  An actor 
might not realize, and might be blameless for not realizing, that a particular risk exists in an 
unfamiliar and rare context—for example, that it is worthwhile to check the brakes of a rental 
car before leaving the rental lot.  But if he rents cars every month and on one occasion 
discovers this problem, perhaps he has a duty to check thereafter. 
70 With impulsive, sudden reactions, even if the actor is aware of the harm his action might 
cause, he is sometimes less blameworthy because he merely has an intellectual, not affective, 
awareness of the significance of that result, or because he has not really considered the result, 
much less considered it carefully.  See also Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 392 
(“[R]epetition [of a criminal act] shows that more of the person, a deeper aspect, is behind 
it—it was not just one isolated passing whim.”). 
Similarly, if the actor’s knowledge is latent, rather than uppermost in his consciousness, 
that might be a reason to mitigate his legal liability.  See, e.g., Moore & Hurd, draft on 
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has more opportunities for reconsideration of his acts and more opportunities to take 
mitigating precautions, his failure to take such steps suggests a more considered 
elevation of his own interests over the welfare of others, and thus adds to his 
culpability.  Indeed, certain actors (such as corporations) sometimes have an 
affirmative duty to disclose past wrongs; continued nondisclosure might then elevate 
the wrongdoing to the level of fraudulent concealment. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that this empirical gloss is the entire 
(nonconsequentialist) story.  Apart from these empirical contingencies, both the 
recidivist premium and similar policies of aggravation seem defensible in principle.  
Specifically, it seems justifiable:  
(1) to punish recidivists more harshly than they would deserve if they had only 
committed their most recent crime;  
(2) to impose especially severe punishment on actors who successively create 
multiple risks of harm in a single extended criminal episode;71 and 
(3) to impose punitive damages on corporations that continue to market a dangerous 
product even after they realize the danger. 
These positions rest on a rejection of ICAA as normatively unattractive in this 
context, even if it might sometimes be empirically applicable.  An actor who persists 
in wrongdoing repeatedly is legitimately viewed as committing a wrong more 
serious than the composite wrong that is constituted by the sum of the individual 
unjustifiable acts.  And this is not merely because, empirically, the course of conduct 
is likely either to produce higher levels of awareness or to provide more 
opportunities for reconsideration that we can fault the actor for not exploiting. 
Rather, I believe the explanation is this: such persistence often reveals the 
culpability of defiance.  This defiance of legal and social norms is a distinctive type 
of wrong, a wrong that transcends the culpability of the individual acts, and might 
properly warrant enhanced legal sanction.72  The whole can indeed be greater than 
the sum of the parts. 
The issue remains, however: just how culpable are such “repeat offenders”?  
Specifically, we should ask two critical questions about actors who repeatedly 
engage in culpable acts:  
(1) Does the statistical knowledge that such actors possess genuinely 
amount to enhanced culpability?   
(2) If so, does it boost culpability all the way up to the level of 
individualized knowledge? 
                                                                                                                               
negligence=.  But as the actor continues to engage in numerous acts of a similar nature, his 
knowledge of the risks that they pose will often become more “occurrent” and less latent. 
71 E.g. =, where D was found guilty of depraved heart murder because of his willingness to 
expose numerous victims to lethal harm over an extended period of highly dangerous 
driving. 
72 I do not have space here for a full discussion of the nature of defiance as a distinct form of 
culpability.  Some valuable discussions include: Jean Hampton, Mens Rea = ; =.  Hampton 
characterizes the most serious types of criminal culpability as exhibiting defiance and 
therefore justifiably incurring serious punishment.  Her argument, however, applies to single 
as well as multiple acts, and thus is considerably broader than the argument I make here.  See 
also Stuart Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White Collar Crime 
(Oxford 2006)(=); Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account," 87 Texas 
Law Review 571 (2009) (=Give description). 
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Those who entirely reject the distinction between statistical knowledge and 
individualized knowledge (at least for culpable actors) answer yes to both questions.  
But careful reflection supports much more qualified answers—namely, “sometimes 
yes,” to question (1), and “only very rarely,” to question (2).  In answering these 
questions, we need to consider them from both the empirical and the normative 
dimensions just noted. 
On the empirical dimension, the answer to these questions is highly 
contextual.  Someone who speeds on the highway repeatedly might not have any 
greater awareness of the risks he is posing the fiftieth time he speeds than the first 
time, and the repetition need not reveal an especially blameworthy reason for his 
conduct.  On the other hand, a corporate defendant that distributes a defective, 
harmful product might legitimately doubt the significance or even the reality of the 
problem if only a few incidents have been brought to its attention, but as the 
incidents greatly multiply, this attitude is no longer credible or defensible.  And even 
if the multiplication of incidents merely reflects a proportionate increase in units of 
the product distributed over time, the fact that the corporation has a more extended 
time period for identifying and correcting the problem justifies treating the “repeat 
offender” corporation as more responsible if it fails to act. 
With respect to question (2), again the answer depends on the context.  
Someone who seriously endangers others repeatedly during a single episode of 
drunk driving and then finally causes a pedestrian’s death might properly be treated 
as harshly as a driver who knowingly causes another’s death; indeed, the doctrine of 
extreme indifference murder would, in many states, treat them the same.73  One 
rationale for this result is that such an actor ordinarily becomes increasingly aware 
of the risks he is imposing and of the need to take compensating precautions.  
Another rationale is that such an actor’s conduct is an extraordinary departure from 
reasonable care, so extraordinary that it is comparable to the decision by an actor 
(such as Clara, above) to knowingly endanger a victim on a single occasion.  On the 
other hand, if the culpability of each of the multiple acts in question just barely 
satisfies the legal criteria of recklessness, then it would usually not be a 
proportionate sanction to treat the actor as severely as he would deserve if he had 
possessed individualized knowledge.  One who drives just above the speed limit 
every day of his adult life, and thus can be fairly certain that he will cause property 
damage to another’s automobile on some indeterminate occasion, should not, on that 
occasion, be treated as harshly as one who has, on one particular occasion, driven in 
a highly dangerous manner and thus knowingly damaged another’s automobile. 
On the normative dimension, we must consider how much normative weight 
should attach to the actor’s defiance (apart from the culpability expressed in the 
individual acts taken separately).  Sometimes it is indeed appropriate to “bump up” 
the actor’s culpability level for legal purposes when he repeatedly engages in what 
would otherwise be merely reckless behavior.74  But I believe that this aggravation 
                                                 
73 =cites. 
74 This analysis might also apply to “negligent” behavior insofar as negligence includes not 
only inadvertence but also instances where the actor has a degree of awareness that falls 
short of what legal recklessness would require, e.g. awareness of what the actor believes to 
be an insignificant risk. 
How does the individualized/ statistical knowledge debate apply to those negligent 
actors who are completely unaware of a relevant risk, but who should have been aware?  
Does ICAA apply to negligently inadvertent actors?  Perhaps not.  Perhaps as the number of 
risk impositions increases, it becomes more fair to blame an actor for not recognizing the 
significance of those risks. 
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in culpability is rarely enough to justify treating the actor as severely as a person 
with individualized knowledge.  To be sure, it is usually justifiable to punish 
wrongdoers much more harshly when they intentionally injure or endanger others 
repeatedly (for example, when they repeatedly rape, murder, or rob).  Yet it is quite 
another matter to punish a wrongdoer much more severely simply because of their 
more extensive knowledge of the harms they will cause or have caused—i.e., simply 
because, in performing a single act, the actor is aware of a risk that the law deems 
unjustifiable, while in repeatedly performing acts of that type, he is aware of a 
proportionately greater cumulative risk.  The “defiance supplement,” if you will, is 
justifiably much greater in the first type of case (where the actor intends to harm or 
endanger) than in the second (where the actor displays only cognitive fault, i.e. an 
awareness of an unjustifiable risk).   
To make this more concrete, reconsider Maxwell, who regularly speeds a 
little above the speed limit.  Suppose his awareness of the risk on any given drive is 
just barely enough (in terms of the specificity of his consciousness, and the 
magnitude of the risk he believes he is running) to make him legally reckless.  Now 
suppose that he takes 4,000 drives, rather than one, and suppose he is aware of the 
statistical high probability (say, 70%) that in the course of all of these drives, he will 
cause some personal injury to someone at some point.  Does his statistical 
knowledge warrant treating him the same as Ned, who speeds through a very busy 
intersection on a single occasion, aware that he is 70% certain to cause personal 
injury to a pedestrian?  Is Maxwell’s acting with statistical knowledge really as 
culpable as Ned’s acting with individual knowledge?  Or suppose, in a variation, that 
Maxwell realizes that his 4,000 drives have a 70% chance of causing another’s 
death.  After numerous drives, he does kill a pedestrian.  Compare Ned taking a 
single highly dangerous drive, e.g. a drive in which he knowingly runs over a 
pedestrian while recognizing a 70% chance that this will kill her.  In most 
jurisdictions, it is clear that Ned will be guilty of murder, while Maxwell is more 
likely to be guilty, not of murder, but of numerous acts of speeding plus one act of 
manslaughter.75 
A primary explanation for treating statistical knowledge less harshly than 
individualized knowledge here is that acting with statistical knowledge, while 
unjustifiable in this scenario, is much less unjustifiable than acting with 
individualized knowledge.  For the individualized knowledge case is characterized 
by a much greater disproportion between risk and (conceivable justifying) benefit.  
Assume that the actor’s reason for taking the risk is the same in both cases—to 
                                                 
75 One significant complication is how this analysis is affected by our rejection or acceptance 
of moral luck, i.e., of the idea that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a harmful result 
should matter to culpability.  If we reject moral luck, then Maxwell should be punished 
equally for all his acts of endangerment, whether or not they cause injury (so long as they are 
sufficiently close to causing harm that they can be considered, in effect, “last act” attempts), 
while Ned should be punished for his single act of attempted murder.  Given the multitude of 
Maxwell’s acts, his aggregate punishment might exceed Ned’s. 
 However, if we accept moral luck, then both Maxwell and Ned receives a more 
serious punishment if their act results in death, and each act has about the same chance of 
doing so.  Thus, it seems likely that accepting moral luck will tend to result in a lesser 
disparity of treatment between Maxwell and Ned than will rejecting moral luck. 
Of course, moral luck does count in tort law, where liability for compensatory 
damages depends on actually causing harm. 
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arrive home earlier in order to relieve a babysitter and care for a sick child.76  Again 
in highly stylized form, the two cases (and the case of Larry, the faultless driver) can 
be analyzed as follows. 
 
Chart 2:   Larry, Maxwell, Ned 
  
Disvalue of risk 
(of causing personal injury) 
 
Value of benefit 
 
Larry, one drive 






Larry, 20,000 drives 
[Not at fault] 
 
20,000 



























 This chart reveals a dramatic difference between Maxwell and Ned: 
Maxwell’s conduct produces a much larger social benefit.  This difference 
legitimately bears on the appropriate legal sanction for that conduct. 
When one looks at these charts, it is easy to see that Larry should not be 
considered legally at fault in either scenario—or more precisely, he should not be 
considered culpable in the second if he is not treated as culpable in the first.  It is 
also evident that Maxwell’s 4,000 drives are, in one important way, much less 
culpable than Ned’s drive.  Of course, in another way—the defiance exhibited by the 
repeated faulty behavior—his 4,000 drives are more culpable. 
 
D. The special stringency principle (SSP) for highly concentrated risks 
What deeper principle explains the presumptive unjustifiability of acting 
with individualized knowledge?  A partial answer is the following deontological 
principle, which I will call the “special stringency principle” (SSP): one owes an 
especially stringent duty not to impose highly concentrated risks on another.  For 
                                                 
76 The structure of the analysis does not significantly change if the “benefit” is of little or no 
social value, such as catching the beginning of a televised basketball game, or racing a friend 
to one’s house, though the “benefit” numbers would be much lower. 
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this reason, the moral and legal constraint against knowingly causing a serious harm 
is especially stringent, indeed disproportionately more stringent than the constraint 
against recklessly causing a serious harm.77 
Two more characters, Alfa and Benna, illustrate the point. 
 
Suppose Alfa speeds in the vicinity of a pedestrian, knowing that she is 
almost certain to kill him, because this is the only way to save the lives of 
five passengers whom she must bring to the hospital.  Benna speeds in the 
vicinity of a pedestrian, aware that she is running a 20% risk of killing him, 
because that is the only way to save the life of one passenger whom she 
must bring to the hospital.  Many would conclude that Alfa acted 
impermissibly while Benna acted permissibly.  Most would at least conclude 
that justifying Alfa’s conduct is more difficult than justifying Benna’s.  And 
yet the justifying benefits in each case are five times the expected harm.  
(Put another way, if 20 Alfa-situations and 100 Benna-situations arise each 
year, then the Alfa-situations and Benna-situations will each result in 20 
deaths and the saving of 100 lives annually.)78 
 
Many consequentialists would treat Alfa-situations and Benna-situations the 
same, because each scenario produces the same expected net saving of lives (the 
“same” in the sense that each produces an identical 5:1 ratio of [expected lives 
saved: expected lives lost]).  But many nonconsequentialist will treat the two 
scenarios differently in the way suggested in the quoted passage.79 
We can represent this “special stringency principle” (SSP) in graphic form: 
 
                                                 
77 See Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, supra note 36=, at 65, from which the following 
discussion is taken.  I owe the Alfa/Benna example that follows to Leo Katz. 
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., Kamm, Intricate Ethics, supra note 19=, at =; T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other = (Harvard 1998).  Nonconsequentialists might also consider the risk imposition 
more justifiable as the absolute level of the benefits and the risks decreases further while the 
ratio of benefit to risk remains 5:1.  Suppose speeding driver Benna^ imposes a 2% risk of 
injury on a pedestrian in order to secure a 10% chance of saving the life of a passenger, and 
Benna^^ imposes a 0.2% risk of injury in order to secure a 1.0% chance of saving a 
passenger’s life.  Intuitively, the action of Benna^ is easier to justify than the action of Benna, 
and the action of Benna^^ is easiest to justify. 
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Chart 3:   Alfa, Benna 
  
Disvalue of risk 
(of causing death) 
 
Value of benefit 
(saving life) 
 
Alfa, one drive 
[probably at fault] 
 
1,000,000 
[100% risk of causing one death] 
 
5,000,000 
[100% chance of saving five lives] 
 
Benna, one drive 
[not at fault?] 
 
200,000 
[20% risk of causing one death] 
 
1,000,000 
[100% chance of saving one life] 
 
Again, the example is stylized,80 but it illustrates the basic point: on a 
nonconsequentialist approach, even if Benna’s conduct is justified, more than a 
proportionate increase in the expected benefit is required in order to justify Alfa’s 
conduct.  Indeed, the example also illustrates a related point: knowingly causing 
harm, in the individualized sense of knowledge, might be impermissible even if the 
expected benefits outweigh the expected risks as measured by a simple risk-benefit 
test.  This related point will be important in our discussion of corporate risk-creation, 
below. 
But now consider this variation: suppose Benna engages in repeated acts 
with a cumulative risk as great as Alfa’s single act?  Examine the last row below, a 
scenario in which Benna takes five drives: 
 
                                                 
80 The chart assumes that the benefit of saving a life is precisely equal in value to the harm of 
causing one death, but nothing turns on this assumption.  For example, one might believe that 
the claim of a bystander not to be killed is significantly stronger than the claim of a dying 
person to be saved; and of course many other factors might be relevant to the strength of 
these claims.  But even on these different assumptions, Alfa’s conduct remains more difficult 
to justify than Benna’s. 
Also note that the benefit secured by Benna in one drive is described as “one life.”  
This could literally mean one life, i.e., one passenger will be saved.  Or it could refer to 
expected value, e.g., five sick passengers are in the car, and there is a 20% chance that all 
will certainly be saved (or it could refer to some other permutation with an expected benefit 
of one life).  For purposes of the current discussion, these differences do not matter, though 
for other purposes, they might.= 
Finally, I have translated “almost certain” risk of death as 100%, to simplify the 
exposition; but in the real world, the percentage would undoubtedly be lower—say, 90% or 
95%.  The same is true of the probability that the action will save lives, which undoubtedly is 
less than 100%.  These variations do not affect the basis analysis. 
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Chart 4:   Alfa, Benna, Repeat Benna 
  
Disvalue of risk 
(of causing death) 
 
Value of benefit 
(saving life) 
 
Alfa, one drive 
[probably at fault] 
 
1,000,000 
[100% risk of causing one death] 
 
5,000,000 
[100% chance of saving five lives] 
 
Benna, one drive 
[not at fault?] 
 
200,000 
[20% risk of causing one death] 
 
1,000,000 
[100% chance of saving one life] 
 
“Repeat Benna,” 
or R-Benna,  
five drives 
[not at fault?] 
 
1,000,000 
[Almost 100% aggregate risk of 
causing one death] 
 
5,000,000 
[100% chance of saving five lives] 
 
Is the culpability of “repeat Benna,” who takes five equally risky drives, closer to 
that of Alfa or closer to that of “one-drive Benna”?81 
 The discussion earlier provides an answer.  If “one drive” Benna acts 
permissibly, then ICAA provides that “repeat” Benna (or R-Benna) acts permissibly 
as well.  If “one drive” Benna acts impermissibly, then R-Benna’s culpability is no 
greater, except to the extent that greater fault attaches to her repeated acts because 
they reflect her defiance of moral and legal duties.  But we should not treat R-Benna 
as harshly as Alfa—with one important exception that “proves (the rationale for) the 
rule.”82 
 Here is the exception.  Suppose (and I realize that this is fanciful) that the 
multiple drives of R-Benna all endanger one and only one victim.  For example, 
imagine that the route to the hospital bypasses a private home where a young child is 
always lingering right by the road.  The 20% risk of death that this R-Benna (call her 
R-Benna*) poses on each drive is a risk only to this child.  When R-Benna* 
                                                 
81 A further complication is the computation of the aggregate risks and benefits Benna 
creates over five drives.  If the probability of harm and of benefit from one drive is 
independent of the probability from each other drive, which I have implicitly assumed, then 
we cannot simply add the risks or probabilities.  Instead, the risk that Benna will cause death 
after five separate drives is actually 1-(1-.2)5 = 1-(.8)5 = 0.67 or 67%. 
 This complication is ultimately not that important: we can make it irrelevant if we 
change the example so that the risk of death from Alfa’s one drive is 67%; then five drives 
by Benna creates the same aggregate risk.  (Or if Alfa is characterized as causing a higher 
risk of death, such as 90%, then it turns out that Benna would have to take a very large 
number of drives, each creating a risk of 20%, in order to reach that cumulative risk—more 
than ten drives, in fact!) 
82 As a contingent matter, it is also possible that as Benna increases the number of her drives, 
(a) she develops a clearer awareness of the risks that she is running on any given drive, or (b) 
in some other way her fifth drive is no longer relevantly identical to her first.  See TAN = 
supra. 
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continues to drive past the child a sufficient number of times that the aggregate risk 
to that child is the same as the risk posed by Alfa to the victim on Alfa’s single 
drive, there is no longer much distinction between R-Benna* and Alfa.  The reason 
is clear: R-Benna* is now imposing all of the risk of her activity on a single person.  
But that is precisely why Alfa’s conduct is especially difficult to justify.  That is the 
force of the special stringency principle.83 
The R-Benna* example vividly highlights a crucial but underappreciated 
reason why an actor such as Alfa is especially culpable and is ordinarily much more 
culpable than either single-trip or multiple-trip Benna: an actor commits a distinctive 
and especially serious moral and legal wrong when the risks from her conduct are 
highly concentrated and distributed upon a single victim.84  Note that this 
distribution-of-risk explanation is not a counterexample to ICAA; rather, ICAA 
simply does not apply when acts significantly differ in how they distribute the risk 
of harm (as I explained earlier in defining ICAA).  If R-Benna’s five drives 
endanger different classes of victims, ICAA applies: her multiple drives are no more 
culpable than a single drive.  But if her five drives all endanger the same victim, 
ICAA no longer applies: that victim is now subjected to a much more concentrated 
risk.85 
                                                 
83 For a similar example, see Alexander and Ferzan, supra note =, at 65: 
Suppose … that the risks of tunnel building were concentrated on one known 
individual—Sam. Sam lives near the construction site, has a rare medical condition 
such that repetitive jack-hammering will eventually cause him to die, and cannot be 
moved. If tunnel building’s benefits justify the loss of several statistical lives, does it 
likewise justify the killing of Sam? It is possible that some acts are justifiable only if, 
from our ungodlike epistemic vantage point, the risks of an act are borne by many 
individuals rather than concentrated on one—even if God knows the one on whom 
the harm will actually fall, and whose risk is therefore one. 
84 For another illustration, recall Maxwell and Ned (Chart 2).  In this comparison, the 
disparity in risk that each imposes on any single victim is even greater, so it is even clearer 
that Maxwell’s 4,000 drives should not be equated in culpability to Ned’s single drive even 
though the aggregate risk imposed by Maxwell is the same as the risk imposed by Ned.  But 
by the same token, if one can imagine a world in which Maxwell’s thousands of drives all 
endanger only a single victim (a desert island inhabited only by Maxwell and a disabled 
victim?), then the aggregate risk imposed by Maxwell on that one victim is the same as the 
risk Ned imposes on his single victim.  Of course, Maxwell is still arguably less culpable 
insofar as the benefits that his 4,000 drives provide far exceed the benefit that Ned’s one drive 
provides. 
85 A related “concentration of risk” argument also helps explain an otherwise puzzling aspect 
of self-defense proportionality doctrine. 
 The defender is permitted to use no more than “proportional” force, but this 
requirement is weaker than it might seem in several respects.  One respect is that the 
defender is permitted to use individually proportional force against each of multiple 
attackers, if that is necessary to defend himself, even though the aggregate force he would 
thereby inflict might seem disproportionate.  Consider some examples. 
 (a) D may kill attackers W1, W2, and W3 who are bent on killing him, even though 
the loss of their three lives is, in a sense, disproportionate to the loss of his own life.   
(b) E may not kill or seriously wound attacker X1 who is bent only on shoving E to 
the ground, even if this is the only way to stop X1’s nondeadly attack.  (Suppose E is elderly 
and frail.) 
(c) But F, like D, may use nondeadly force against attackers Y1, Y2, Y3, … Y10, 
who are bent only on harming him, even though the aggregate harm he will cause to the ten 
attackers is, in a sense, disproportionate to the harm that E would otherwise suffer.  (Suppose 
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Another illustration is Eleanor, a character in the introduction.  Eleanor is a 
builder who decides to forge ahead with her tunnel construction project despite her 
awareness that continuing the project requires lowering a fitting into place and very 
likely killing a worker trapped below.  She would properly be convicted of murder, I 
believe, for knowingly and unjustifiably causing that death.  But why should she be 
so harshly punished?  Would it not be perfectly acceptable for a tunnel builder 
(remember Agatha) to proceed, with great care, to build a tunnel even if she predicts 
that this will cause at least one death?  And would it not be at worst negligent for a 
tunnel builder (remember Bertha) to proceed, with less care, to build a tunnel that 
she predicts will cause at least one death? 
The answer is the special stringency principle (SSP): Eleanor has chosen to 
engage in an act she knows is virtually certain to kill the worker, and that choice 
requires an extraordinarily compelling justification.  The other scenarios are quite 
different: at no point in time does Agatha or Bertha take a particular action, or 
decline to employ a precautionary measure, that she knows will very likely kill a 
particular individual.86 
                                                                                                                               
that they would have jointly shoved him to the ground; he can prevent this only by use of a 
stun gun that would throw all of them to the ground.) 
(d) Now suppose that G, like F, is fending off a nondeadly attack from many 
attackers, in this case a hundred: Z1, Z2, Z3, … Z100.  The only weapon at G’s disposal will 
create a 1% risk of causing serious bodily injury or death.  Presumably he still may use the 
weapon; this will still, as to each individual attacker, create only a trivial risk of serious 
bodily injury.  And yet, in aggregate, it is almost certain to cause serious bodily injury or 
death to at least one of them. 
But if G’s defensive force is permissible, as I believe it is, then why isn’t E’s?  E, 
like G, has used the only necessary means to defend himself, and unfortunately has caused 
serious bodily injury or death. 
The answer, I think, is that the proportionality aspect of the right of self-defense 
does not simply give you the right to use a certain degree of force to defend yourself; rather, 
it gives you a right to use a certain degree of force vis-à-vis an individual attacker.  And you 
may not “concentrate” a disproportionate degree of force on one attacker, even if you could 
legitimately “distribute” that aggregate amount of force on a group of attackers, and even if 
that distributed force would probably result in one of the attackers suffering disproportionate 
harm. 
86 The Keating/Scanlon “World Cup” example, noted above, supra note 9=, would be 
analyzed similarly to Eleanor: even widespread social benefits do not justify failing to rescue 
the technician, because the broadcaster knows that his omission is highly likely to cause the 
technician’s death. 
Frances Kamm offers an example analogous to Eleanor.  She supposes that a town 
has a policy that an ambulance driver will not brake on the way to a hospital if braking will 
prevent him from saving several lives, even if not braking will kill a pedestrian in his path.  In 
an alternative version, she imagines that we are deciding whether to install a device on an 
ambulance that somehow will work precisely in the manner that the policy instructs, i.e., Do 
not brake if braking will lead to a net loss of lives even if not braking will cause a 
pedestrian’s death.  F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics, supra note 19=, at =; F.M. Kamm, 
Morality, Mortality, Vol. II: Rights, Duties, and Status 303-306 (1996).  Deontological 
principles, she plausibly argues, forbid both the policy and the installation of the device. [= 
GET QUOTE from intric. ethics =]; F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, at 303 (“[C]ertain ways 
of causing persons deaths cannot be made permissible by agreement because they are too 
inconsistent with the moral ideal of the person and interpersonal relations”).  A critical reason 
why the “do not brake” policy or device is impermissible is that the policy/device requires 
imposing a highly concentrated risk of harm on a single victim. 
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But this deontological principle is a bit puzzling.  Why should it matter that 
the risk is concentrated in this way?  Here are some possible explanations for SSP: 
(a)  Highly concentrated risk-exposures are especially likely to be 
nonreciprocal (disproportionately endangering the victim, and 
disproportionately benefiting others), and therefore especially likely to be 
unjust; 
(b) The participants might agree ex ante to accept lower level risks but not 
highly concentrated risks.   
These explanations hardly dissolve the puzzle, however.  First, from an omniscient 
perspective, when workers are accidentally killed in Agatha’s tunnel or Bertha’s 
tunnel, isn’t the actual risk of death to such a worker 100%?87  Second, this approach 
seems to count some lives as more worthy than others.  Why is it more important to 
save the life of Eleanor’s victim than the life of the victim of Agatha or of Bertha?  
Third, isn’t this approach paradoxical?  After all, the workers might all prefer to take 
the chance that they might be the unlucky one who needs to be sacrificed in 
precisely the manner that Eleanor sacrifices the worker.  They might even agree 
explicitly to take such a chance.  And yet many deontologists would still find the 
sacrifice unjustifiable.88  For analogous reasons, deontologists would reject ex ante 
agreement in other well-recognized scenarios where their principles depart from 
consequentialist reasoning.89 
The first and second points can be answered more readily than the third.  
The question we are addressing is how culpable the actor is in various legal 
                                                 
87 See the discussion by Alexander and Ferzan of Sam, at note = supra.  See also Richard 
Brook, Statistical and Identifiable Deaths, in Philosophy and its Public Role 167 (2004) at 
177, asserting that a builder such as Agatha and Bertha “can say … that, given the evidence, 
she believes the probability of death to each at risk is minimal. However, assuming 
determinism, she may also note that whoever dies had no chance to survive.”  Brook posits 
other hypotheticals that test the limits of the special stringency principle.  For example, 
suppose someone S knows who will die in the building project but cannot communicate with 
the builder.  If the builder knows that S knows the victim’s identity but the builder herself 
does not know the victim’s identity, may the builder continue with the project?  Id. at 171.  
Similarly, John Broome asks: “If a definite number of people are going to die, can it really 
make such a vast difference whether or not it is known who they are?”  John Broome, Ethics 
Out of Economics 179 (1999).  Broome goes on to offer several examples illustrating how 
implausible it is to make a project’s permissibility depend on whether the victims of the 
project are known.  Id.   
The short answer to Brook and Broome is that it is much more difficult to justify a 
highly concentrated risk than a risk that is more widely distributed, and more culpable to 
knowingly impose the first risk than the second.  But I concede that the indirect knowledge 
(via third parties) examples are difficult to sort out.  Compare a case where the builder knows 
that a manager on the product will knowingly kill one worker (in the manner, say, of Eleanor), 
where the manager knows the worker’s identity but the builder does not.  Here, SSP should 
unquestionably apply not only to the manager but also to the builder if he authorizes the act. 
88 See Kamm, Morality, Mortality, supra note 86=, ch. 11; Leo Katz, Incommensurable 
Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1465, 1474-1475 (1998); 
Scanlon, =. 
89 Thus, in the famous Transplant Case, it is clearly unjustifiable to forcibly take bodily 
organs from one person, thus knowingly causing his death, in order to save the lives of five.  
=cite.  Indeed, it is also unjustifiable merely to forcibly take a kidney from A (creating a 
health risk to him but not killing him) in order to save the life of B.  And it would still seem to 
be unjustifiable to perform such involuntary organ transplants even if all patients in the 
hospitals agreed in advance to permit this type of utilitarian reallocation of organs and even if 
the involuntary “donor” pool were limited to such consenting patients. = cite 
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contexts—for example, how much blame he deserves for purposes of criminal 
punishment.  Even if a deity could foresee which particular victim will die, an actor 
(such as Agatha and Bertha) who we are thinking of sanctioning lacks that type of 
foresight when she possesses only statistical knowledge; however, she is indeed 
highly culpable if she chooses to sacrifice a known victim for the sake of more 
diffuse social benefits.90  And even though the lives of the victims of Agatha and 
Bertha are as valuable as the life of Eleanor’s victim, the question before us is a 
different one—viz, what is the culpability of the actor who causes their death?  One 
way to see the difference in perspectives is to ask a different question: if we as a 
society were in a position to save either two “statistical” victims or one “individually 
known” victim, we certainly should save the two.  Thus, suppose by the same 
budgetary investment we knew we could either (1) prevent two highway accident 
deaths (deaths that I assume are caused either by careful drivers such as Larry or by 
merely negligent drivers such as Maxwell), or instead (2) prevent one red-light 
runner (such as Clara) from knowingly killing a victim, but we cannot afford to do 
both.  Then we should choose the first investment.  Yet it hardly follows that Clara 
is no more culpable than Larry.91 
 The third point, the paradoxical nature of a deontological constraint that 
disserves even the ex ante welfare of the affected persons, is most difficult to 
explain.  Some scholars have tried their hand, in the context either of SSP or of other 
deontological principles.92  Perhaps widespread intuitive responses to examples are 
as important as arguments in explaining these paradoxical features.93  For purposes 
of this article, I will simply accept them.  Of course, consequentialists will reject this 
approach.  Indeed, if they focus only on the bottom line “body count,”94 they will 
consider Eleanor’s conduct permissible, as well as the conduct of our speeding-to-
the-hospital drivers Alfa and Benna.95  But most people view this type of 
unqualified, relentless cost-benefit calculus as morally objectionable, and our legal 
system appears to reflect that view. 
                                                 
90 I have been assuming that we judge whether the risk imposed on the victim is “highly 
concentrated” from the purely subjective perspective of the actor whose culpability we are 
evaluating.  It is possible to alter this assumption, e.g. to restrict the special stringency 
principle to situations in which both (a) the actor subjectively believes that he is imposing a 
highly concentrated risk and (b) a reasonable person (or some other idealized actor) would 
also believe that the risk is highly concentrated.  I do not pursue these complications. 
91 See Katz, supra note 85=, at 1474: “[I]f a negligent manufacturer ends up killing fifty-five 
people in a year and a vicious murderer ends up killing exactly one, and if we could stop only 
one of them, we would probably try to stop the negligent manufacturer.  This would not show, 
however, that the manufacturer is worse than the murderer.” 
92 For example, Scanlon offers an individualistic contractarian argument against aggregating 
risks.  For discussion, see Simons, Tort Negligence, supra note 14=, at =. 
93 Kamm famously relies heavily on intuitive responses to hypotheticals in justifying her 
“intricate ethics.”  Kamm, supra note 19=. 
94 I say if they focus only on the bottom line, because consequentialists can include other 
factors in their social welfare calculus, including the distaste that many citizens would feel if 
the legal system permitted unadorned “bottom line” calculations of this sort.  The standard 
deontological retort, however, is that when consequentialists revise their cost-benefit calculus 
by including the cost of disappointing widespread popular preferences for honoring 
deontological restrictions, they achieve closer alignment of consequentialism with deontology 
but do so in an unprincipled and unpersuasive way.  (For example, this approach achieves 
closer alignment only to the extent that the policy is known to the populace; so if the policy is 
deliberately hidden from public view, that might create even greater social welfare; yet it 
seems illegitimate to defend a policy whose value depends on such secrecy.) 
95 For example, Kaplow and Shavell strongly imply that they would find Eleanor’s action 
morally and legally permissible. See note = supra. 
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E. Is the real question whether the victim is identifiable? 
 This discussion of SSP might suggest that the underlying issue is simply 
whether the victim is identifiable: if he is, then the actor has individualized 
knowledge; if he is not, then the actor has statistical knowledge.  But this view is 
oversimplified, indeed mistaken.  “Identifiable” has no single meaning in this 
context, and most of its plausible meanings bear no intrinsic relationship to 
individualized knowledge.  In this section, I hope to show: (1) the strong intuition 
that “identifiability” is morally and legally highly significant is largely explicable by 
psychological heuristics and cognitive biases that lack direct moral relevance; (2) 
however, the intuition is indeed morally and legally relevant insofar as it implicitly 
reflects the significance of a highly concentrated risk and of SSP. 
When the actor has statistical knowledge, the victim is typically 
unidentified, while if he has individualized knowledge, the victim is in some sense 
identified.  Does it matter to the permissibility or culpability of an act whether the 
likely or possible victim is identifiable?  Intuitively, the answer seems to be yes.  
Consider the classic illustration: we as a society96 are willing to expend far more 
resources to save an identified, trapped coal miner than we are willing to invest ex 
ante in mine safety in order to save the life of one miner (whom we cannot currently 
identify) in the future.97  Moreover, legal doctrine contains some examples of 
especially stringent duties to rescue identifiable individuals.  First, under traditional 
tort doctrine, a landowner owes a duty towards adult trespassers only if he “knows” 
of their presence; his duty is much more restricted if he is aware only of a statistical 
risk of trespassing.98  Second, courts often recognize an unusually stringent duty on 
the part of a ship’s captain to attempt to rescue someone if he falls overboard, even 
when the rescue is very unlikely to be successful; indeed, courts sometimes ignore 
the traditional cause-in-fact requirement in such cases, for they permit full liability 
even when plaintiff cannot show that but for the breach of duty, the decedent more 
likely than not would have been saved.99 
                                                 
96 This implicit policy of differential concern characterizes both government regulatory efforts 
and private acts of risk-creation and risk-prevention. 
97 See Calabresi, supra note =, Ideals, Beliefs at 6; Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1415, 1416 (1969).  The classic quotation on the topic is from Josef Stalin: "The death 
of a single Russian soldier is a tragedy. The death of a millions soldiers is a statistic." = 
 In the field of medical care, the identifiability of the victim is relevant in a number of 
different ways.  For example, once a patient is under a doctor or hospital’s care for an existing 
ailment, a more stringent duty is owed the patient to prevent further harm, more stringent in 
the sense that greater resources are required to be expended than are required to prevent the 
patient from developing future illnesses, i.e. to prevent mere “statistical” harms.  More 
generally, “[a] bias toward identified lives can drive priorities in risk management including 
the choice between prevention and treatment of injury or disease,” Hammitt & Treich, =, at 
46.  See also Fried, id. at 1416; Jenni & Lowenstein, = at 236.  See Corso, Hammitt, Graham, 
Dicker, & Goldie, Assessing Preferences for Prevention versus Treatment Using Willingness 
to Pay, Med Decis Making 2002 22: S92 (finding that survey respondents stated a willingness 
to pay for treatment that was significantly greater than their WTP for prevention, and 
concluding that “treatment is more strongly preferred by society than prevention when the 
health context is the same and benefits of each are held constant”). 
98 =cites, brief discussion. 
99 See Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962); = 
 A quite distinct “identifiable victim” issue arises in tort law: many jurisdictions limit 
the duty of a therapist to warn about, or take precautions against, a patient’s threats of 
violence, to “identifiable victims.”  =cite.  But this limitation is due to the perceived 
unfairness of imposing broad liability on therapists and the perceived inefficacy of such a 
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However, the question of the relevance of identifiability is more complex 
than first appears, because identifiability has various distinct senses.100  Most of 
these senses, we will see, have little or no relevance to the issue before us—namely, 
the culpability of an actor with some awareness (either “individualized” or 
“statistical”) of the risk he is posing to a potential victim.  Moreover, paradigm 
examples such as the trapped coal miner provide dubious guidance precisely because 
they combine numerous features, and numerous senses of identifiability, so it is 
difficult to determine the source of their power over our intuitions. 
As a preliminary matter, any analysis of identifiability must be from some 
perspective—but which one?  The most relevant perspective for our purposes is that 
of the actor whose culpability is being judged, though, in discussing psychological 
research, I will necessarily have to take the view of ordinary observers, since that is 
the perspective that the studies explore.101 
Consider, then, some possible meanings of identifiability.  First, it can be 
understood as non-anonymity, i.e., a situation in which we have some specific 
information about the victim.  Such identifying information could be very weak—
for example, any information that makes the victim other than completely 
anonymous.  Or the identifying information could be stronger—for example, the 
actor might know the victim’s gender, or age, or name, or might be personally 
acquainted with the victim. 
Second, identifiability could mean salience: the situation of the victim is “on 
screen,” vivid, emotionally engaging.102  When the coal miner becomes trapped and 
in need of rescue, his plight might be televised or otherwise widely reported.  But 
when a large group of miners suffer health and safety consequences due to 
inadequate advanced health and safety precautions in the mine, they are virtually 
invisible to public attention.103  The Availability heuristic is likely playing a role 
here: people view a type of event as more probable if it more easily comes to 
                                                                                                                               
broad duty in reducing harm.  It is not premised on the principles we have discussed, e.g., the 
supposed greater culpability of one who picks out a named or non-anonymous victim, or the 
special duty to avoid imposing a concentrated risk on an individual. 
100 For a careful parsing of the difference senses and sources of the identifiable victim effect 
in the psychological literature, see Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the 
'Identifiable Victim Effect,"14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235 (1997).  See also Cass 
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in M. Adler & E. Posner, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 223 (2001) (providing a helpful 
overview of cognitive biases that affect risk perception).  
101 Another relevant perspective is that of an idealized observer; and this perspective is indeed 
often implicit in the paradigm trapped coal miner example, where the question is often put as 
what “we” as a society are willing to invest ex post in rescuing v. ex ante in prevention. 
102 Jenni & Loewenstein, =, at 237. 
103 To be sure, if we examine the two scenarios after a death has occurred, the difference in 
salience is greatly reduced.  If a mine collapses and kills a miner due to inadequate safety 
precautions, that will provoke enormous public sympathy and scrutiny, perhaps comparable to 
a failure to save a trapped miner.  Nevertheless, even from this perspective, statistical 
knowledge cases often differ from individual knowledge cases.  After the fact of a fatality, it 
is sometimes difficult to determine, in a statistical knowledge case, whether the inadequate 
precaution of the actor or instead some background or different risk caused the death, while in 
an individualized knowledge cases, it is almost always clear that the actor caused the death. 
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mind.104  And the emotional connection to a victim is strongest when only a single 
victim is “on screen.”105 
Third, identifiability could refer to the fact that a victim is already in peril—
i.e., the victim needs to be rescued from a peril that has already placed him in a 
highly vulnerable position.  Such a victim can be contrasted with a victim who might 
be endangered in the future if we fail to take proper precautions.  Put differently, 
when the victim is already in peril, the intervention to save him is in a sense ex post; 
when he is not yet in peril, the precaution needed to save him is (in this sense) ex 
ante.106  And psychological studies confirm that people react more generously when 
they confront someone already in peril than someone who is expected to be in peril 
in the future.107 
Fourth, identifiability could describe an understood, relatively certain causal 
process for saving the victim.  We know we can effectively save the trapped coal 
miner.  We don’t know, with anything like that degree of confidence, that safety 
precautions would prevent any specified number of deaths or injuries. 
Fifth, identifiability could mean that the death is certain, in contrast to a 
statistically known death, which is uncertain.  And, psychologists explain, when we 
add the fact that people are usually risk-seeking for losses, the result is a tendency to 
care more about preventing a certain loss (e.g. a certainty that Victor will die) than 
about preventing an uncertain loss with the same expected value (e.g. a statistical 
prediction that adopting a particular safety precaution for a large group of miners 
will reduce the expected number of deaths in the mine from five to four).108 
Sixth, identifiability could be a proxy for proximity in time and space.  The 
trapped coal miner is immediately before us.  The miner or miners who would be 
                                                 
104 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 97=, at 229-230. The evidence in the psychological 
literature of a distinct vividness effect, separate from the other identifiable victim effects, is 
surprisingly weak, however.  See Jenni & Loewenstein, at 253. 
105 Thus, the study authors found support for their hypothesis that “a single identified victim 
evokes stronger feelings than an unidentified single victim, or a group of victims, regardless 
of their being identified or not.” T. Kogut & I. Ritov, The ‘‘Identified Victim’’ Effect: An 
Identified Group, or Just a Single Individual?, J. Behav. Dec. Making, 18: 157–167, 165 
(2005). 
106 The ex post/ ex ante characterization is a natural one here, but it might be questioned.  If 
the miner in need of rescue has not yet suffered any harm, his plight is also ex ante: he is at 
risk of harm if we do not act now to rescue him.  And the same is true of the miner who would 
in the future be saved from a mine collapse if we do not act now to build more safety features 
into the mine in which he will work.  The key might be that the first miner is “already 
endangered” or in “immediate, actual peril” (see Fried, supra note 97=, at 1419) while the 
second miner is not.  But this idea of “actual peril” is difficult to cash out, at least if one views 
risks as subjective and epistemic. 
107 =cite.  Interestingly enough, psychological research reveals that people do respond more 
generously, in studies examining their degree of altruism, when they know merely that 
someone in need has been selected as an eligible recipient than when they know that the 
eligible recipients have not yet been selected.  This finding suggests that some type of 
identifiable victim effect persists even when the person considering a contribution has 
absolutely no information about the recipients. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, 
Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 5, 5-14 (2003). 
108 “[T]he number of certain (identifiable) fatalities that is deemed “equivalent” to uncertain 
(statistical) fatalities is less than the expected number of statistical deaths. Both the certainty 
effect and risk seeking for losses, therefore, may contribute to the tendency to treat 
identifiable (and thus certain) victims as more worthy of attention than statistical victims.” 
Jenni & Loewenstein, =, at 238. 
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saved by a precaution in the future are not.  Just as we feel stronger bonds to those in 
our geographic community, we might feel a stronger obligation to a person whose 
plight is immediately before us.109 
Seventh and finally, identifiability could be a proxy for concentration of 
risk.  Here, psychological studies show that participants give much greater priority 
to a life-saving project if its effects are described as saving a high proportion of a 
reference group than if they are described as saving a low proportion.110  Perhaps, 
then, when people show special sympathy towards an identifiable victim, they are 
responding to an individual victim who is at extremely high risk of death if not 
rescued. 
In the end, identifiability in all of these senses (except for the last) has little 
to do with the culpability exhibited by individualized knowledge.  Moreover, 
identifiability in most of these senses has at most an ambiguous bearing on the 
actor’s culpability in any other respect.  Consider these different senses of 
identifiability in turn. 
First, consider non-anonymity.  In the very weak sense, where identifiability 
merely requires some information that makes the victim non-anonymous, the 
concept does not even distinguish individual from statistical knowledge.  For 
whenever an actor is analyzing risks that a specified action or inaction would pose, 
he can readily articulate at least some information about the group that is at risk 
(future coal miners who might benefit from a mine safety improvement, for 
example).  Even in the stronger sense, requiring significantly more information, the 
concept is an unhelpful criterion of individualized knowledge.  A driver speeding at 
night-time might perceive only that he is likely to strike a human body; he acts with 
individualized knowledge that he will harm another person, even if he is unable to 
determine the age, gender, or size of the person, much less his facial features or 
name.  One could also imagine a mine rescue case in which we were unable to 
identify the particular person in need of rescue except as one of a large group of 
miners.  Indeed, in a natural disaster, rescuers might come upon a helpless individual 
whom they cannot identify at all.  Yet those who support a stringent duty of rescue 
are not likely to weaken their support because of this lack of information.  And, 
finally, anonymity of the victim has an ambiguous relationship to culpability: in 
some respects it makes the actor less culpable, but in other respects more.111 
Second, greater salience does indeed distinguish the trapped coal miner from 
the miners who would in the future be saved if we built safer mines.  But the 
question remains whether this differential in the emotional reactions felt by ordinary 
                                                 
109 Similarly, philosophers have discussed the “nearest and dearest” objection to 
consequentialism, i.e., the objection that consequentialists cannot account for a perceived 
greater duty to our neighbors or fellow citizens. = Jackson, Ethics); = Kamm, Intricate 
Ethics, supra note 19=, Ch. 11 and  Ch.12. 
110 Thus, if a traffic safety project is described as saving 2 out of 4 persons in the reference 
class (fatalities at a given intersection) rather than as saving 2 out of 1700 persons in the 
reference class (traffic fatalities in the state), the first description receives a much higher 
priority.  Jenni & Lowenstein, supra note =, at 252. 
111 In some cases an actor’s willing to harm an anonymous stranger seems to inculpate, for it 
makes the act more incomprehensible, more frightening, more inhuman.  See Heinzerling, 
The Rights of Statistical People, supra note 10=, at 196 (noting that in the 1982 Tylenol 
poisoning incident, it was the very inability to identify who would be victimized that 
magnified the public’s fear; “unidentifiedness is a close cousin of the awful randomness—
associated with terrorists and criminal maniacs—that many people uniquely fear”).  But in 
other cases, willingness to harm a person one knows seems to inculpate, for it can express 
personal spite or malice, or can target a vulnerability in an especially reprehensible way.= 
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observers should, without more, have normative weight.112  Moreover, salience and 
vividness are not always present in cases of individualized knowledge, nor are they 
always absent in cases of statistical knowledge.  Consider again the speeding night-
time driver from the prior paragraph, who knows very little about the potential 
victim; and compare a careful driver who only drives in his own neighborhood, 
where he knows everyone, including everyone he puts at slight risk, and thus has a 
vivid and rich appreciation of the lives he is putting in peril. 
Third, the ex post/ex ante distinction is treacherous to draw in this context, 
as noted.113  Moreover, whether someone is in some sense “already in peril” is only 
indirectly relevant to one’s moral and legal obligations.  For example, the burden to 
save such a person will often, but not always, be less than the burden to take 
advance precautions to save one life.  And again, the ex post/ex ante distinction does 
not precisely track the individualized/ statistical knowledge distinction.  For 
example, if an employer fails to make the workplace safe for her one and only 
employee, she might have individualized knowledge that the employee will be 
harmed by her omission, yet, at the time of her negligent omission, the worker might 
not be in peril. 
Fourth and fifth, causal and statistical uncertainty do indeed characterize 
many cases where advanced precautions might have a beneficial effect on safety 
levels, and we tend to be less uncertain in these respects about efforts to save or not 
to harm identified individuals.  But these generalizations are crude.  Even if the only 
technique for saving the trapped coal miner was untested, resulting in causal 
uncertainty, the intuition that there is a strong obligation to rescue him would 
remain.  And although it is sensible to discount probabilistic judgments about the 
precise effectiveness of future safety measures, it would be folly to ignore strong 
statistical evidence that has been empirically confirmed.114  Moreover, an actor 
might have individualized knowledge that he is likely to harm another and at the 
same time harbor small doubts about the causal effects of his act. 
Sixth, temporal and spatial proximity do not really explain the coal miner 
examples: many Americans would have a similarly strong empathic response to a 
mine disaster in England than one in another county or state in the United States.  
And these features do not align very well with individualized knowledge: with 
modern technology, an actor can knowingly harm individuals from a great spatial or 
temporal distance. 
However, the seventh factor, identifiability in the sense of concentration of 
risk, is indeed morally and legally relevant, and also might help explain some of the 
psychological findings noted above.115  In the “trapped coal miner” type of scenario, 
                                                 
112 A policy that gives higher priority to saving more familiar victims “would amount to 
allowing media coverage to determine aid allocation.”  Jenni & Loewenstein, at 240.  See also 
Simons, Dworkin's Two Principles of Dignity: An Unsatisfactory Nonconsequentialist 
Account of Moral Duties, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 715, = (2010). 
113 See note = supra. 
114 Often people discount very heavily, or simply ignore, low probability risks, a cognitive 
bias that is classified as Probability Neglect. =cite. 
115 Interestingly enough, Jenni & Loewenstein find that of the various factors that might 
explain the identifiable victim effect, the strongest was the proportion of a reference group 
that could be saved.  = at 254-255.  This “reference group” effect is one way of describing the 
degree of concentration of a risk.  Perhaps this psychological tendency is at least partly based 
on a belief in the deontological principle SSP.  On the other hand, the effect is significant in a 
far wider range of cases than SSP, for it applies even when the proportion that could be saved 
is much less than 50%.  Moreover, the reference group that experimental studies employ in 
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we do have a concentrated risk, a very high probability that this individual will die if 
not rescued.  Of course, individualized knowledge by definition requires awareness 
that one is highly likely to cause harm to an individual victim.  Moreover, the special 
stringency principle applies here, at least with respect to those owing a duty of aid to 
the miner.  To be sure, this is an omission case, unlike the previous individualized 
knowledge and SSP cases we discussed, including Alfa (the actor who knowingly 
ran over a pedestrian to save the lives of her passengers) or Eleanor (who knowingly 
crushed the worker in order to continue the tunnel project).  However, there is no 
obvious reason not to apply SSP to omissions by actors owing a duty to the person 
in need of rescue, as well as to actions.116 
But is there anything else to be said in favor of a higher duty to an 
identifiable victim, other than the “high concentration of risk” argument?  Can the 
other features somehow, in combination, have some significant moral relevance?  
Perhaps, for example, we must uphold at least symbolically our self-conception as a 
caring society; and therefore we have a duty to spend much more on persons in need 
of rescue when their plight is salient and unmistakable.117  On the other hand, 
perhaps (as I am inclined to believe) this social preference cannot really be 
defended, but merely reflects an irrational psychological disposition to overvalue 
salient events, an inability to comprehend the importance of ex ante precautions, and 
an unjustifiable tendency to discount greatly, or even to ignore, risks of future harm 
if the probabilities of such harm are low. 
  However we resolve this debate, I am doubtful that the symbolic argument 
has great force in the context we are considering, namely, whether an individual 
actor is more culpable if he knowingly creates a high likelihood of harming 
identifiable individuals.  Even if there is significant expressive value in 
demonstrating that we are a caring society, that value is only weakly furthered or 
instantiated by heightening legal sanctions for wrongdoing.  To be sure, that 
expressive value might sometimes be relevant to what actions are permissible in the 
first place, especially when the actor in question is the government, so that its acts 
and failures to act have a distinctive expressive dimension.  Those attracted to this 
view might then claim that if a government actor owes a more stringent duty to save 
identifiable individuals in service of this symbolic value, a private actor also has a 
                                                                                                                               
evaluating the effect is susceptible to quite arbitrary framing (id. at 254; and see note = supra) 
in a way that SSP is not. 
116 Many deontologists, to be sure, will recognize weaker duties to affirmatively aid than 
duties not to harm.  But that distinction is irrelevant here.  SSP, when applied to omissions, 
would compare different affirmative duties to aid; it would not compare a duty to aid with a 
duty not to harm.  Thus, SSP would impose a much more stringent duty to aid (a) when the 
vulnerable person in need of aid is highly likely to die without the actor’s aid (and is highly 
likely to survive with aid), than (b) when the vulnerable person has only a small chance of 
dying if not aided. 
117 “Decisions that are seen to protect identified victims have the merit of endorsing social 
values of compassion, solidarity, and unwillingness to sacrifice the few for the benefit of the 
many.”  Hammitt & Treich, at 46.  “It may … be dehumanizing to stand idly by when 
strenuous, expensive effort has a substantial chance of saving lives.”  Allan Gibbard, Risk and 
Value, from Values at Risk 94, 101 (Doug MacLean ed. 1986).  See also Fried, supra note 
97=, at 1425 (describing but questioning the “symbolic value” argument); Ronald Dworkin, 
Justice for Hedgehogs (2010=), at = 178-179, discussed in Simons, Dworkin’s Two Principles 
of Dignity, supra note 108=, 90 B.U. L. Rev. at 721-724. 
 To be sure, an alternative, pragmatic argument is plausible: if we fail to recognize a 
higher duty to the trapped coal miner, the public will lack the political will to invest ex ante in 
mine safety and other precautions that will save merely statistical victims.  But the focus of 
this article is on the underlying norms of culpability and wrongdoing that a well-informed 
public should endorse, not on political realities. 
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higher duty.  On this approach, it might be impermissible for a coalmine operator 
not to expend enormous resources to save a trapped miner, even if it would not be 
impermissible not to spend equivalent resources in advance on safety precautions to 
save a statistical life.  However, I doubt the premise, that the symbolic value should 
either increase culpability or make otherwise permissible acts impermissible.  In my 
view, the heightening of duty that SSP demands, and that sometimes requires greater 
expenditures on saving identifiable lives, is high enough. 
 
F. Why are we tempted to equate statistical with individualized 
knowledge? 
Why, despite the arguments thus far presented, is there a lingering sense that 
the actor who engages in repeated actions that predictably will lead to a high 
probability of a harm is about as culpable as an actor who takes a single action that 
he predicts is likely to cause that harm?  Part of the answer is that the arguments we 
have explored, including ICAA and SSP, are subtle; and the “identifiable” victim 
effect can seem quite persuasive (even though it often should not be).   In this 
section, I address four other reasons for the ill-advised equation of the statistical and 
individualized knowledge.118 
The first is an understandable confusion between causing harm knowingly 
(in the individualized sense) and causing harm purposely, and a concomitant 
assumption that both are equally difficult to justify.  But that assumption is false.  
Causing harm knowingly is much more easily justified.  To be sure, knowing 
infliction of harm is often quite unjustifiable, or justified only by especially 
compelling reasons such as self-defense and necessity.  But this is so only in specific 
contexts of individual interaction and only with respect to specific types of harm 
(such as death or serious bodily injury).   It is not wrongful knowingly to cause 
devastating economic harm to another in the course of legitimate market 
competition, or knowingly to cause severe emotional harm to another as an incident 
of the break-up of a relationship.  In many contexts, knowingly causing harm is both 
morally and legally permissible.  Thus, we need to proceed carefully before 
assuming that knowingly causing harm should carry a presumption of serious fault 
                                                 
118 A fifth reason, specific to tort law, is a strict liability principle.  Under Vincent v. Lake 
Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), an actor can be liable in damages for 
intentionally destroying the property of another in order to save his own person or property, 
even if his decision to do so is reasonable (or, in doctrinal terms, even if necessity gives him 
a privilege to commit the trespass).  When an actor engages in a course of conduct that he 
knows will harm some victims for the greater good of others, or for the actor’s own benefit, 
then the Vincent principle arguably applies.  See James Henderson, Jr., Coping with the 
Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 937 (1981) (discussed in 
Armour, = 1159). 
However, once again, this perspective is problematic in not clearly distinguishing an 
individual act (in this case, a faultless act) that the agent knows will cause harm from a series 
of acts that the agent “knows” will cause harm only in the statistical sense.  If I drive at a 
reasonable speed and faultlessly harm a pedestrian, I have made an implicit decision to 
provide benefits to myself (the benefits flowing from speedy transportation) at the expense of 
risks of harm to others (albeit very low risks).  Yet the Vincent principle does not apply to 
such low-level risks.  See [=KWS Culpability and retributive theory?].  =See also 
Restatement Third draft, comment on strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities 
(rejecting extension of strict liability to the mere repetition of risky activities).=  Still, from a 
wider perspective, the decision of all motorists to drive rather than walk or bicycle results in 
a predictable (and probably significant) number of deaths or serious injuries annually even 
with respect to the class of motorists who drive without any fault. 
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(or indeed a presumption of any fault), even when the knowledge is individualized 
(and a fortiori when it is statistical).  By contrast, purposely causing harm is virtually 
always legally impermissible.  For example, the Restatement Second of Torts treats 
the purposeful causation of economic harm as a prima facie tort.119 
Those who find abhorrent the law’s failure to sanction those who cause 
harm with statistical knowledge might be unthinkingly confusing statistical 
knowledge with individualized knowledge, and then individualized knowledge with 
purpose.  This is an understandable confusion in some contexts.  We are sometimes 
epistemically justified in inferring purpose from knowledge (e.g., in concluding that 
if an actor shoots point blank at the victim and knows that the bullet is very likely to 
cause his death, he has the purpose to kill).  And it is tempting to say that a 
corporation that is hell-bent on profits, that does not care about the environmental 
effects of its activities, and that knows those effects will be very harmful, must 
intend those harmful effects.  Indeed, there is empirical evidence that ordinary 
people often unconsciously employ a moralized conception of “intention”: if a 
known (but motivationally irrelevant) side-effect is harmful, study participants are 
more likely to characterize it as intended, but if it is beneficial, they are much less 
likely to do so.120 
The problem, however, is that knowledge differs from purpose or intention.  
A person does not always intend the (known) natural consequences of his act.  The 
nurse who gives my child a vaccination does not (I hope!) intend to cause him pain.  
The woman who regretfully breaks up with her boyfriend does not intend to cause 
him distress.  Even an actor who shoots a bullet that he knows will kill the victim 
need not intend that result.121  Recall the introductory examples.  Neither Agatha (the 
careful builder) nor Bertha (the less careful one) intends the injuries that their 
projects inevitably and predictably will cause, for each has taken precautions against 
them. 
Second, it is also easy to forget that legal standards do not consider an act 
unjustified merely because the actor is cognitively reckless, i.e. merely because he is 
aware that he is creating a significant risk of harm.122  Modern life is bursting with 
justifiable risks, and is inconceivable without them.  Even the deliberate or 
purposeful creation of risks is often justified when the risk is not unduly high and the 
actor creates the risk in pursuit of a socially acceptable benefit (such as the thrill of 
skiing or the pleasure of observing a trapeze artist walking a tightrope without the 
protection of a net).  Yet cognitive recklessness is the state of mind that most 
instances of statistical knowledge actually reveal.  (Indeed, the bare fact that an actor 
                                                 
119 =cite.  Only a few jurisdictions have followed this very broad provision.  Simons, supra 
note 30=, at 1084 n. 84.  But tort doctrine commonly makes intent to cause certain specified 
harms tortious, or at least considers an intent to harm a factor militating in favor of liability. 
=cites. 
120 See Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk 
Psychology, Philosophical Studies, 130: 203-231 (2006). 
121 Consider a self-defense case in which the actor’s goal is only to completely disable the 
victim from posing any further threat.  If the victim were miraculously to survive while at the 
same time posing no threat, this actor would be relieved, not disappointed; for he did not 
intend the victim’s death. 
122 Recall the distinction between cognitive and complex recklessness, supra note =; the latter 
additionally requires that the risk the actor knowingly took was unjustifiable. 
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is aware of possible harm is what many advocates of statistical knowledge liability 
most emphasize.123) 
Third, the tendency to view statistical knowledge as very similar, if not 
identical, to individualized knowledge might reflect heuristic error.124  Many people 
have difficulty apprehending the significance of large numbers, and therefore 
mistakenly assume that if an activity can be predicted to cause even a relatively 
small number of deaths or injuries, the activity must be excessively dangerous.  But 
that assumption ignores the plain fact that many very widespread or long-continuing 
activities will inevitably produce harm even if they are conducted with reasonable 
care.  Consider a pair of examples offered by Cass Sunstein: 
A. Company A knows that its product will kill ten people. It 
markets the product to its ten million customers with that 
knowledge. The cost of eliminating the risk would have been $100 
million. 
B. Company B knows that its product creates a one in one million 
risk of death. Its product is used by ten million people. The cost of 
eliminating the risk would have been $100 million. 
I have not collected data, but I am willing to predict, with a high 
degree of confidence, that Company A would be punished more severely 
than Company B, even though there is no difference between the two.125 
Sunstein concludes that the response he predicts to these examples illustrate a 
“moral heuristic,” a rule of thumb (analogous to a cognitive heuristic) that works 
well most of the time but also sometimes misfires126: 
I suggest … that a moral heuristic is at work, one that imposes 
moral condemnation on those who knowingly engage in acts that will result 
in human deaths. Of course this heuristic does a great deal of good.  The 
problem is that it is not always unacceptable to cause death knowingly, at 
least if the deaths are relatively few and an unintended byproduct of 
generally desirable activity.127 
Sunstein’s observation is plausible, and it helps explain both the popular 
sentiment against cost/benefit analysis, and the associated popular inclination to 
reject ICAA and to judge one who acts with statistical knowledge as harshly as one 
who has individual knowledge.  Of course, the reason that plaintiffs’ trial lawyers 
would use the rhetoric of the Company A example rather than the Company B 
example is in order to suggest that (justifiable) popular disapproval of actions taken 
with individual knowledge should extend to disapproval of actions taken with only 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., LeBel, supra note 33=; Henderson, =old article; Heinzerling, supra note 10=. 
124 See Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1556, 1578-
1580 (2004); Viscusi, supra note 12=, at 574 (in one products liability case, a key witness 
presented evidence of the automobile manufacturer’s conscious cost-benefit analysis; the 
jury awarded punitive damages, and “they knew” became the “‘conscious refrain among the 
jurors interviewed.’”). 
125 Sunstein, id. at 1579.  I agree with Sunstein’s assessment, though I think the paired 
comparison would be more fairly presented if the first sentence of the first were phrased less 
dramatically, i.e. “Company A knows that its product will cause the death of ten people” 
(rather than “… will kill ten people”). 
126 Id. at 1558-1559. 
127 Id. 
Page 51 of 84  Simons, Stat.Knowl Decon 11 3/3/11
   
statistical knowledge.128  At the same time, Sunstein’s observation is only a partial 
explanation of how heuristics affect popular understanding of cases of statistical 
knowledge, because folk psychology can also undervalue merely statistical (and 
often temporally distant) risks, at least relative to more salient immediate risks and 
harms.129 
And fourth, it is very difficult to develop a criterion for distinguishing the 
two categories that is both principled and workable.  Because of the significance of 
this problem, it deserves more extensive discussion in the following section. 
 
 G.   How should we distinguish statistical from individualized knowledge? 
Up to this point, the examples we have discussed have straightforwardly fit 
within either the statistical knowledge or the individualized knowledge category.  
However, many other examples are difficult to categorize.  And sometimes, even 
when we can confidently classify an example, the implicit criterion that drives our 
intuitions remains obscure.  For example, some cases that intuitively seem very 
similar to paradigm cases of individualized intention or knowledge (and not merely 
statistical knowledge) nevertheless involve an extended class of potential victims, or 
an extended time dimension.  An instance is the Time Bomb example, above.   
Another is the killer who shoots into a crowd, not knowing or caring who he kills, 
but intending to kill someone.  He is just as much an intentional killer as someone 
who selects a particular victim to kill.  A similar pair of examples can be constructed 
for harms that the actor knowingly rather than purposely causes.130  But how do 
these sorts of cases differ from genuine statistical knowledge cases? 
This section evaluates some possible criteria for distinguishing the two 
categories.  It also treats in more detail two issues: (1) an additional “invariant 
culpability” principle, ICREA, that is sometimes relevant, and (2) a special context, 
extremely unjustifiable risks, in which the distinction can be ignored. 
Consider two recent efforts to develop workable criteria.  Neither is quite 
successful, as we will see, but they both illuminate the problem; and the first 
identifies a dimension of the problem that we have not yet analyzed. 
First, James Henderson and Aaron Twerski investigate the problem in the 
context of defining “intent” in tort law.131  Tort doctrine frequently defines “intent” 
                                                 
128 One popular strategy of plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking punitive damages for product defects is 
to emphasize the number of injuries that the product caused.  Some courts, sensitive to the 
concerns underlying ICAA, are appropriately careful not to permit punitive damage awards 
based on number of accidents or injuries alone.  See, e.g., Kopczick v. Hobart Corp., 721 N.E. 
2d 769, 975 (Ill. App. 1999) (pointing out that the 30 injuries similar to plaintiff’s injury from 
a meat cutting machine represent “roughly 0.5% of the total production of the Model 5700 
and 0.0000007% of the estimated total number of cuts made with the Model 5700.  Such 
meager percentages do not put a manufacturer of a mass-produced and inherently dangerous 
product on notice that its product has an unreasonably dangerous defect.”); Loitz v. 
Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 397, 404-407 (Ill. 1990). 
129 See Wertheimer, comment on restorative justice=; Sunstein, =. 
130 Thus, suppose that a radical political extremist, with no intention to kill, bombs a 
particular prominent government building that he knows is occupied at the time by a single 
victim whose identity he knows.  He is a knowing killer.  Should we say the same of the 
terrorist in Time Bomb, who knows only that the bomb will indiscriminately wound or kill 
random individuals who happen to enter or exit the train station at the wrong time? 
131 James Henderson & Aaron Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft 
of Restating Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1133, 1141-1143 (2001). 
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as encompassing both purpose and knowledge.  But how should we define 
“knowledge”?  Henderson and Twerski essentially agree with my claim that 
knowledge should be confined to what I have called individualized knowledge and 
must be distinguished from statistical knowledge.132  They suggest that the basic 
distinction is between: 
(1) the harm predicted to result from an individual act; 
 and either of the following: 
 (2a) the harm predicted to result from a course of repetitive conduct; or  
(2b) the harm predicted to result from the interaction of an individual act 
(one that creates a continuing danger) with the repetitive acts of other 
persons. 
In their view, neither (2a) nor (2b) (two categories of statistical knowledge) should 
be treated the same as (1) (a type of individualized knowledge). 
 An example of category (2a) is a baseball player hitting numerous fly balls 
into the stands over the course of a season.  Here, Henderson and Twerski plausibly 
argue, the player should not be liable (even prima facie) for the tort of battery, which 
requires “intent” to contact, even if he can be practically certain that someone 
eventually will suffer injury from a batted ball. 
Henderson and Twerski’s treatment of category (2a) as instantiating (mere) 
statistical knowledge, not genuine individualized knowledge, is largely persuasive.  
This category is usually a straightforward application of the ICAA principle.133  
When a baseball player hits a single fly ball, he will at most be aware of only a small 
risk that the ball will injure a fan (if indeed he is conscious of any such risk at all).  
And repetition of such acts does not elevate his culpability to the level of 
individualized knowledge. 
But the authors’ category (2b) is especially illuminating: it isolates a new 
dimension to the statistical knowledge problem.  At the same time, for reasons we 
will now explore, I believe that their specific interpretation of that category is too 
lenient, treating too many cases as statistical knowledge when some should be 
treated as individualized knowledge. 
 
                                                 
132 I say “essentially” agree because they frame the question as “whether the consequence 
complained of must result directly and proximately (both temporal and spatially) from the 
act.”  Id. at 1143.  In my view, the question is better framed not as a question of proximate 
cause but as a question of how best to conceptualize “knowledge.”  See also Anthony Sebok, 
Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 1165, 1172 (2001).  There is no serious problem of proximate cause when an 
activity predictably and foreseeably leads to precisely the type of harm that could make the 
activity negligent in its manner of execution.  Criminal law theorist George Fletcher similarly 
relies on this unpersuasive proximate cause argument to explain why actors such as Agatha 
and Bertha are not criminally prosecuted. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 363 
(1978) (arguing that such actors are not prosecuted because of the “implicit rationale” that 
“the death is simply too remote from the defendant’s act.”). 
133 I hedge my endorsement of their category (1), however, because they do not include the 
qualification I endorse, e.g., that the repetitive conduct must consist of an aggregation of acts 
that do not differ in any relevant respect from the single act. 
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1. The principle of ICREA (Invariant culpability when risk-
exposures are aggregated) 




A playground equipment company manufactures a jungle gym for 
use during recess at elementary schools.  The company can anticipate that 
over the fifteen year useful life of the equipment, hundreds of children will 
suffer minor injuries. 
Is the company liable for an intentional tort of battery for causally contributing to 
these injures?  Not at all likely.  The mere fact that repetitive use of the structure by 
thousands of children is likely to lead to injury does not justify treating the company 
as negligent or wrongful.  It certainly does not justify treating the company as if it 
had individualized knowledge—as if, for example, it had manufactured an “extreme 
sport” version of the jungle gym, with slippery surfaces and a 20-foot drop to the 
ground.  In the latter case, the company’s knowledge that most child participants are 
very likely to suffer injury could well result in battery liability. 
The reason why “Jungle Gym” should be treated as a case of statistical but 
not individualized knowledge is quite similar to the rationale underlying ICAA, but 
it is also subtly different.  It is similar because the repetitive use by others of the 
jungle gym creates, not just a corresponding increase in aggregate risk, but also a 
corresponding and roughly proportionate increase in aggregate social benefit.  
Accordingly, whatever judgment we should render about the actor’s balance of risk 
and benefit in one or two instances of use (e.g., permissible, impermissible, grossly 
impermissible), we should render the same judgment as the instances of use 
multiply.134   
However, Jungle Gym is also different from the ICAA cases we have 
discussed thus far because the repetition of risk exposures and of accidents in Jungle 
Gym is not due to a repetition of dangerous acts by the company making the 
equipment; rather, it is due to the fact that, over time, numerous users interact with 
the potentially dangerous equipment.  For completeness, we should recognize a 
second “invariant culpability” principle.  Let us christen it: “Invariant Culpability 
when Risk-Exposures are Aggregated” (or “ICREA”).135  ICAA tells us to presume 
                                                 
134  However, if a jungle gym will be heavily used only by one or two actors, arguably the 
highly concentrated risk would invoke the Special Stringency Principle.  Is this a reductio ad 
absurdum of that principle?  Is it really more culpable to sell a jungle gym to a family 
knowing that only two children will use it, than to sell precisely the same equipment to a 
school knowing that hundreds of children will use it?  Perhaps this is the answer: SSP does 
not apply here because, in both scenarios, the users’ consent legitimates the manufacturer’s 
choice to sell the product; consent might be valid here because each risk exposure creates 
only a very minor risk of injury.  On the other hand, consent would not legitimize the 
product’s dangers if the risk on any single occasion of use was very high (e.g. if the user 
could easily increase the height of the climbable structure to 20 feet or more). 
135 And we could spell out ICREA in a parallel fashion to the definition of ICAA (with the 
differences noted in italics): 
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that the culpability of single acts carries over to multiple acts of precisely the same 
type, while ICREA tells us to presume that the culpability of single instances of risk-
exposure carries over to multiple instances of risk-exposure of precisely the same 
type (even when all of those risk-exposures are the result of a single act). 
Now consider a more problematic example of ICREA (or their category 
(2b)) offered by Henderson and Twerski: 
 
Removed Safety Guard 
“[A]n employer permanently removes a safety feature from a 
machine at a workplace, in order to increase the machine’s productivity...  
Permanent removal of the safety feature creates a virtual certainty that, 
sooner or later, a worker will suffer the type of injury that the safety feature 
would have prevented.”136 
 
Henderson and Twerski claim that here, just as in the case of the baseball player, we 
should not treat the resulting injury as an intended or known result of the act; rather, 
it should be analyzed under standard negligence principles.137 
However, the authors’ treatment of Removed Safety Guard as just a 
straightforward example of their category (2b) or of ICREA, and thus merely an 
instance of statistical knowledge, is much less persuasive, for two138 principal 
reasons: 
                                                                                                                               
Invariant Culpability when Risk-Exposures are Aggregated (“ICREA”): 
Suppose: (1) a person engages in a single act that exposes multiple 
persons to a risk of harm, such that each risk-exposure is identical in all respects 
relevant to legal culpability, including: 
the actor’s intentions, beliefs, and motives;  
the socially recognized benefits and risks of harm that the act entails; and  
the manner in which the benefits, and risks of harm, from the act are 
distributed among the actor, potential victims, and others;  
Then: (2) we should attribute to that actor the same degree of culpability 
for the whole set of risk-exposures as the degree of culpability that we properly 
attribute to him for any individual risk-exposure. 
My formulation is broader than Henderson and Twerki’s category (2b) in one 
significant respect: they seem to require the interaction of the original act with the repetitive 
acts of others persons, while ICREA only requires that multiple persons be exposed to risks 
of harm.  The broader principle is more sensible, I think.  For it encompasses passive victims 
who do not “act.”  (Suppose Fanny builds a bridge that crumbles over time, depositing debris 
on pedestrians passing underneath.) 
136 Id. at 1142. 
137 Id. at 1142-1143.  They explain, by way of summary: “for a consequence to be intended 
in the ‘belief with certainty’ sense, not only must the act producing the consequence be 
discrete, but the consequence complained of must result directly and proximately (both 
temporally and spatially) from the act.”  Id. at 1143. 
138 A third possible reason is as follows.  Although the initial decision to remove the guard 
might be justifiable if the machine will remain in that dangerous condition only for a short 
period of time, the continued failure to repair it might become unjustifiable if lengthier 
exposure will impose a risk of harm to the workers that exceeds some specified threshold of 
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First, the safety guard example seems to involve a concentrated distribution 
of the risk to a relatively small group of workers, many of whom will be repeatedly 
exposed to the same risk.  As we have seen, the ICAA principle loses its persuasive 
power when the distribution of risk is concentrated in this way rather than randomly 
and widely dispersed.  The same is true of the ICREA principle.  Both principles are 
qualified by SSP, the Special Stringency Principle, which was discussed above.  At 
the extreme, imagine that only one worker operates the machine; if over time the 
lack of a guard creates a virtual certainty that he will be harmed, his situation is 
analogous to that of a worker who, the employer can predict, will be harmed the 
very first time he works with the unguarded machine. 
Second, the extended time period also makes it more likely that the owner is 
aware of the condition and of the opportunity to correct the problem, but chooses to 
ignore his moral and legal obligation to do so.  It might be, in short, a potent 
illustration of the culpability of defiance, discussed above. 
In short, the Henderson/Twerski approach is illuminating, for it reveals that 
foresight of likely future harm resulting from one’s conduct can count as (mere) 
statistical knowledge even in some instances where the conduct consists of a single 
act, rather than a series of acts.  ICREA is sometimes necessary to supplement 
ICAA.  However, in endorsing an extremely broad version of ICREA, their 
approach is unpersuasive. 
A similar but more persuasive proposed criterion for distinguishing 
individualized from statistical knowledge appears in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: 
The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to 
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty 
that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone 
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area.  The test 
loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims become 
vaguer, and when, in a related way, the time frame involving the actor’s 
conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm 
becomes more complex.139 
                                                                                                                               
permissibility.  And this is so even if the risks and benefits of a machine lacking a guard both 
increase in rough proportion.  Just as exceeding a threshold level of environmental harm 
might trigger a more stringent duty of precaution, exceeding a threshold level of risk of 
personal injury might warrant greater legal protection (switching from no liability to liability, 
for example, or no longer permitting defenses of consent or assumption of risk). 
139 Restatement (Third) of Torts, §1, comment e, pp. 8-9. 
Moreover, comment e observes, a company’s knowledge that its products will, 
because of the inevitable limits of quality control, contain some manufacturing defects that 
will cause physical injury might support strict liability, but does not support intentional tort 
liability.  And in other situations, knowledge even of relatively certain harms is consistent 
with the absence of any tort liability.  Id. at 9.  Thus the comment implicitly endorses ICAA. 
 The Reporter’s Note to this comment shares my criticism of Henderson and 
Twerski’s criterion of knowledge as too narrow: 
…Comment e is satisfied if the actor can predict with substantial certainty that 
someone "within a small class of [persons] within a localized area" will suffer the 
consequences of the action. Consider the employer that provides employees with a 
machine that is lacking a crucial safety mechanism; several employees during the 
workweek use this machine, and the employer knows with substantial certainty that 
over time one of these employees will suffer injury. Those courts that regard 
substantial certainty as sufficient to justify the employer's liability for an intentional 
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 This formulation is an improvement over that of Henderson and Twerski, 
for it offers a straightforward account of the distinction that legal actors (including 
jurors) can understand and that is broadly consistent with the ICAA, ICREA, and 
SSP principles. 
 
2. Statistical knowledge of a risk that is extremely unjustifiable 
But a significant problem remains.  Sometimes “merely” statistical 
knowledge seems to be as culpable as individualized knowledge.  Does this 
exception swallow the rule?  I hope to show that it does not; rather, I believe that the 
exceptional circumstances in which statistical and individual knowledge are indeed 
normatively indistinguishable actually “prove” the rule, i.e. they actually underscore 
the legitimate rationales behind ICAA and ICREA.  When the risk is extremely 
unjustifiable, we will see, it is normally appropriate to treat one who acts with 
statistical knowledge of the risk as harshly as if he had acted with individual 
knowledge. 
Sometimes we intuitively characterize an actor as “knowingly” causing 
harm even when it is somewhat indeterminate ex ante who will be harmed, or when, 
or where.  Recall this example:  
 
Time bomb, explodes at indeterminate time in near future 
 A terrorist plants a bomb in a central train station.  He knows that  
the bomb is constructed in such a way that it will explode at an 
indeterminate time in the near future, indiscriminately wounding or killing 
many individuals who happen to pass by. 
 
It seems absurd to deny that the terrorist knowingly wounds or kills, and is thus 
properly sanctioned as a murderer, even though two important dimensions of the 
act—its timing and the identity of the victim—are not as readily known or knowable 
ex ante as in a paradigm case of knowingly harming another.140  For it is still the 
case that when the bomb explodes, it is almost certain to kill whoever is nearby.  
And the act seems just as unjustifiable and culpable as a bombing in which the 
terrorist knows which individuals will die. 
Now one implicit feature of Time Bomb sets it apart from the types of cases 
we have been discussing: the terrorist most likely intends to kill or wound.  And it is 
ordinarily proper to treat intended or purposeful harms of this sort as highly 
culpable, even if the actor believes that the likelihood of success is relatively low.  
(A terrorist plants a bomb on a plane in order to kill the passengers; he acts with the 
purpose of killing even if he recognizes that the bomb will probably be discovered.)  
Purposely causing serious harm is almost always highly unjustifiable.  And purpose, 
unlike knowledge, does not readily partake of degrees; either one has purpose to 
                                                                                                                               
tort tend to find that the employer's knowledge in such a case satisfies the 
substantial-certainty standard. 
Reporter’s Note, id., p. 16. 
140 See Heinzerling, Knowing Killing, supra note 10=, at 530 (providing an analytically 
similar example of an actor who randomly distributes a lethal but undetectable poison in a 
small percentage of a large population). 
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cause harm or one does not.  Thus, there is no “statistical purpose” problem 
analogous to the statistical knowledge problem. 
But we can easily fine-tune the example so that the terrorist acts with 
knowledge and not purpose.  And once we do so, the example seems similar to more 
standard individualized knowledge cases.  Suppose the bomber’s purpose is not to 
cause personal injury; rather, his aim is to cause major disruption in the nation’s 
transportation system.  Still, he is undoubtedly aware that he is very likely to cause 
serious injury or death to one or more people.  So modified, the example is not 
easily distinguishable from a standard individualized knowledge case, such as a 
driver knowingly running down a pedestrian in order to escape the pursuit of another 
driver or in order to rush to work.  (Recall Clara.)  To be sure, the victims of the 
bombing might be difficult or impossible for the actor to identify in advance.  But 
apart from its questionable legal or moral relevance (as noted above), ex ante 
anonymity does not distinguish this case from many standard knowledge cases, in 
which the actor can “identify” the victim in only the weakest sense (for example, the 
sense in which a driver running a red light can crudely distinguish one complete 
stranger in the vicinity from another stranger).  Nor does an appreciable time lapse 
between the act of planting the bomb and the explosion causing the harm mark an 
important distinction.  In a standard case, too, serious injuries might occur only well 
after the actor’s risky act, e.g. a death might occur only well after a car crash.  Nor 
does a significant physical distance between the actor and the instrumentality 
causing the harm amount to much of a distinction.  (Suppose the terrorist detonates 
the bomb by means of a remote control from another room or even from another 
city).  Again, in a standard case the driver’s act might predictably have some 
physically distant effects (for example, colliding with a truck transporting chemicals 
and thus causing widespread environmental harm). 
And yet, on closer analysis, even Time Bomb is not a genuine case of 
individualized knowledge.  Individualized knowledge requires some threshold T of 
probability of harm that the actor believes to exist.  Whatever value T has (whether 
50%, or 70%, or 95%), in Time Bomb the actor might well believe that the risk to 
each individual potential victim is much less than T.141 
But although this case is not an instance of individualized knowledge, it is 
most certainly an instance of very high culpability.  The actor knows that someone 
will die as an immediate result of his act.  And his act is grossly unjustifiable.  So it 
is not surprising that we intuitively wish to treat him as if he acted with 
individualized knowledge. 
Now recall the Removed Safety Guard example, where the employer 
removed a guard from a machine and knew that one of a small number of workers 
would almost certainly suffer injury as a result.  This case, too, is probably not a 
genuine instance of individualized knowledge.  Suppose the employer has five 
workers each of whom uses the machine about the same amount of time, and the 
employer can predict that there is only about a 20% probability that any one of them 
will suffer harm, but a high likelihood that at least one of them will.  The 
justifiability of his conduct is not much different than if he removed the guard while 
employing only one worker, knowing that the worker was almost certain to suffer 
                                                 
141 For another example, compare: (1) an actor who plays involuntary Russian Roulette with a 
single victim, firing multiple shots which in aggregate impose a risk greater than T, and (2) an 
actor who plays Russian Roulette with multiple victims, firing multiple shots which in 
aggregate impose a risk greater than T, but firing only one shot at each victim, each imposing 
a risk less than T.  The first shooter acts with individual knowledge; the second does not.  See 
the Russian Roulette examples in the Appendix. 
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injury.  Again, it is plausible that we might wish to treat Removed Safety Guard the 
same as a case of individualized knowledge for purposes of legal sanctions—and 
that is what the Restatement Third of Torts provides, as we have seen. 
In short, Time Bomb and Removed Safety Guard show that it is entirely 
defensible for the law to endorse a relaxed, capacious definition of individualized 
knowledge, applying it not only to paradigm cases involving a probability of greater 
than T that an individual victim will be harmed, but also to cases involving small 
numbers of individuals when the actor is certain (or is aware of a probability greater 
than T) that one of them will be harmed.  On this approach, there is no bright-line 
distinction between individualized and statistical knowledge.  And for similar 
reasons, SSP is probably best understood, at least for purposes of legal sanctions, as 
imposing (1) a duty that becomes continuously more stringent as the concentrated 
risk that the actor believes he is creating increases, rather than (2) a special duty that 
is triggered only when a defined threshold risk of harm is reached.142 
 So far I have examined cases that stretch the scope of individualized 
knowledge only modestly.  But in other cases, the indeterminacy of time, space, and 
possible victims is much greater.  And yet, in some of these cases, too, cases that are 
more aptly described as involving statistical knowledge, we have reason to treat the 
actor as harshly as we would if he had individual knowledge.  Consider an example 
offered by Jody Armour, which, he suggests, shows that a criterion of intention (and, 
by implication, a criterion of individualized knowledge143) can legitimately apply 
even over an extended period of time: 
 
                                                 
142 Nevertheless, even if SSP is a continuous function, it is not a simple proportionate 
function.  That is, as the risk to a single victim, or to a group of potential victims, becomes 
more concentrated, other features of the actor’s conduct that are relevant to its justification 
must become more compelling, not just in a proportionate way, but in a more dramatically 
escalating way.  For an illustration, recall Alfa and Benna.  Suppose it is permissible for 
Benna to impose a 20% risk of death in order to save one life, but impermissible for Alfa to 
impose a 100% risk of death even in order to save five lives.  Now imagine two intermediate 
cases.  Charles imposes a 60% risk of death in order to save three lives.  Dennis imposes an 
80% risk of death in order to save four lives.  On an invariant threshold version of SSP, it is 
triggered only when the risk exceeds a particular level, such as 75%; on that version, Dennis 
acts impermissibly, while Charles, like Benna, acts permissibly.  But on a more plausible 
continuous version of SSP, Charles (as well as Dennis) might act impermissibly even though 
Benna acts permissibly.  (Indeed, when we consider the different degrees and types of harms 
that risky conduct can cause, it is quite doubtful that any invariant threshold version applies in 
all contexts.) 
One objection to SSP is that it is unnecessary.  Instead, we should simply apply a 
sliding scale, increasing the requisite scrutiny or the requisite weight of justifying factors 
when the probability of the harm (as perceived by the actor) increases.  That is the approach 
endorsed by Alexander and Ferzan, supra note =, at =.   Although superficially attractive, this 
strategy is not an improvement.  First, simply indicating that a range of relevant factors are 
relevant and requiring them to be balanced in a sliding scale provides an opaque formula.  See 
Simons, Retributivism Refined - Or Run Amok?, 77 U.Chi.L.Rev. 551, = (2010).  And, as 
articulated by Alexander and Ferzan, the formula takes the form of a very simple function of 
risks and benefits, a function that cannot explain the differing evaluations of Alfa and Benna.  
An adequate explanation requires a more complex function such as SSP. 
143 Armour’s original example apparently involves “intention” to injure in the sense of 
purpose, for he assumes that the shooter deliberately aims the gun at a crowd.  But I have 
modified the example to encompass an actor who lacks that intention but possesses 
individualized knowledge that he will cause injury.  The entrance to a train station, the shooter 
knows, is likely to be extremely crowded most of the day.  But the shooter need not intend to 
harm or kill anyone; his purpose might simply be to cause public panic. 
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Programmed Rifle144 
A shooter aims a rifle at the public entrance to the train station.  The 
rifle contains a hundred randomly selected rounds, only one of which is 
“live.”  The rifle is connected to an automatic timer and is programmed to 
shoot once per day or week. 
 
Notwithstanding the significant time gap between the discrete acts, Armour claims, 
“our intuition would demand that he be responsible for an intentional injury when 
the ‘live’ round is finally discharged into the crowd.”145 
Armour’s example is indeed persuasive, and it demonstrates the need to add 
a qualification to the accounts we have discussed, including that offered by 
Henderson and Twerski.  Two features of his example seem important—(1) the 
actor’s precommitment to a course of activity that will cause serious harm, and (2) 
the extremely unjustifiable nature of the conduct.  In the end, I think the second 
feature is the critical one in formulating a defensible criterion of individualized 
rather than statistical knowledge. 
Consider first the actor’s precommitment to a course of action.  
Precommitment of different types and degrees can be distinguished,146 but let us 
begin with the clearest case: where the actor makes a single decision that (without 
further effort by the actor) will reliably result in future imposition of risk.  
“Programmed Rifle” is such a case, but so is the decision of a corporate executive to 
market a product (e.g., a knife or an automobile) that will undoubtedly causally 
contribute to injuries to many of its users.  On reflection, this cannot be a decisive 
factor.  Businesses often, and justifiably, precommit to the marketing of a large 
number of products over an extended period of time, knowing that some of the 
products will inevitably cause harm.  The builder of the jungle gym knows that 
innumerable children will use it over the course of many years, and some will suffer 
injuries.  Individuals also implicitly precommit in a comparable way, by deciding to 
engage regularly in a risky activity, such as driving a car or skiing.  To be sure, a 
single individual might not be statistically certain that, by participating in such 
activities, he will cause serious harm, even over his lifetime.  Still, a group of such 
individuals could be statistically certain of such a result.  Yet it would hardly be 
proper to treat, say, the American Automobile Association as an “intentional” or 
knowing wrongdoer because it encourages its members to drive—to drive 
responsibly, but indeed to drive. 
                                                 
144 The example is adapted from an example in Jody Armour, Interpretive Construction, 
Systemic Consistency, and Criterial Norms in Tort Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1157, 1160-1161 
(2001).  Armour offers it in criticism of the criterion, just discussed, proposed by Henderson 
and Twerski. 
145 Id. at 1161. 
146 In the strongest form of precommitment, once he has performed the initiating act, it is 
impossible for the actor to prevent the harm from occurring.  In a slightly weaker form, it is 
possible but extraordinarily difficult to prevent the harm (i.e., it would not be reasonable to 
expect the actor to do so).  In a yet weaker form, the actor could and should prevent the risk 
from taking effect, as when a product manufacturer should recall the defective product.  
(When an automobile manufacturer sells a defective vehicle, it could exhibit any or all of 
these forms of precommitment.)  And customary patterns of conduct could also be described 
as a weak form of “precommitment”: I habitually drive to work rather than walk or bicycle or 
take a bus.  But these distinctions are not critical to the main argument in the text. 
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This is not to say that precommitment is never relevant to legal liability.  If 
Domino’s Pizza had a policy (as some alleged) to encourage its delivery drivers to 
speed if necessary in order to deliver pizzas to customers within 30 minutes,147 then 
their knowledge that this policy would lead to a predictable number of accidents and 
injuries is highly relevant to their liability.  And if that policy was sufficiently 
unjustifiable, and if Domino’s knew of its effects, punitive damages would be 
appropriate.148  But that conclusion would be true whether drivers followed the 
policy once or a thousand times (assuming no difference in the company’s 
knowledge of the risks or in other relevant factors).149  In short, the ICAA principle 
seems to apply: repetition of conduct that conforms to the policy does not, by itself, 
make the conduct more culpable. 
Now consider the second feature in the “Programmed Rifle” example—the 
clearly unjustifiable nature of the risk.  This feature does seem to be a compelling 
reason for classifying such cases within the individualized knowledge rather than 
statistical knowledge category.  The fact that the actor maliciously intends serious 
injury, or at the very least knows that such injury will occur and is moved to act by a 
sadistic or other highly immoral reason, very clearly distinguishes him as among the 
most culpable wrongdoers.  This is true even if no one can know, when he 
precommits, the precise time or the precise victim of the future injury.  Indeed, one 
could extend the spatial and temporal dimensions of the example indefinitely, yet we 
still would want to treat the actor as harshly as an intentional or (individually) 
knowing wrongdoer.  Consider this case: 
 
Atmospheric Poison 
A terrorist sends into the atmosphere a specially-designed chemical 
that he knows is virtually certain to randomly kill a hundred people 
somewhere on Earth some time in the next hundred years. 
 
Even if the terrorist does not intend the deaths—suppose, for example, that he 
merely intends to frighten those currently alive, and does not care whether or not the 
poison has its expected future effect—his clear lack of justification and immoral 
motivation warrant treating him as extraordinarily culpable, just as culpable as one 
who poisons a local water supply expecting 100 people to die as a consequence 
within the hour.150 
                                                 
147 Cf. Wauchop v. Domino’s Pizza, 832 F.Supp. 1572 (D. Ind. 1993) (policy of Domino’s 
Pizza guaranteeing pizza delivery within 30 minutes allegedly contributed to death when 
delivery driver struck victim’s minivan; however, policy explicitly required drivers to 
comply with traffic laws). 
148 Moreover, if the repetition of the conduct of speeding was pursuant to official policy, 
rather than simply a pattern of conduct of which the company was aware, that could, of 
course, bear on the company’s legal responsibility under respondeat superior. 
149 In practice, of course, when an actor repeats his conduct, he will often have a more 
confident and certain belief about its harmful results; and similarly, a legal decision-maker 
will often be more confident in her judgment that the actor was aware of the high risks he 
was posing.  See TAN = supra.  Moreover, it is especially culpable to persist in posing risks 
that one knows or should know are unjustifiable; this is an aspect of the concern about 
“defiance,” noted above. 
150 Note that this example involves a single culpable act that exposes numerous people to risk.  
Thus, it exemplifies ICREA, not ICAA. 
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What is the deeper explanation for this “extremely unjustified” 
qualification?  When we recall the basic rationale for presumptively treating agents 
as serious wrongdoers when they act with individualized knowledge that they will 
cause harm, the reason for the qualification becomes more evident.  In a standard 
individualized knowledge case—for example, when a driver realizes that in running 
a red light he is very likely to run over a pedestrian—the actor is especially culpable 
because he chooses to act despite his knowledge that he is creating a very high risk 
of a direct, immediate harm to a victim.  Ordinarily that decision will be extremely 
difficult to justify, given his beliefs and intentions as well as the reasons that should 
have guided him.  Even if the driver’s reason for so acting is legitimate, he is not 
justified if that reason is not very weighty (if, for example, his speeding through the 
light merely serves his convenience, in getting home earlier).  Compare an 
analogous statistical knowledge case.  Now, an actor is justified in driving (at a 
reasonable speed) rather than walking home, even though he realizes that this creates 
a very small risk of serious physical injury to random pedestrians, bicyclists, and 
occupants of other vehicles, because those same benefits are now sufficiently 
weighty and the risks of the activity are low and are dispersed among numerous 
potential victims.   
But in both the Programmed Rifle example and the Atmospheric Poison 
example, there are no legitimate compensating benefits whatsoever.  The analysis is 
dramatically different if we modify the example to one in which the chemical will 
produce countervailing benefits: 
 
Atmospheric Cancer Cure 
Scientists release into the atmosphere a chemical which they believe 
will have highly beneficial effects in reducing the incidence of cancer from 
air pollution, but which at the same time will, as an unavoidable side-effect, 
have the same expected mortality effect as the terrorist’s poison: it is 
virtually certain to randomly kill a hundred people somewhere on Earth 
some time in the next hundred years. 
 
Even if the scientists overestimate the compensating benefits, and even if their error 
is negligent, they would not and should not be treated as harshly as intentional (i.e., 
either purposeful or knowing) wrongdoers, such as the terrorist releasing the 
atmospheric poison.151 
Another way to appreciate the critical importance of this justification issue 
is by examining the significant doctrinal distinction between (individualized) 
knowledge and recklessness.  Knowingly causing harm is much more difficult to 
justify than recklessly doing so.  Suppose that “knowingly” causing a particular 
harm (such as serious bodily injury) is somewhat arbitrarily defined as requiring a 
subjective belief that one’s act creates at least a 70% risk of that type of harm.  Then 
an actor causes that harm “recklessly” rather than “knowingly” if she subjectively 
                                                                                                                               
 A separate question is whether future deaths should be discounted to present value, 
so that killing 100 over an extended future time period is no worse than killing, say, 70 today.  
However this question is resolved, the main argument here is unaffected. 
151 But suppose the terrorist honestly believes that the social benefits from his action 
(obtaining justice for his ethnic or religious group, destabilizing an oppressive regime, etc.) 
are as great as those achieved by the atmospheric cancer cure?  The short answer is that legal 
and moral norms trump the individual’s subjective beliefs about the legality and morality of 
his conduct.  I cannot explore the complexities of this issue here. 
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believes that the risk of harm is less than 70%.152  There will, of course, be close 
cases.  But it is sensible for the law to employ a relatively bright-line rule that only a 
belief that one is creating a high degree of risk will trigger the distinctive doctrinal 
consequences of knowing or “intentional” harms identified above (especially (1) 
greater punishment or liability, and (2) the obligation to demonstrate a weightier 
justification in order to avoid all liability).  Murder (knowingly causing death) is 
justifiably punished more harshly than reckless manslaughter; “intentional” battery 
(including knowingly causing harm) is justifiably treated as a more serious tort, in 
several respects, than negligence (causing harm recklessly or negligently).  Although 
borderline differences in the perceived risk of harm (e.g., 75% v. 65%) do not so 
clearly warrant differential consequences of this sort, more substantial differences 
(e.g. 75% v. 10%) do. 
And why are these differential consequences warranted?  First, as noted 
above, ordinarily the greater the risk of harm knowingly created, the more the actor 
has impermissibly devalued the interests of the victim (or other socially valued 
interests) relative to the actor’s own ends.  Second, we normally cannot be sure that 
the actor who knowingly creates a smaller risk in pursuit of his ends would have 
been willing to knowingly create the greater one in pursuit of the same ends.  And 
third, all else being equal, one who knowingly creates a higher risk needs a 
weightier justification in order to deserve exemption from legal responsibility. 
All three reasons argue in favor of treating knowing actors more harshly 
than reckless ones.  But none of these reasons argues in favor of treating actors with 
statistical knowledge as harshly as those with individual knowledge, as early 
discussion confirms. (Consider the third reason again: statistical cases simply 
involve aggregation of numerous low-risk individual cases; and if a low burden of 
justification is appropriate for the latter, it should be appropriate for the former.)  
And yet, all three reasons do militate in favor of treating a small subset of statistical 
knowledge cases, such as Time Bomb, Programmed Rifle and Atmospheric Poison, 
in the same way that we treat individualized knowledge cases.  For if there is 
absolutely no socially acceptable justification for creating the risk, then:  
                                                 
152 In the text, I assume that “reckless” is understood in the purely cognitive sense, see note 
28= supra, so that we are indeed comparing apples with apples.  Most criminal law and tort 
“recklessness” criteria are more complex than this: they require, not only a cognitive 
awareness of a risk of harm, but also the taking of an unjustified, or clearly unjustified, risk.  
See id.  This common use of a complex rather than purely cognitive conception of 
recklessness accentuates the legal difference between knowledge and recklessness: if D1 
knowingly causes a serious harm, D1 is typically liable unless he can invoke an affirmative 
defense (such as self-defense or necessity); but if D2 recklessly causes a serious harm, D2 is 
typically liable for recklessness only if the state (or the plaintiff) can also show that D2’s act 
was unjustified (or clearly unjustified).  For affirmative defenses, a criminal defendant must 
at least produce supporting evidence before the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution; and 
sometimes, the defendant has the burden of proof to disprove the defense.  See Dressler, 
Understanding Criminal Law 77 (5th ed. 2009); MPC §1.12(2) & MPC §1.12(2).  Tort law 
typically shifts the burden of persuasion to defendants for affirmative defenses.  Dan B. 
Dobbs, The Law of Torts 36-38 (2000). 
 A jurisdiction also might narrow the definition of recklessness by requiring a 
subjective belief that the risk is above some particular threshold, e.g. 1% or “substantial.”  It 
seems that the Model Penal Code imposes a requirement that the actor believe that the risk is 
substantial, though the matter is not entirely clear.  See Simons, Should the Model Penal 
Code be Amended?, supra note 25=, at =.  But whether or not a jurisdiction narrows 
recklessness in this way, the basic analysis in the text comparing knowledge and recklessness 
remains valid. 
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(1) The actor has very significantly devalued the interests of the victim and of 
society relative to the (nonexistent) value of any permissible interest the action 
serves;  
(2) The actor often has revealed that he was willing to create an even higher risk if 
that had been feasible;153 and 
(3) The actor has made irrelevant the question whether he has imposed a sufficiently 
high level of risk to warrant a strong presumption of unjustifiability, for by 
hypothesis, his conduct is clearly unjustifiable.   
Put differently, a principal reason why the law isolates individualized knowledge 
that one will cause harm as an especially culpable state of mind is that acting with 
such knowledge is normally not simply unjustifiable, but especially unjustifiable.  
This is not usually true of acting with statistical knowledge.  Yet in a subcategory of 
the latter cases, we have independent reason to conclude that the conduct is 
especially unjustifiable—for example, because the conduct is prompted by a highly 
immoral motivation). 
Criminal law doctrine does recognize this subcategory of cases in its 
“depraved heart” or “extreme indifference” murder category.  In such cases, an actor 
who would otherwise be considered only reckless is deemed to be as culpable as one 
who knowingly or purposely causes a death.154  One who plays Russian Roulette 
with the victim is guilty of murder if he spins the cylinder and happens to discharge 
a live bullet on the first pull of the trigger, even if the probability of death is only 
one in six.155  Such an actor clearly lacks individualized knowledge, but his 
depravity is sufficient to justify an extremely severe sanction.  The actors in 
Programmed Rifle and Atmospheric Poison could readily be convicted of murder 
under this same doctrine. 
To be sure, the “depraved heart” murder doctrine itself is controversial 
insofar as it permits very severe punishment premised on very uncertain criteria.    
But, for our purposes, the doctrine does reveal that legal doctrine can and does 
recognize certain “exceptions” to usual mental state criteria when those exceptions 
“prove,” or serve the underlying rationales of, the usual rules. 
Accordingly, the Restatement Third’s criterion for distinguishing 
individualized from statistical knowledge is essentially sound: individualized 
knowledge should indeed normally be restricted to “knowledge to a substantial 
certainty that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone 
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area.”  But the criterion 
must be qualified to account for unusual cases such as Programmed Rifle or 
Atmospheric Poison, with a proviso such as the following: “or, in rare cases, an 
actor’s knowledge that he will harm someone within a more diffuse or temporally 
remote group of victims, in circumstances where causing that harm is extremely 
                                                 
153 But not always.  Consider the sadist who wants to badly injure but not kill the victim; his 
dangerous acts do not demonstrate a willingness to kill, but he is still about as culpable as 
someone who is indeed willing to kill.  See Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for 
“Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Character”? Examining the Requisite 
Connection between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 219, 266 (2002). 
154 The Model Penal Code explicitly requires both recklessness as to the risk of death and 
“extreme indifference.”  §210.2(1)(b).  Other jurisdictions are less clear about whether 
recklessness as to the risk must always be proven. 
155 Even if the defendant credibly commits to pull the trigger only once, many jurisdictions 
would uphold a conviction of extreme indifference murder. 
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unjustifiable.”156  Such a proviso permits the law to treat the culpability displayed in 
these unusual cases as comparable to the culpability displayed in paradigm 
individualized knowledge cases. 
 
IV. Applications 
 The analysis above is illuminating in a range of legal contexts.  This section 
discusses three. 
 
 A.  Knowledge in contexts other than knowingly causing serious harm 
“Knowledge” that your action is very likely to cause harm is not always 
culpable.  It is only presumptively culpable when you have individualized 
knowledge.  Subject to rare exceptions, only in this situation is the knowing actor 
very likely to be acting in an unjustifiable way.  How widely do these conclusions 
apply?  Do they apply beyond the context we have been discussing, actors who 
knowingly cause death or serious bodily injury?  Do they apply when the knowledge 
in question pertains to a legally relevant circumstance, rather than to a legally 
required causal result? 
                                                 
156 This solution does not resolve all conceptual difficulties.  One might object that it proves 
too much: it seems to imply that creating even a very low-level risk (one that would normally 
be categorized as reckless or negligent at worst) can count as individualized knowledge, and 
should accordingly be sanctioned especially harshly, if the actor’s reason for creating the risk 
is sufficiently immoral or unjustifiable.  Thus, suppose you drive carefully, and you take a 
drive not for pleasure, convenience, or to accomplish some socially acceptable goal, but 
merely because you sadistically hope that your careful driving will nevertheless injure or kill 
someone. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note =, at = (discussing a similar example, Frankie).  
My analysis seems to imply that if your improbable plan is realized, you should be treated as 
having knowingly harmed or killed the victim. Arguably the driver is on a moral par with 
someone who plays Russian Roulette with an unwilling victim employing a device that has a 
1 in 1,000,000 chance of killing him. 
 It is difficult to have confidence in one’s intuitive response to such strange examples, 
but here are some reactions.  An attempt to kill another with a gun should clearly be 
sanctioned harshly (whether or not it succeeds) even if the subjective and objective risks of 
success are only one in a thousand.  But it is much less clear that the careful but sadistic driver 
should be treated harshly, or indeed sanctioned at all.  The example raises evidentiary doubts: 
if he were really such a sadist, obtaining pleasure from endangering others, why didn’t he just 
deliberately run someone over, or at least deliberately drive dangerously rather than carefully?  
The causal nexus here is also likely to be less direct or foreseeable: careful driving will not 
cause injury unless unusual events or mechanisms intervene.  And the fact that the actor’s 
conduct conforms to standards of reasonable care makes it much more difficult to credit proof 
that his actual motivation was an illicit reason.  Moreover, if the risks he poses truly are 
extraordinarily minimal, it is possible that those exposed to them implicitly consent to them, 
or that there is some very modest social benefit to his creating the risk.  See Simons, 
Retributivism Refined, supra note 139=, at  565 (analyzing a similar character, Frankie). 
On the other hand, if that proof were strong enough, perhaps we could indeed justify 
harsh sanctions for the careful driver who kills.  Thus, suppose Leo wants to kill Larry, but he 
knows that he, Leo, is under constant police surveillance.  Yet he also knows that Larry often 
sleepwalks in the completely dark street outside his house at 2 a.m., oblivious to his 
surroundings.  If Leo repeatedly drives by Larry’s house at 2 a.m. at a very cautious rate of 
speed, unable to see whether anyone is on the street, but hoping thereby to kill Larry, and if 
on the 500th drive he does cause Larry’s death, it seems appropriate to treat Leo as a murderer.  
And if there really is equally strong proof in other cases that the actor took a (careful) drive 
simply because he wanted to endanger or kill another, perhaps he, too, should be treated 
harshly. 
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We must be cautious before applying the analysis to other “knowledge” 
requirements in the law.  Consider the following legal prohibitions that require 
knowledge before liability will attach: 
1. A criminal defendant must (to be liable for murder) know that his 
actions will cause the victim’s death. 
2. A tort defendant must (to be liable for battery) know that his action will 
cause offense or physical harm (or must know that his action will cause 
a nonconsensual physical contact).157 
3. A business owner must know that he is hiring an undocumented 
immigrant, or a person under the legal age; or that he is selling alcohol 
to a person under the legal age. 
4. A business or individual must know that the property that it received 
from another is stolen. 
5. A lawyer must know that his client will give false testimony. 
 
 In each case, the law’s prohibition is very likely intended to encompass 
individualized knowledge but not mere statistical knowledge.  Presumably the laws 
against knowingly putting on a witness who will commit perjury focus on whether 
the lawyer is aware of a very high probability, in a single trial, that a witness will 
lie.158  Laws prohibiting receipt of stolen property focus on an actor’s awareness that 
a particular item of property is probably stolen, not his awareness that some item or 
other in his possession might be stolen.  In short, some version of the invariant 
culpability principles most likely applies in all of these cases.  An actor’s legal 
culpability normally should not change just because his business is high volume or 
his activity extensive. 
However, the five examples may well differ in just where they do and 
should draw the individualized/statistical knowledge line.  In this respect, the first 
two contexts differ significantly from the others.  In these two contexts, the wrong is 
serious and of a fundamental sort.  A moral wrong underlies the legal wrong,159 and 
partly for this reason, SSP is an important part of the explanation for presumptively 
treating action with individual knowledge as especially difficult to justify.160 
 But in the other contexts, a serious moral wrong need not underlie the legal 
wrong.  Moreover, the specified legal wrong might simply be a proxy, in useful rule-
                                                 
157 Actually, although the requisite “intent” for battery encompasses knowledge, courts differ 
concerning the requisite object of that intent.   Some require merely an “intent” to contact 
another person; others also require an intent to harm or offend.  See Simons, A Restatement 
Third of Intentional Torts?, supra note 30=, at 1066-1070. 
158 Research has not disclosed any judicial definitions of “knowledge” in this context that 
refer to probabilities.= 
159 In criminal law terminology, it is malum in se, not malum prohibitum. 
160 However, the second example, the tort of battery, encompasses some relatively minor 
harms as well as more serious one, for it embraces unpermitted contacts that merely cause 
offense, not physical injury.  SSP might not apply to these less serious instances of battery, 
just as it might not apply to examples three, four, and five. 
 Moreover, one of the reasons for clearly distinguishing statistical from individualized 
knowledge relates to the grading role of the latter relative to other available grades of an 
offense, such as recklessness or negligence.  But in many legal contexts where a knowledge 
requirement is employed, no lesser grade or degree of culpability is recognized.  (This is 
likely true of examples three, four and five listed in the text.) 
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like form, for the real legal or moral wrong that the legal standard is meant to 
address.  Consider the third example, a law against selling alcohol to a minor.  This 
criminal law rule is a pragmatic proxy for an underlying norm such as, “Don’t 
endanger the health of immature people who do not fully appreciate that they are 
jeopardizing their own health and safety.” 
 Why do these distinctions between the first two categories and the other 
categories matter?  For three reasons.  First, some of the arguments that we have 
explored, especially SSP, do not apply, or do not apply with the same force, to the 
last three examples.  The concern about not imposing highly concentrated risks on a 
single victim is much more persuasive when the risk in question is serious personal 
injury or death, than when the risk is that a trial will be distorted by false testimony 
or that a person’s property will come into the possession of a person with no right to 
it.161  Stated more generally, when the actor’s knowledge pertains to a legally 




Pawn shop owners P1, P2, and P3 
 Owner P1 receives and offers for sale a particular piece of jewelry 
that he knows is stolen.  P2 adopts a sloppy policy for screening goods 
received by his pawn shop that he knows will result in 10% of the retained 
goods being stolen.  P3 adopts a more effective screening policy that he 
knows will result in only 1% of the goods being stolen.  P2 and P3 each 
receives and offers for sale a particular piece of jewelry, not realizing it is 
stolen. 
 
P1 clearly acts with individualized knowledge, while P2 and P3 arguably do not.  
However, these distinctions are not readily justified by SSP, with its special concern 
that an actor not impose highly concentrated risks on individual victims.  To be sure, 
in all three cases, the actual jewelry owner is directly harmed when a pawn shop 
improperly takes possession of his property.  But it is doubtful that an especially 
stringent deontological constraint applies when one creates, say, a 70% risk of 
improperly depriving a victim of her property yet does not apply when one creates a 
30% or 10% or 1% risk. 
 Second, in cases such as the third example, where a rule serves as a proxy, 
the judgment about whether individualized knowledge or some lesser culpability 
should suffice is more complex than in the “knowledge of result” cases canvassed 
earlier in this article: sometimes a lesser culpability is perfectly consistent with the 
underlying norm.163  Third, in a particular legal context, we might have good reason 
to employ an especially broad or narrow definition.  If, for example, it is important 
to ensure that the insurance exclusion from worker’s compensation for “intentional” 
                                                 
161 For a series of illustrations, see Appendix, at = . 
162 For a possible counterexample, however, see the example of actors S1, S2, and S3, in the 
Appendix. 
163 For example, requiring only reckless awareness of a risk that the person purchasing alcohol 
is under age might be consistent with properly respecting the underlying norm not to 
contribute to the health problems of an immature person. 
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torts remains narrow (or broad), then we have ample reason to define the 
individualized knowledge prong of “intentional” torts narrowly (or broadly).164 
 Still, for practical reasons, it is not surprising that legal standards in quite 
different domains (criminal law, tort, regulation) and in different subdomains 
(criminal homicide v. criminal theft) often employ similar mental state categories.  
The proper definition of knowledge is complex enough as it is; legislators, judges, 
and other legal actors have reason to use as uniform a criterion as is practicable in 
different contexts. 
 
B. If a cost-benefit analysis supplies knowledge that an activity will 
cause harm, is it culpable to proceed? 
 The propriety and legitimate scope of cost-benefit analysis, whether 
conducted by government regulators or by private actors, is an enormous topic.165  
For purposes of this paper, I focus on one question within the host of issues that the 
topic raises.  If an actor conducts a serious cost-benefit analysis of whether to take a 
precaution or alter his activity, he will come to appreciate many of the harmful 
consequences of his action or course of conduct.  If he then proceeds with the action, 
is he presumptively culpable, or even highly culpable? 
The short answer is no.  The longer answer comes in six parts. 
 First, to presume culpability in this context is unwarranted, for familiar 
reasons.  The invariant culpability principles (ICAA and ICREA) tell us that 
expanding the scope or duration of an activity does not, for that reason alone, make 
one more culpable.  Furthermore, if we did treat predictions of harm derived from a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis as individualized knowledge, the result would be 
dramatic and unacceptable; for it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to 
justify such knowing killings under existing legal criteria for the necessity or lesser 
evils defense.166 
 Second, in this context, it is understandable that people mischaracterize 
statistical knowledge cases as individualized knowledge cases, for reasons we have 
explored.  Thus, when the causal effect of which the observer is cognizant is a 
serious harm, people often (but incorrectly) characterize the harm as intended; and 
of course intended harm is almost always unjustifiable.167  And, when harms are “on 
screen” and highly salient, psychological research teaches that people will feel that 
                                                 
164 Some jurisdictions, indeed, define this exception so narrowly that only purpose, not 
individualized knowledge in any form, satisfies this exception. =cite from R.3rd.  On the other 
hand, many jurisdictions treat deaths arising from Russian Roulette as “intentional” and not 
“accidental,” even if there is credible testimony that the insured decedent honestly believed 
that the live bullet was not in the firing chamber, and thus lacked (what I call) individualized 
knowledge of the risk.  See, e.g., Arnold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 360, 362-363 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
165 Useful discussions include: M. Adler & E. Posner, New Foundations of Cost Benefit 
Analysis (2006); Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives (M. 
Adler & E. Posner 2002); Risk: Philosophical Perspectives (T. Lewens ed. 2007). 
166 If marketing a product in the face of a cost-benefit analysis predicting serious injuries or 
deaths from the use of the product counts as individualized knowledge, it is quite unlikely that 
existing legal doctrine would recognize a justification.  As noted earlier, many jurisdictions 
decline to recognize a necessity defense for murder, or if they do recognize it, they limit the 
defense to “emergencies.”  Supra note =.  Securing benefits for consumers of a product (such 
as lower cost or greater ease of use) is not likely to count as a “necessity” justifying a 
knowing killing.  Heinzerling, Knowing Killing, supra note 10= at 529. 
167 See TAN = supra (Knobe on confusion of knowledge with intent). 
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actors have an especially strong duty to avoid those harms.168  However, as we have 
seen, this psychological fact is too thin a reed to support a more stringent moral and 
legal duty. 
Third, it is indeed plausible to critique some versions of cost-benefit 
analysis as morally and legally objectionable.  But even when this is so, it is not at 
all plausible that the statistical knowledge of harmful effects that the actor acquires 
in the course of performing cost-benefit analysis is, by itself, what makes acting on 
the basis of that analysis objectionable.  Rather, when such an analysis is 
objectionable, it is for different reasons—e.g., because distributive effects or 
deontological constraints are improperly ignored, or because the social welfare 
function gives inadequate weight to the value of human life or to soft variables that 
are difficult to measure. 
Consider, for example, the special stringency principle and the examples of 
Alfa and Benna.  Alfa knowingly creates close to a 100% risk of killing one 
pedestrian in order to save the lives of five passengers.  Many deontologists would 
condemn her conduct, while many consequentialists would not.  But the 
condemnation by deontologists does not flow simply from the fact that she can 
predict that her actions will cause harm.  For they will not necessarily condemn all 
actors who possess only statistical knowledge that they will cause harm (recall 
Agatha and Larry).  Indeed, they might not condemn the conduct of Benna, who 
knowingly creates a 20% risk of killing a pedestrian in order to save one passenger.  
Card-carrying deontologists can still endorse the need to balance consequences as 
part of the proper moral analysis, especially when the risk levels are smaller and are 
fairly distributed.169 
Fourth, it is easy to confuse the cold-blooded, deliberate state of mind that 
characterizes first-degree murder with the deliberate decision of an actor (such as a 
corporate manager) to move forward with a project or activity despite knowledge of 
its very likely harmful effects.  By trading off health and safety against more diffuse 
social benefits, the actor who engages in cost-benefit analysis seems to be equally 
“cold-blooded.”170  But this conflation of premeditated murder with “premeditated” 
use of cost-benefit analysis is unwarranted.  The two categories are not directly 
comparable.  To be sure, if D1 impulsively shoots another out of jealousy, while D2 
deliberates over whether to shoot his victim out of jealousy and ultimately decides to 
do so, we might have reason to punish D2 more harshly (for first degree rather than 
second degree murder).  Impulsiveness sometimes mitigates, and premeditation 
sometimes aggravates, in this context.  But if corporate manager M1 impulsively 
decides to send a product onto the marketplace without conducting any advanced 
research into its benefits and risks, while M2 deliberately weighs those benefits and 
                                                 
168 =cite.  Recall the quotation from Sunstein, supra at = (comparing Company A with 
Company B).  This is another instance of salience and the Availability heuristic.  See supra at 
= (discussing these issues in the context of the identifiable victim effect). 
169 See Simons, Tort Negligence, supra note =, at =. 
170 See Heinzerling, Knowing Killing, supra note 10= at 523, 526.  To be sure, if a product 
manufacturer can confidently predict that his product will contain some manufacturing defects 
that will cause harm, that prediction is sometimes relied upon in justifying strict liability for 
the resulting harms. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a 
(1998)(“Because manufacturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels, their 
knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will enter the marketplace entails an 
element of deliberation about the amount of injury that will result from their activity.").   
Unfortunately, this rationale is quite open-ended, justifying much broader strict liability than 
tort law actually imposes, or than tort law justifiably should impose.  I do not have space to 
address the issue here. 
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risks, it hardly follows that M2 is more culpable.  To the contrary, it is quite possible 
that M1 is negligent (or worse), while M2 is not culpable at all. 
 Fifth, even when an actor has conducted a cost-benefit analysis in an 
improper manner, the question remains: how culpable is this?  The answer depends 
in part on what was defective about her analysis.  A misunderstanding of the facts?  
A failure to conduct sufficient research?  A failure to consider (or to give sufficient 
weight to) certain factors?  But we should not assume that the decisive factor in 
determining her culpability for conducting an improper analysis is always the extent 
or severity of the harms of which she had statistical knowledge.  Nor should we 
assume that a complete failure to conduct any cost-benefit analysis must be less 
culpable than undertaking such an analysis but performing it poorly.  Sometimes, it 
is more culpable for a corporation (1) to fail, because of indifference, even to 
investigate the likely consequences of its decision to market a product that could 
produce serious harm if it is unsafe, than (2) to conduct a cost-benefit study of those 
consequences but to perform the analysis negligently.171  Or, in doctrinal terms, 
sometimes “recklessness” (in the sense of awareness of the predictable harms from 
the product) can be less culpable than “negligence” (in the sense of blameworthy 
inadvertence to whether the product will produce such harms). “In many respects the 
actor who does not care about the risks is worse than one that assesses the risks and 
makes the wrong judgment.”172 
 The broader point, that cognitive recklessness is sometimes less culpable 
than negligence, raises some fundamental issues about how we should rank different 
mental states and different culpability categories.173  But for our purposes, the lesson 
                                                 
171 Note that Viscusi’s study, mentioned in the introduction, supra at note 12=, provides 
empirical evidence that many people do not appreciate this point.  In mock juror studies of 
punitive damages, participants tend to treat (2) as warranting much greater punitive damages 
than (1).   
172 George Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and 
International (Volume One: Foundations) 315 (2007).  Here is Fletcher’s argument in more 
detail: 
Compare two possible versions of the prosecution against Ford Motor Company for 
locating the gas tank in a vulnerable position in their rear-engine model, the Pinto.  
In case A, the company never bothers to study whether it is safe or dangerous to 
build their car with gas tanks in front.  In case B, the company undertakes a 
systematic study of the costs and benefits of expected deaths from collision and the 
costs of placing the tank in [a] safer spot.  It concludes that in light of the difference 
in expected deaths from collision and the costs of redesigning the car, the saving of 
lives is not worth the costs.  [Suppose in case B the costs of the design outweigh the 
benefits and the company is properly found to be reckless.] 
Now suppose that the company was sloppy, it did not invest the money to 
test the design, and it was blissfully unaware of the risk.  Do we seriously believe 
that a merely negligent Ford Motor Company, one that took exactly the same risks 
in marketing the Pinto, should receive more favorable legal treatment?  The 
opposite conclusion seems plausible as well.  In many respects the actor who does 
not care about the risks is worse than one that assesses the risks and makes the 
wrong judgment. 
Id. at 314-315. 
173 In my view, acting with a cognitive mental state is sometimes more, and sometimes less, 
culpable than acting with a conative mental state (of intention or indifference) or than acting 
unjustifiably as measured by an objective standard of conduct.  The conventional hierarchy of 
mental states, ranging from purpose, to knowledge, to recklessness, to negligence, is thus 
imperfect.  See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 15=. 
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is straightforward: a bare decision to conduct a cost-benefit analysis should not 
make the actor legally culpable, and even if such an analysis was conducted 
imperfectly or unreasonably, this should not inevitably make the actor legally 
culpable to the same degree as an actor who knowingly causes a harm. 
 Sixth, and finally, consider high-profile product liability cases in which the 
corporation’s decision to trade off health and safety against the cost of a precaution 
apparently enraged the jury and prompted an award of punitive damages.174  Such 
cases appear to be counterexamples to the arguments I have just offered.  The best-
known example here is the controversy over the alleged defect in the design of the 
gas tank of the Ford Pinto.  Ford was found liable for an enormous punitive damage 
award, and was even criminally prosecuted.  And a popular understanding of the 
reason for the award and for the prosecution is that Ford made a morally abhorrent, 
coldly calculated decision to weigh the cost of paying tort liability awards for 
predicted injuries and deaths against the lost profits it would suffer if it had to incur 
the cost (which was very small per automobile) of taking a precaution to prevent 
those harms. 
 This popular understanding rests on a contestable understanding of the facts.  
More importantly for our purposes, it is also unjustified as a matter of principle.  
With respect to the facts, it is not clear that the jury which imposed the punitive 
award, and the judges who upheld that award, decided as they did simply because 
Ford (a) performed a cost-benefit analysis of whether to make the gas tank safer and 
(b) thus improperly traded lives off against money,175 though I concede that this 
simple abhorrence of cost-benefit balancing might indeed have been the central 
motivation.176  However, if the popular understanding of the facts and of the 
                                                 
174 For a recitation of some such cases, see W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis, supra 
note 12=, at =. 
175 See Schwartz, id. at 1039 (noting that the civil jury in Grimshaw was instructed under the 
consumer expectation, not a risk-benefit test); & 1059 n. 178 (noting that the enormous size of 
punitive damage award might have been based on Ford’s profits over the relevant time 
period). 
  Many have also criticized Ford’s decision, in its cost-benefit analysis, to value life 
at only $200,000.  However, that figure was supplied to Ford by a government agency.  See 
id at 1022-1026.   Note also that the famous “smoking gun” cost-benefit memo in which 
Ford purportedly memorialized its cost-benefit analysis was not admitted into evidence.  Id. 
at 1021. 
176 See id. at 1067.  In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. App. 1981), 
the appellate court upheld the punitive damage award against Ford because a jury could find 
that it sold an automobile that it knew, based on crash tests, was highly dangerous: 
Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear 
structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20- to 30-mile-per-
hour collision. There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous 
design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings 
by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against 
corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous 
indifference to public safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct 
constituted "conscious disregard" of the probability of injury to members of the 
consuming public. 
… 
While much of the evidence was necessarily circumstantial, there was substantial 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that Ford's management 
decided to proceed with the production of the Pinto with knowledge of test results 
revealing design defects which rendered the fuel tank extremely vulnerable on rear 
Page 71 of 84  Simons, Stat.Knowl Decon 11 3/3/11
   
motivation of the jury and appellate court were correct, and if Ford really was 
sanctioned with punitive damages simply for conducting a cost-benefit analysis, 
without regard to how sensitively and carefully they performed that analysis, then 
the punitive damage award was indeed unjustified. 
 Similarly, the 1980 criminal trial of Ford Motor Company for the same 
alleged design defect in the Pinto gas tank might appear to raise serious doubts about 
my argument; but it does not.  Again, Ford was not prosecuted simply for 
proceeding with a product that Ford (statistically) knew would cause harm.  Indeed, 
the State of Indiana prosecuted Ford for reckless homicide, not for murder; and yet 
murder (which under Indiana law encompasses knowingly causing a death) would 
have been an appropriate charge if indeed the law treats statistical knowledge the 
same as individualized knowledge.177 
 
C. Can retributivists tolerate the predicted mistaken punishment of the 
innocent? 
Another highly instructive illustration of the confusions created by the 
statistical knowledge problem is an important debate about the justification of 
punishment.  Consequentialist critics of retributivism charge that retributivists are 
inconsistent or hypocritical: according to the critics, retributivists cannot endorse as 
justifiable any humanly realizable punishment system, because the architects of any 
real-world system will know to a statistical certainty that the system will result in the 
mistaken punishment of some number of innocent defendants.  This criticism fails,  
however, due to an improper conflation of statistical with individualized knowledge. 
The basic debate has proceeded as follows.  First, retributivists assert that 
consequentialist accounts of punishment (like consequentialist accounts generally) 
improperly permit social welfare to trump or override individual rights and 
principles of desert.  A classic example of this problem, in the view of retributivists, 
is that consequentialists are committed to supporting the intentional punishment of 
identified innocents if this would serve a greater good—for example, they would 
support the lynching of an innocent if this were necessary in order to appease a mob 
and prevent much greater violence.  Second, and in response, consequentialists 
suggest that the retributivists are not on such high moral ground, because every real-
world and every practicable system of criminal justice will, unfortunately, make at 
least a few mistakes in attempting to identify the guilty.   Retributivists are then 
faced with a dilemma: either they purport to justify such systems of punishment, 
even though we know for certain in advance that the result will be the mistaken 
punishment of the innocent; or they take the route of moral purity and irrelevance, 
and concede that no real-world system of justice is morally justifiable.  If they 
choose the first horn, however, then they seem to be guilty of a fundamental 
                                                                                                                               
impact at low speeds and endangered the safety and lives of the occupants. Such 
conduct constitutes corporate malice. 
Id. at 91-92 (underlying added).  However, this excerpt is also susceptible to the more radical 
interpretation that any use of cost-benefit analysis in designing products is unjustifiable and 
warrants punitive damages.  This view should be rejected, for reasons that I have explained. 
177 Indiana homicide law applicable to the 1978 crash defined murder as including knowingly 
causing death.  Ind. Crim. Code 35-42-1-1.  (The relevant provision was enacted in 1976). 
 According to Gary Schwartz, the jury’s acquittal of Ford for the reckless homicide 
charge was due in part to the fact that the reckless homicide statute was only enacted in 1977, 
while Ford had manufactured the Pinto involved in the accident in 1973; thus, the theory of 
defect had to depend on Ford’s failure to repair or warn of the defect, not on Ford’s initial 
defective design.  Schwartz, supra note 11=, 43 Rutg. L. Rev. at 1017. 
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inconsistency.  On the one hand, they condemn consequentialists for sometimes 
permitting the greater good to justify the intentional punishment of the innocent.  
But on the other hand, in claiming to be able to legitimate a criminal justice system, 
they must rely on the very argument they condemn, for they rely on the overriding 
importance of a greater good (protecting the rights of victims or giving offenders 
their just deserts) in order to justify a lesser evil, the use of a punishment system that 
we know will inevitably punish a small number of innocents.178 
The analysis above helps to explain why this criticism of retributivism is too 
facile: it implicitly rests on an unfounded conflation of individual knowledge and 
statistical knowledge. 
 Suppose a judge decides, in an individual case, to punish a defendant he 
knows is factually innocent.  This is both immoral and illegal, even if the judge 
reasonably believes that such punishment will provide substantial social benefits.179  
Such an action is indeed analogous to a judge deciding, in order to prevent mob 
violence, to free a known innocent so that private citizens can lynch him.  But when 
a judge decides to participate in a system that he knows will result in some innocents 
being convicted (because he applies a reasonable doubt standard under which a very 
small number of innocent persons inevitably will still be convicted180), his action is 
neither illegal nor immoral.  And the difference is based on the distinction between 
individualized and statistical knowledge.181 
                                                 
178 See Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just Punishment,” 96 
Nw. U. L. Rev. =, 899-90= (2002).   
 Some try to rebut the criticism of retributivism by invoking the doctrine of double 
effect, distinguishing purpose (in the individual case) from knowledge (in a large number of 
cases).  If an actor supports the lynching of an innocent in order to appease a mob, he intends 
to punish the innocent victim; but if a judge participates in a system that predictably results 
in mistaken convictions of the innocent, at worst he knowingly punishes the innocent but 
does not intend to do so.  =; Moore, Placing Blame =, response to Dolinko?; Duff, recent 
draft =.  But this move fails.  Even if in an individual case the judge knowingly but not 
purposely punishes an innocent, his action is almost impossible to justify.  And in this type 
of example, it is perfectly plausible to conclude that the judge acts with individualized 
knowledge, not with purpose.  Thus, suppose that a judge finds a particular defendant guilty 
in order to protect the public, despite knowledge that that defendant is almost certainly 
innocent.  If the defendant’s innocence or guilt played no part in the judge’s practical 
reasoning, it is more accurate to characterize the judge as knowingly but not purposely 
punishing an innocent. 
179 Suppose the judge had earlier presided over another trial involving this defendant in 
which he was acquitted despite overwhelming evidence of guilt; and suppose the judge 
reasonably believes that the defendant is a continuing serious threat to public safety. 
180 Many alternative systems are conceivable in which error might be almost entirely 
eliminated.  Suppose conviction requires proof “beyond any doubt whatsoever,” and requires 
two full trials before different juries. 
181 The relevant distinction is not between “known” and “unknown” victims.  See Dolinko, =, 
at 1633; Lempert =.  Rather, it is between individualized knowledge in a single trial that the 
defendant is innocent, and statistical knowledge that across a large number of cases, some 
defendants are innocent.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent 
Punishment of the Innocent, 2 Law & Phil. 233, 245 (1983) (critiquing the equation of 
“knowingly risking punishment of the innocent with knowingly punishing the innocent”).  
See the discussion of identifiability, supra at =. 
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 In virtually182 no case is it morally justifiable to impose criminal punishment 
on an individual criminal defendant who the legal authorities know is innocent of the 
offense.183  But, for the reasons we have canvassed above, it hardly follows that it is 
morally (or legally) impermissible for a judge to convict a defendant despite 
awareness of a genuine (but very small) statistical chance that he is innocent.  
Indeed, a judge who regularly presides over large numbers of criminal cases 
probably knows to a statistical certainty that he has imposed punishment on some 
innocent defendants.  Rather, if it is morally and legally permissible to apply a 
reasonable doubt standard in a single case, given the relative error costs and the 
substantial social benefit of securing convictions of those who are guilty, then, under 
the principle of ICAA, it is also permissible to apply that standard in an indefinitely 
large number of cases.  (And none of the exceptions to, or qualifications of, ICAA 
apply in this context.) 
 Now consider a scenario in which the actor with statistical knowledge is 
somewhat culpable.  Suppose a judge participates in a system that, she realizes, 
creates an excessive, unjustifiable risk of convicting the innocent. (For example, she 
employs a jury instruction that is insufficiently stringent, one that she knows will 
often produce convictions even when the jury believes there is as much as  a 10% 
risk that the defendant is innocent.)  Although her participation in this system is 
wrongful (morally and legally), it is still less wrongful than upholding a conviction 
of an individual defendant who she knows is very likely innocent. 
 I conclude with two final observations about the problem of punishment of 
the innocent.  First, even when legal actors possess neither purpose to punish an 
innocent person as such184 nor individualized knowledge that the person being 
punished is innocent, their statistical knowledge that innocents are being punished is 
still morally and legally very significant, for it is highly relevant to their ongoing 
duty to minimize this unfortunate effect.  A system that leads to this result demands 
a very compelling justification, and actors within the system have a stringent duty to 
minimize the risk of innocents being punished. 
 Indeed, a punishment system itself can be illegitimate when it permits too 
many innocent individuals to be convicted.  Any punishment system in which 10% 
of those convicted were innocent simply creates too great a risk of error to be 
justifiable.  And perhaps any capital punishment system that creates even a tiny risk 
                                                 
182 I include this qualification to recognize the possibility that where the national security is 
genuinely at stake, knowing or even purposeful punishment of an innocent might be 
warranted.  But it is difficult to imagine an actual, credible example—even (or, given our 
experience, especially) after 9/11. 
183  I do not address whether legal innocence should be treated differently in this respect from 
factual innocence. 
184 The more accurate and honest way to conceptualize the “predictable punishment of the 
innocent” problem is as posing the question whether statistical knowledge should be treated in 
this context like individualized knowledge, and not as posing the question whether knowledge 
should be treated like purpose.  For the special wrongness of punishing a known innocent 
individual remains even if the actor does not intend to be punishing an innocent person as 
such, i.e., even if the actor (a) intends to punish X, knowing that X is innocent, but (b) does 
not have as his purpose, or aim, or one of his reasons, that his acts punish an innocent person. 
Suppose the judge simply wants to ensure that X is punished, to avoid the adverse publicity 
from setting X free in light of the public’s strong but mistaken belief in X’s guilt; yet the 
judge hopes that X might actually be guilty, and certainly would prefer that X were not 
innocent and wishes he could acquit X and persuade the public of X’s innocence.  The judge’s 
knowledge that he is punishing an innocent is still highly culpable. 
Page 74 of 84  Simons, Stat.Knowl Decon 11 3/3/11
   
of convicting the innocent is unjustifiable, given the irrevocability and seriousness 
of the death penalty. 
 In a recent, provocative article arguing that the death penalty is morally 
obligatory if it deters a significant number of private killings, Cass Sunstein and 
Adrian Vermeule explicitly claim that the risk of mistakes does not distinguish the 
death penalty from other social policies that predictably and inevitably cause or 
permit the deaths of innocents.185  Many would reject their claim, believing that the 
statistically certain death of even one innocent due to the state’s death penalty 
system is such a grievous wrong that no consequential benefits can justify it.186  
While I do not agree with Sunstein and Vermeule that legally authorized executions 
are on a moral par with construction projects and other human activities that 
predictably cause the death of innocent life, their insistence that human institutions 
inevitably produce some level of error is a valid point, worth remembering.  And I 
am not convinced that the risk of even an infinitesimal risk of error should condemn 
a capital punishment system that is otherwise justifiable.  On the other hand, there 
certainly is a great deal more we could do right now to reduce significantly the risk 
of erroneous executions in contemporary death penalty systems.187 
 Second, the state should, of course, provide an ex post remedy if a case of 
mistaken punishment of the innocent is discovered.  But it is a separate question 
whether the system that results in such mistakes is unjustifiable, and whether 
individual actors within the system bear moral or legal responsibility for such 
mistakes.  The answer to these questions, I suggest, is “no”—or more precisely, “not 
necessarily.”  We should not simply assume an affirmative answer based on an 
improper conflation of statistical with individualized knowledge. 
 
D. Practical and doctrinal issues 
 I do not focus in this paper on practical and doctrinal issues.  For example, 
significant difficulties of proof arise if legal sanctions depend on the specific mental 
state of an actor, including the precise probability of harm (or of the existence of a 
circumstance) that the actor believes to exist.  Various legal strategies have been 
employed to circumvent these proof problems.   For example, if individualized 
“knowledge” is the minimum mental state required, as it often is in criminal statutes, 
then judges and other legal actors may employ various devices to expand the 
meaning of “knowledge” in order to encompass lower-probability beliefs.188  For 
purposes of this article, I simply assume that we have adequate proof of the 
cognitive mental state in question.  But the proof difficulties can be serious, 
especially because we are considering whether the actor possesses a cognitive 
mental state.  It is often easier to determine what an actor’s purpose in acting is, than 
to determine what he knows about the circumstances of the act or its possible results, 
since his knowledge will often have no direct motivational significance. 
                                                 
185 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  Acts, 
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, = (2006). 
186 Cf. Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, 
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 Stan. L. Rev. Law 751 (2005); Eric Blumenson, =. 
187 See Steiker , id., mentioning inadequacy of trial counsel, =etc. 
188 Consider the doctrine of willful blindness, which essentially treats certain unusually 
culpable instances of reckless belief as satisfying a legal knowledge requirement.  See 
Simons, Retributivism Refined, supra note 139=, at =. 
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Moreover, pragmatic concerns also shape the categories that the law 
employs: it must draw a somewhat arbitrary line between individualized knowledge 
and cognitive recklessness, identifying some particular probability formula (such as 
“practical certainty” or “highly probable” or “more likely than not”) for the 
former.189 
 Although the analysis in the paper will certainly inform the answer to 
specific doctrinal questions, it will often not be dispositive. What counts as 
“individualized” rather than “statistical” knowledge might well depend on whether 
the issue arises in criminal law, tort law, or some other field of law, and indeed on 
whether it arises in one or another particular subcategory of criminal law, or of tort 
law.  For example, whether repeated dangerous acts demonstrate a form of 
“defiance” that justifies punitive damages in tort is a different question than whether 
a repetition of similar acts justifies a recidivist premium in criminal law. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Acting with statistical knowledge is ordinarily less culpable than acting with 
individualized knowledge.  Often, indeed, the first is not culpable at all.  Expanding 
the spatial or temporal scope of an activity or a series of acts ordinarily does not 
increase the level of culpability properly attributable to the actor.  The invariant 
culpability principles, ICAA and ICREA, formalize this idea. 
 We are now in a position to make sense of the various positions for and 
against distinguishing statistical from individualized knowledge that were set forth 
in the introduction, and also to show some of the implications of a more careful 
analysis of these concepts. 
 Consider first the arguments against distinguishing the two types of 
knowledge. 
1.  “Statistical victims are still victims.”  True enough.  The lives of all 
victims are indeed extraordinarily valuable, whether or not we can predict in 
advance the specific lives that will be lost.  But the question before us is how best to 
measure the culpability of an actor who causes harm to victims; and in this context, 
we have reason to condemn more strongly (or at least to find some fault with) those 
actors who possess individualized, rather than statistical, knowledge that they will 
cause harm.190 A primary explanation for this position is the special stringency 
principle (SSP), a deontological principle that treats an actor as highly culpable 
when he knowingly imposes a highly concentrated risk of serious harm on a victim. 
2. “Juries often reject the distinction between statistical and 
individualized knowledge.”  This behavior is a relevant datum.  And indeed, 
rejecting the distinction is sometimes just what juries should do—specifically, when 
the risk of which the actor is statistically aware is extremely unjustifiable.  However, 
often, juries simply make a mistake in rejecting the distinction, though their 
                                                 
189 We would also need to draw a somewhat arbitrary line between cognitive recklessness and 
a lesser degree of cognitive culpability, if cognitive recklessness requires that the actor 
believe he is posing at least some specified threshold degree of risk, e.g. “substantial” or 
“significant” or “nontrivial.”  See note = supra (noting that the Model Penal Code might 
impose such a threshold). 
190 By contrast, when we are considering ex ante what preventive measures government 
should take to prevent the death of innocents, the relative culpability of those who 
immediately cause such deaths might be a minor factor at best.  It may be better to invest 
limited government funds to prevent 500 deaths caused by poor highway design than to 
prevent 20 murders.  See TAN = supra. 
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behavior is understandable in light of cognitive biases, psychological heuristics, and 
a neglect of the invariant culpability principles. 
3. “Ordinary people often find cost-benefit analysis abhorrent.”  Yes, 
they do.  Again, sometimes this is a justifiable reaction, as when the cost-benefit 
analysis is imperfectly done, or when the situation is one in which a deontological 
principle should trump or constrain the cost-benefit calculus (e.g. when SSP 
applies).  But when people simply reject as morally objectionable all trade-offs 
between the advantages and disadvantages of taking precautions against risk, they 
express a moral position that is unrealistic in a world full of low-level risks and, 
more importantly, is untenable. 
4.  “Acting with merely statistical knowledge is sometimes still highly 
culpable.”  This is correct, but only in limited circumstances—especially, when the 
risk is extremely unjustifiable (as in Time Bomb or Atmospheric Poison, but not in 
Atmospheric Cancer Cure). 
 Now consider the arguments in favor of distinguishing the two types of 
knowledge.  With these assertions, I largely agree. 
5.  “Scale should not matter.”  This is an important lesson of the invariant 
culpability principles, ICAA and ICREA.  But we must also remember the ceteris 
paribus conditions that those principles contain.  And we should recall that when a 
person’s individual act of risk-creation is faulty, repetition of that act might elevate 
the actor’s culpability to a higher level. 
6.  “Careful risk/benefit analysis should not inculpate.”  Indeed it should 
not.  This is another implication of the invariant culpability principles. 
7.  “The modern hierarchy of mental states requires a distinction 
between statistical and individualized knowledge.”  True, though this argument 
only takes us so far, because in some respects the modern hierarchy is 
oversimplified.  But in this context, it usually provides the right answer. 
 8.  “Knowingly harming another is distinctively wrongful only when the 
actor’s knowledge is individualized.”  This argument is indeed crucial, but that we 
must distinguish the following two versions of it. 
  (a) “We owe a higher duty to identifiable victims.”  The term 
“identifiable” has  many meanings, but none of them makes this claim persuasive, 
except insofar as the claim is a crude version of the following assertion. 
  (b) “We owe a special duty not to impose highly concentrated 
risks of harm on a single person.”  Just so.  And SSP is my attempt to formalize 
this idea.  However, we should distinguish between a very high risk of serious 
physical harm to a person, and a very high risk that a legally relevant fact or 
circumstance exists—for example, the risk that an actor is in possession of stolen 
property or that the actor has sold alcohol to an underage person.  It is doubtful that 
SSP applies in the latter context. 
 
 The analysis in the article has also suggested the following important 
conclusions. 
 When a faulty actor repeats his unjustifiable acts or expands his activity, that 
repetition sometimes reveals the culpability of defiance of moral and legal 
norms.  The invariant culpability principles, properly applied, recognize this 
special type of culpability.  Accordingly, a retributivist can indeed support a 
punishment premium for recidivists. 
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 The legal criterion endorsed by the Restatement Third of Torts for 
distinguishing individualized from statistical knowledge is essentially sound, at 
least in cases where the knowledge concerns the causation of serious physical 
injury or death: individualized knowledge should normally embrace knowledge 
to a high likelihood that “the conduct will bring about harm to a particular 
victim, or to someone within a small class of potential victims within a localized 
area.”191  But the criterion must be qualified to account for unusual cases such as 
Programmed Rifle or Atmospheric Poison.  In such cases, where the actor 
possesses merely statistical knowledge but his conduct is extremely 
unjustifiable, the actor’s culpability is comparable to that of an actor with 
individualized knowledge. 
 A legal system can be legitimate even though legal actors within the system 
know that it will, as a statistical matter, punish the innocent.  Retributivists are 
not, despite the claims of critics, vulnerable to the objection of hypocrisy or 
inconsistency for defending the legitimacy of an imperfect criminal justice 
system while condemning legal actors who punish an individual they know to be 
innocent.  Individualized knowledge of the latter sort is much more culpable, 
and in need of a far more compelling justification, than statistical knowledge 
that the system will inevitable permit some innocent defendants to be mistakenly 
punished. 
 
We have taken an extended journey through a varied “culpability” landscape 
populated with a motley cast of characters.  The excursion did not fully resolve all 
the questions it explored.  For example, I offered only a preliminary answer to the 
question why one might owe an especially stringent duty not to impose a 
concentrated risk of serious harm on an individual.  Nevertheless, the article does 
provide a novel analytic structure, one that should assist future voyagers who wish 
to investigate this important, yet underexplored, piece of the terrain—the conundrum 
of statistical knowledge. 
                                                 
191 Note 139= supra. 
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VI. Appendix: formulas, principles, paradigms, variations 
 
For the convenience of the reader, this appendix includes the formulas and principles 
discussed in the text, with some refinements.  It also includes a series of paradigm 
individual knowledge scenarios, together with some variations. 
 
Abbreviations: 
IK = individualized knowledge 
SK = statistical knowledge 
 
A. Paradigm case of IK 
 
Rolling Boulder 1: 
 Dee pushes a large boulder down the hill, for reason X, “knowing” 
(that is, believing to a probability exceeding T) that the boulder will strike 
and kill V. 
 
In this paradigm case of IK, Dee’s conduct is presumptively highly culpable, 
warranting a severe legal sanction; and only an unusually compelling justification 
will render her conduct permissible.  One explanation for these moral and legal 
implications is SSP (see below). 
Implicit in the example, and in the variations that follow, is a definition of 
“knowledge.”  The key part of the definition for our purposes is this: “knowing” that 
a result (such as V’s death) will occur requires that D must believe that the result will 
occur with a high probability, a probability exceeding some threshold T.  What is the 
magnitude of T?  In the law, T is usually understood as being greater than 50%, and 
often significantly greater.  For example, in defining “knowledge,” the Model Penal 
Code requires “practical certainty” as to a result, or “high probability” as to a 
circumstance.192 
The example leaves open whether reason X helps justify the conduct or 
instead counts against justifying it.  Thus, X could be a strong justification, e.g. Dee 
directs the boulder down the hill in order to plug a hole in a dike and thereby save 
1000 people; or a strong anti-justification, e.g. in order to frighten Z at the bottom of 
the hill; or more neutral, e.g. for an idiosyncratic religious reason.  The example also 
assumes that Dee does not push the boulder for the purpose of killing V. 
 
 
B. Formulas and principles 
 
 1. ICAA = Invariant Culpability when Acts are Aggregated: 
 
 Suppose: (1) a person engages in a course of conduct containing 
multiple acts each of which, considered individually, is identical in all 
respects relevant to legal culpability, including: 
the actor’s intentions, beliefs, and motives;  
the socially recognized benefits and risks of harm that the act 
entails; and  
the manner in which the benefits, and risks of harm, from the act are 
distributed among the actor, potential victims, and others;  
                                                 
192 =cites.  See also Restatement Third of Torts, §1, comment c, requiring “substantial 
certainty” and indicating that this is not satisfied by “more probable than not.” 
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Then: (2) we should attribute to that actor the same degree of 
culpability for the whole course of conduct as the degree of culpability that 
we properly attribute to him for any individual act. 
 
 
 2. ICREA = Invariant Culpability when Risk-Exposures are 
 Aggregated:193 
 
Suppose: (1) a person engages in a single act that exposes multiple 
persons to a risk of harm, such that each risk-exposure is identical in all 
respects relevant to legal culpability, including: 
the actor’s intentions, beliefs, and motives;  
the socially recognized benefits and risks of harm that the act 
entails; and  
the manner in which the benefits, and risks of harm, from the act are 
distributed among the actor, potential victims, and others;  
Then: (2) we should attribute to that actor the same degree of 
culpability for the whole set of risk-exposures as the degree of culpability 
that we properly attribute to him for any individual risk-exposure. 
 
 
 3. SSP = Special stringency principle 
 
If D knows that by his conduct he will impose a highly concentrated risk of 
serious harm on a single victim, then D has an especially stringent duty not to impose 
that risk, and is especially culpable if he does impose the risk.  Consider this more 
precise, albeit still oversimplified, 194 formulation: 
 
Action A creates an expected socially recognized benefit B and causes an 
expected socially recognized harm H. 
 
B = MB x PB (where MB is the magnitude of the social benefit and PB is the 
probability that the act will secure that benefit) 
 
H = MH x PH (where MH is the magnitude of the social harm and PH is the 
probability that the act will cause that harm) 
 
 
SSP recognizes an “especially stringent” duty in this sense: 
 
Even if a ratio n of B: H would (just barely) suffice to justify the conduct in 
the range of cases where PH to an individual is relatively small, that ratio is 
insufficient to justify the conduct where PH to an individual is highly 
concentrated, i.e., where PH > C and C is, say, 70%. 
 
For an illustration, recall the Alfa/Benna example: even if Benna is justified in 
knowingly creating a 20% risk of killing one pedestrian in order to save the life of 
                                                 
193 Differences from ICAA are italicized. 
194 A complete analysis should, among others things, consider all the socially relevant benefits 
and harms, not just one benefit and one harm. 
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one passenger, it does not follow that Alfa is justified in knowingly creating close to 
a 100% risk of killing one pedestrian in order to save the lives of five passengers.195 
 What counts as a “highly concentrated” risk C triggering the rule?  This 
could be pegged to T, the probability of risk perceived by the actor that counts as IK.  
But we might also understand SSP as a more continuous function, one not triggered 
by any particular threshold C or T.196 
 
  
C. Variations on paradigm case of IK 
 
 1.  Paradigm case of IK 
 
Rolling Boulder 1: 
 Dee pushes a large boulder down the hill, for reason X, knowing that 
the boulder will strike and kill V. 
 
 
2.  Variation: Consecutive acts endanger, and will likely kill, a single person 
 
Rolling Boulder 2: 
Dee pushes six smaller boulders down the hill, one after the other, 
for reason X,197 knowing that each boulder endangers V.  This time, she 
knows that each boulder poses a smaller risk (say, 20%) of killing V.  
However, the aggregate risk of death to V is still close to 100%. 
  
Analysis: Dee knowingly imposes a highly concentrated risk on V, albeit 
through a series of acts.  SSP applies.  Her culpability is roughly comparable to that 
of Dee in Rolling Boulder 1.198 
 
 
3.  Variation: Consecutive acts endanger six people, and will likely kill one 
of them 
 
Rolling Boulder 3: 
Dee pushes six smaller boulders down the hill, one after the other, 
for reason X, knowing that each boulder endangers a different person.199  As 
                                                 
195 Text at note = supra.  Although the formulation in the text assumes a simple ratio function 
n =  (B/H), nothing turns on this.  The function could be more complex, with n replaced by 
some new function f(MB, PB, MH, PH).  Whatever the function, the critical feature of SSP is 
that barely satisfying the new function in the range of cases where PH is small, i.e. where PH is 
much less than C, will be insufficient to justify the conduct in the range of cases where PH  > 
C. 
196= [perhaps give further details about how this could work without a sudden threshold jump 
in special stringency]. 
197 Suppose, for example, that successfully plugging the dike requires six boulders rather than 
one, or that frightening Z can be accomplished equally well either by rolling six smaller 
boulders or by rolling one large one. 
198 See “repeat-Benna,” a/k/a Benna*, supra note 83=. 
   These examples, as well as others in the appendix, assume for simplicity that the 
actor believes there is a 100% (or close to 100%) probability that the relevant harm would 
occur, either to an individual victim (by means of one act or many acts), or to one victim or 
another.  But we can easily change the examples to ensure that they instantiate a requisite 
probability of 90%, or 75%, or whatever threshold T we want to employ for IK. 
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in Rolling Boulder 2, each act poses a small risk (say, 20%) of killing a 
victim.  The aggregate risk that at least one of the six different people will 
die is still close to 100%. 
 
 Analysis: SSP would not normally apply where the risk to each victim is this 
small.  And it should not apply just because the aggregate risk that at least one of a 
group of victims will die is close to 100%.  After all, we could extend this variation 
to a case where D endangers 1,000 different victims, imposing a very small risk on 
each but an aggregate risk close to 100%; in such a case, clearly SSP should not 
apply.  In the end, depending on X, Dee’s conduct may or may not be justifiable; 
however, the features of the act identified in this variation are not sufficient by 
themselves to characterize Dee as acting with IK such that IK and SSP trigger the 
demand for an unusually strong justification. 
 
 
4.  Variation: One act, which will kill either A or B 
 
Rolling Boulder 4: 
 Dee pushes a large boulder down the hill, for reason X.  She also 
knows the following.  Halfway down the hill, the path splits in two.  The 
boulder will either travel down the left fork directly towards A or down the 
right fork directly towards B.  It will almost certainly kill whoever is in its 
path.  The probability of veering in either direction is 50%.  Thus, A and B 
each has a 50% chance of being struck and killed. 
 
 
5.  Variation: One act, which will kill one of six persons 
 
Rolling Boulder 5: 
 Dee pushes a large boulder down the hill, for reason X.  She also 
knows the following. Halfway down the hill, the path splits into six forks.  
The boulder will either travel down the first fork directly towards A, or down 
the second fork directly towards B, or … [and so on up to the sixth fork and 
sixth potential victim F.]  The boulder will almost certainly kill whoever is in 
its path.  The probability of its veering in each of the six directions is the 
same, i.e., 1/6 or 16.7%.  Thus, A, B, C, D, E and F each has a 16.7% chance 
of being struck and killed. 
 
 Analysis of Rolling Boulder 4 and 5: These are difficult cases to classify. 
From the victim’s point of view, the risk is not highly concentrated, 
especially in Rolling Boulder 5, where the risk of death is only 16.7%.  This would 
suggest that the SSP should not apply.  But from the point of view of the actor, Dee, 
there is certainty that he will cause harm to a single victim, though he cannot tell in 
advance which person that will be.  Is this enough to warrant the conclusion that he 
acted with IK, that he has knowingly killed whichever unlucky victim he kills? 
I think not.  These do not seem to be genuine examples of IK or of SSP 
applying.  The impulse to aggregate these risks is understandable, especially if X is 
strongly unjustifiable.  But how do we distinguish these cases from a more extreme 
case in which Dee’s acts endanger 5,000 “downhill” possible victims, imposing a 
1/5,000 risk of death on each?  And how is this more extreme case distinguishable 
                                                                                                                               
199 Assume in this and all the hypotheticals that the victim cannot escape the boulder.  In this 
variation, perhaps different children will wander in the path, or perhaps Dee chooses six 
different boulder paths knowing that immobilized victims are at risk on each path. 
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from the situations of tunnel builders Agatha or Bertha?  Once Agatha or Bertha 
“gets the ball (or boulder) rolling” and starts the huge tunnel project, she can 
confidently predict that physical harm to one or more workers will be a downhill side 
effect of her project. 
  
 
D. IK with respect to a circumstance rather than a result 
 
 The Boulder example and variations all involved IK of a likely result of the 
actor’s conduct.  We should also analyze cases where the actor has IK of the likely 
existence of a circumstance that renders his conduct illegal.  Here, (1) SSP is much 
less likely to apply, but (2) other rationales for treating IK differently from SK do 
sometimes apply. 
Consider three cases involving the crime of knowing receipt of stolen 
property, in which a pawn shop owner is found in possession of a stolen item.   
 
Pawn Shop Owners P1, P2, and P3: 
Owner P1 receives and offers for sale a particular piece of jewelry 
that he knows is stolen. 
P2 adopts a policy for screening goods received by his pawn shop 
that he knows will result in 10% of the goods being stolen.  (He requires any 
form of identification from persons selling goods to him.)  P2 receives and 
offers for sale a particular piece of jewelry, not realizing it is stolen. 
P3 adopts a more effective screening policy that he knows will result 
in only 1% of goods being stolen. (He requires a photo identification from 
persons selling goods to him and also sends a list of all newly received 
property to local police so that they can check it against their list of recently 
stolen property.)  P3 receives and offers for sale a particular piece of jewelry, 
not realizing it is stolen. 
Suppose we conclude that P2’s policy is negligent, while P3’s is 
reasonable. 
 
Analysis: P1 clearly acts with IK.  But P2 and P3 arguably do not.  Rather, 
these are arguably SK cases. 
In all three cases, the special concerns about not imposing highly 
concentrated risks on individual victims (SSP) do not seem to apply.  To be sure, in 
all three, the actual jewelry owner is directly harmed when a pawn shop improperly 
takes possession of his property.  But it is doubtful that an especially stringent 
deontological constraint applies when one creates, say, a 70% risk of improperly 
depriving a victim of her property but not when one creates a 30% or 10% risk. 
However, the conclusion that SSP does not apply does not answer the further 
question: should we treat P2 (or even P3) as IK for other reasons?  With both results 
and circumstances, there are reasons other than SSP for giving special legal 
significance to IK cases.  Recall the aggravated culpability and “greater need for 
justification” rationales for the IK category.  Do these apply to P2?  The answer is 
unclear.200 
                                                 
200 Here are some considerations. 
1. It certainly is the case that as the probability of harm (either of a harmful result or 
of a harmful circumstance) that the actor subjectively perceives increases, we have more 
reason to treat the actor as displaying aggravated culpability and to demand a more 
compelling justification before his action will be deemed lawful.  Thus, interpreting a 
statutory “knowledge” requirement as punishing only P1 in the above example is defensible. 
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 Now consider another set of examples that test my argument that SSP does 
not apply when the concentration of risk pertains to a circumstance rather than a 
result.  The following is an especially sympathetic “circumstance” case for applying 
SSP.  The example is highly stylized in order to present a helpful contrast with the 
previous example. 
 
Actors S1, S2, and S3: sexual intercourse with a nonconsenting victim: 
Actor S1 knows that his sexual partner V1 is not consenting,201 but 
he nevertheless proceeds to have sexual intercourse with her. 
S2 adopts a policy for determining whether his sexual partner 
consents that he knows will result in a 10% chance that his partner does not 
consent.  (The “policy” is: he simply initiates and proceeds with the act of 
intercourse, making no effort to determine whether his partner consents; if 
she is passive or silent, he continues.)  S2 has intercourse with V2, not 
realizing that she does not consent. 
S3 adopts a more effective screening policy that he knows will result 
in a 1% chance that his partner does not consent.  (The “policy” is: he 
carefully considers his partner’s facial expression and body language and if 
satisfied that she is genuinely willing, he proceeds with the act of intercourse; 
he does not specifically ask whether she consents.)  S3 has intercourse with 
V3, not realizing that she does not consent. 
Suppose we conclude that S2’s policy is negligent, while S3’s is 
reasonable.202 
 
Analysis: Clearly S1 acts with IK.  But again, S2 and S3 probably do not.  
Rather, they are SK cases.  Of course, S2 can be punished if we expand the required 
culpability for sexual assault from IK to recklessness or to negligence. 
In this example, however, a stronger argument exists that the special 
concerns about not concentrating risks on individual victims (SSP) does apply.  For 
S1 has decided to impose on V1 a very high risk of infringing sexual autonomy, and 
this is arguably not just proportionately worse, but disproportionately worse, than S2 
imposing a smaller risk of infringing the autonomy of V2, or S3 imposing an even 
smaller risk of that sort on V3.  The culpability of S1 is arguably disproportionately 
greater than the culpability of S2, in much the same way that the culpability of Alfa is 
disproportionately greater than the culpability of Benna in the earlier example. 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
2.  On the other hand, some context-specific features of a particular legal norm might 
suggest a broader interpretation of IK.  In the receiving stolen property context, for example, 
it is increasingly more burdensome for a business owner to avoid causing or creating a risk of 
the criminal harm, as we move from P1 (the burden of not acquiring a particular item known 
to be stolen), to P2 (the burden of not creating a small risk that she is in possession of stolen 
property), to P3 (the burden of avoiding a very small risk). And perhaps the difference in 
burden is quite dramatic when we move from avoiding a small to avoiding a very small risk; 
so it makes some sense to impose legal liability under the “IK” rubric for P2 but not for P3. 
3. And yet, on the third hand, it is much simpler for legal actors to employ a 
relatively consistent conception of IK across contexts; this factor suggests that we should 
restrict “IK” to P1 and, if we want to sanction P2, characterize P2 as a case of recklessness, 
not IK. 
201 Assume nonconsent means subjective unwillingness, whether or not expressed to the other. 
202 If this conclusion is doubtful with respect to S3 on these facts, we can sufficiently lower 
the “error rate” for S3 and alter his “strategy” in order to make the conclusion true. 
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E. Russian Roulette cases 
 
 These cases are especially vivid.  They involve clearly unjustifiable conduct, 
so they lack the useful generality of the Rolling Boulder paradigm case and 
variations.  But in many respects they are parallel to those cases.  Assume that the 
actor in these examples is aware of the risks (a more plausible assumption here than 
in many other scenarios), and intends to expose the victim to risk, but does not intend 
to kill the victim. 
 
Russian Roulette 1 (Malone) (multiple shots, single potential victim):  
 Malone places one bullet in a five-chamber revolver, spins the 
cylinder, and fires at the victim three times, causing death with the third 
shot.203  He knows that the cumulative risk of death is 60%, while the risk 
created by each separate shot is less. 
 
Analysis: Malone’s conduct is akin to Dee rolling six boulders towards V in 
Rolling Boulder 2.  He imposed a 20% chance of death with the first shot, a 25% 
chance with the second, and a 33.3% chance with the third, and a cumulative risk of 
60%.  If IK requires a 60% probability of death, then Malone has IK; if it requires 
more, then he does not.204 
 
Russian Roulette 2 (Stallone) (multiple shots, multiple potential victims): 
 Stallone places one bullet in a five-chamber revolver, spins the 
cylinder, and fires the gun once at A, then once at B, then once at C, causing 
C’s death with the third shot. He knows that the cumulative risk that he will 
cause death either to A, to B, or to C is 60%, while the risk of death he has 
created to each distinct victim by each separate shot is less. 
 
Analysis: We cannot fairly characterize Stallone as having killed C with IK, 
just as we cannot characterize the actor in Rolling Boulder 3 as having killed the 
victim with IK. 
Once again, Stallone can still be convicted of murder if the requisite 
culpability for murder is not restricted to IK and purpose to kill, but also embraces 
depraved heart.  If the culpability were restricted, it would have the unfortunate effect 
that an actor could deliberately avoid murder liability by restructuring his method of 
killing: instead of shooting a random person in the head, terrorist Stallone* could 
simply spin the cylinder containing one bullet and fire five times to the head of five 
different people; instead of exploding a bomb in a workplace where he knows who 
will die, he could explode it in a busy public square where he does not know; and so 
forth.205 
                                                 
203 Adapted from Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1946). 
204 Of course, an alternative ground for murder liability is the ground that the court in Malone 
endorsed: depraved heart murder, which does not require IK. 
205 Leo Katz has carefully explored the issue of the amenability of deontological constraints to 
certain forms of manipulation.  See Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud 
and Kindred Puzzles of the Law (1996); Katz, Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in 
Legal Doctrine, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 863, 879-880 (2003) (comparing two characters analogous 
to my Maxwell and Ned). 
